The meeting was convened at SOAS by Ayan Mahamoud MBE, head of the Somaliland Mission to the UK, and was chaired by Edward Paice, ARI’s director.

The post Decolonisation in Somaliland in July 1960 in historical perspective – Prof Ahmed I Samatar appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001 after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In 2015, he failed to push through a draft law enabling him to extend his rule to a third term due to widespread opposition. Instead the St Sylvestre Accord, a political compromise brokered by the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO) bishops, allowed him to stay in power one year beyond the end of his legal term on 19 December 2016. This was conditional on holding free and fair elections by the end of 2017 at the latest, and that Kabila abide by the constitution and step down following the elections.

Budget and logistical constraints were used as a reason to avoid organising elections, and Kabila declared he would stay until December 2018 to ensure voter registration was completed. As a result, the country was plunged into a new political crisis. Between January 2015 and December 2017, violence intensified as mass anti-government protests demanded Kabila’s resignation. The security forces responded harshly, and violent repression of political demonstrations continues.

On 5 November 2017, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) published an electoral calendar suggesting that the long overdue presidential, legislative and provincial polls would take place on 23 December 2018. The announcement was welcomed by the international community as a significant step towards achieving a first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in DRC. However, Kabila will use various strategies to stay in power.

1. No united internal threat

Political opposition to Kabila is extremely weak and deeply divided. The assets of key opposition activists have been frozen and influential leaders remain either in prison or in exile. Kabila has successfully quashed his three major challengers. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), lays claim to being the most popular political party. Its leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, finished second in the controversial 2011 election, securing 32% of the vote to Kabila’s 49%. But when he died in February 2017 he was succeeded by his son, Felix, who displays neither the charisma nor the experience to challenge Kabila and is referred to as a “lion cub with no teeth”. In a recent poll Moïse Katumbi was named as the most popular opposition figure. But the former governor of Katanga province remains in exile, in effect excluded from running and facing an investigation into several alleged “crimes” including holding Italian nationality.

Finally, the Catholic Church has been disempowered It has always played a significant role in mediating and influencing political outcomes and peace agreements in the DRC and, during the most recent crisis, looked likely to play a leading part in efforts to oust Kabila. However, the response of police and security forces to mass demonstrations including church followers has been so severe that the Church has been discouraged from openly backing the opposition movement. Due to its popularity and status, the Church could instigate action that would trigger violence on a much larger scale, possibly with the potential to escalate to a crisis akin to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, Kabila knows that the leadership is decentralised, not cohesive and reluctant to apply further pressure. The biggest threat to him from this quarter, mainly in Kinshasa, remains manageable.

The alliance of political parties that has backed Kabila is also deeply divided. Each is only loyal to him because their members gain the rewards of being part of his government. The most influential individuals are waiting for the president to nominate his successor. He is unlikely to do so, and will hold off announcing his intention to run for a third term as long as possible, ensuring there is no time for a serious challenge to develop within his own camp.

     2. Continuing conflict

The FARDC – the military – is no threat to Kabila as it is run as a private and personal security operation, is extremely weak and corrupt, and has badly trained and poorly paid personnel. Kabila has maintained control through his most trusted and loyal officers, who are rewarded with prestigious and lucrative positions to manage local threats in the regions. The FARDC has been totally dysfunctional as a national force since it was formed at the end of the Second Congo War, in July 2003, through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in South Africa. This “brought together” the national armed forces and several rebel groups, including the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma, the Ugandan-backed MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba and RCD-Kinsangani, and various Mai-Mai ethno-nationalist militias.

The presence of what remains the world’s largest – and most expensive – international peacebuilding/ peacekeeping intervention, the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), is also no hindrance to Kabila. The mission is regarded as being ineffective and inefficient by most observers. There is even a possibility that Kabila could deliberately push Western powers to back a new military offensive from the east – supported by Uganda, Angola and Rwanda – to forcibly remove him from power. In the event of such a war, MONUSCO would act as a peacemaker rather than peacekeeper and, with the support of the UN Forces Integration Brigade (UNFIB), would actively endeavour to limit the extent of any incursions. This would inevitably lead to a political dialogue to ensure a “peaceful” transition (and provide guarantees to Western and multinational business interests through negotiations). In DRC, peace agreements and accords tend to be stronger than the constitutional law.

A major military incursion would enable Kabila to declare that the country was too unstable to organise free, fair and credible elections. He has used similar tactics regionally, allowing and actively maintaining conflict across the DRC, especially in Tanganyika, Kasai and Kivu. More than 13 million people are already in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, and about 4.5 million are internally displaced. In the northeast, more than 50,000 families have recently fled to Uganda, thousands remain trapped in the Lwenzoli forest, and over 650,000 refugees have fled from Tanganyika province to Tanzania. There are around 120 armed groups in the region, attacks are ongoing especially in South Kivu, and people continue to flee, in fear for their lives. The electoral law stipulates that if a quarter of the country’s landmass is affected by instability, national elections can be postponed

3. Technical difficulties

In February 2018, the Electoral Commission (CENI) introduced new electronic voting technology imported from South Korea. The system was described as being efficient, cost-reducing and effective at limiting electoral fraud, but it failed during a demonstration in front of a parliamentary commission and has, following further controversy, been rejected by both civil society and opposition groups. There have been allegations regarding the relationship between the CENI and a bank linked to the president’s family. Kabila and the CENI will argue that the election cannot go ahead without the new voting machines. Similarly, while voter registration in DRC was completed in February 2018, there are still more than 10 million Congolese in the diaspora who have not been able to register. Arranging for the diaspora to register is another potential pretext for delay.

4. Friends and neighbours

Leaders in DRC tend to be regionally “manufactured”. Four of Kabila’s major regional allies have left the political scene in just two years: the former presidents of Angola, Tanzania, South Africa and Zimbabwe. During their presidencies, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) became significantly involved in DRC, expanding its influence following the defeat of the M23 rebels by the UNFIB, a force led by Tanzania and South Africa. José Eduardo dos Santos, Jacob Zuma and Robert Mugabe had financial interests in DRC; Jakaya Kikwete’s main motivation was a determination to prevent any increase in Rwandan influence in eastern DRC. With support from SADC member states, Kabila was able to isolate both Rwanda and Uganda – both hostile to him for not resolving the persistent conflicts in eastern DRC – and deter them from interfering militarily.

New SADC leaders have different priorities: Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa) and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe) have elections in their own countries and are keen to demonstrate their democratic credentials. Kabila’s main political opponent, Moïse Katumbi, has been allowed to hold rallies in South Africa. The focus for the president of Tanzania, John Magufuli, is very different to that of his predecessor, Kikwete: he is more concerned with internal priorities and regional economic development. On the face of it, the only good news for Kabila among the changing faces within SADC is that Ian Khama, who had clearly demanded that Kabila allow a democratic process in DRC and was a vocal and influential figure in SADC, has been succeeded as president of Botswana by the inexperienced Mokgweetsi Masisi. Kabila knows that other regional leaders have extended their rule beyond the legal limit and SADC’s ongoing commitment to UNFIB is a foil to threats from DRC’s neighbours in the east who would prefer to see him removed from power.

5. Further violation of the constitution

Kabila is not concerned about accusations of violating the constitution because it is already desecrated. He heads illegitimate institutions and a corruptible leadership system based on political patronage. Technically, Kabila is not the only one who has overstayed in power. Like Kabila, members of the lower parliament chamber were elected in 2011; members of the upper parliamentary chamber, the Senate, and the provincial parliament were elected in 2006. None have ever alluded to their illegitimate status, still less resigned.

In such a climate of illegitimacy, Kabila will use the “Burundi system”, by which he argues that “legally” his second mandate was his first and therefore he can stand in the next elections. Kabila may try to prepare national and international opinion for this gambit by arguing that the constitutional revision in 2011 violated some aspects of Article 71, which modified and, in effect, interrupted his presidential term.

6. Playing off international interests

DRC has always been of global “strategic” interest due to its size, location and vast mineral wealth. With such significance, Kabila is acutely aware that no leader can survive unless they satisfy Western governments and multinational and Chinese commercial interests. Kabila has successfully managed a brokerage strategy to date, and accumulated huge wealth as a result. While he is currently regarded by many of them as a liability, multinationals do not as yet have any alternative guarantor of their interests in DRC.

As for Western governments, their agendas differ. Belgium, using its EU “role” as former colonial power and self-appointed expert on DRC, seems to be pushing hard for Kabila to leave power. But its wishes cannot be fulfilled unless endorsed by France – and Kabila has opened doors for French multinationals. If he also maintains his enmity with Rwanda, he will remain friends with France, to his own benefit. In the US, DRC is still very low on Trump’s foreign policy agenda and his commitment to promoting democracy abroad remains unclear. The Trump administration will most likely be driven by security and economic priorities which Kabila will endeavour not to subvert.

Given that the political and military crises that have repeatedly enabled Kabila to avoid elections show no sign of abating, and that he has several means at his disposal to ensure they are delayed again, the president looks set to extend his rule beyond 2018. In this scenario, decisive action from Western governments in the event of a further postponement of the elections is unlikely.

Alex Ntung is an author, a PhD research candidate, a professional member of the UK Expert Witness Institute and a DRC political and security analyst. Twitter: @AlexMvuka

Featured image: ‘President Kabila casts his vote during Presidential and Legislative elections in Kinshasa’ MONUSCO/John Bopengo (Creative Commons). 

The post DR Congo: Six reasons why Joseph Kabila will not relinquish power on 23 December 2018 appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Further reading:

“International observers of Somaliland presidential election congratulate Somaliland as Supreme Court announces final result” (Somaliland Focus, 29 November 2017)

“International observers of Somaliland’s presidential election urge all parties to use legal channels to resolve post-election differences” (Somaliland Focus, 17 November 2017)

“International observers of Somaliland’s presidential election congratulate the Somaliland people on a peaceful poll and look forward to a peaceful conclusion to the electoral process” (16 November 2017)

“SONSAF, Domestic Observers Certify Presidential Election on Monday Concluded Faultlessly” (SomTribune, 15 November)

“Somaliland Votes next week. Its biggest challenges come after the election” (Scott Pegg and Michael Walls, Washington Post Monkey Cage, 10 November 2017)

“Q & A session with HE Dr Sa’ad Shire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Somaliland” (Africa Research Institute, April 2017)

“Report by International Observers on the 2016 Voter Registration Process in Somaliland” (March 2017)

“Voter Behaviour in Somaliland” (Academy for Peace and Development/ Interpeace December 2016)

“The Economics of Elections in Somaliland: The financing of political parties and candidates” (Rift Valley Institute, 2015)

“Statebuilding in the Somali Horn” (Michael Walls/ Africa Research Institute, December 2014)

The post Somaliland’s 2017 presidential election: interview with Dr Michael Walls appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

This may seem unsurprising and unremarkable, but it was not long ago that aid agencies were radically downsizing their focus on cities. USAID allegedly all but eradicated its urban team in the 1990s, and some major international NGOs confessed to spending less than 10% of their resources on urban areas despite growing evidence of poverty. Across the African continent, until recently, cities were primarily conceived as privileged locations that sucked resources out of the countryside, rather than spaces for development intervention.

The renewed attention to the urban is welcome. But it also comes at curious time, when a new range of international influences seems to have nudged aside “traditional” development partners on the ground, particularly in Africa. In fact, the resurgent interest in Africa’s cities among mainstream donors has probably emerged partly because they have been decentred in this way.

Ask any resident of, or recent visitor to, the continent’s major cities from which direction the major winds reshaping them are blowing and the answer is likely to be east. This is not just about China: countries including India, South Korea, and Turkey are all ramping up their investment, as well as forms of aid and technical assistance.

China does loom extremely large, however, principally when it comes to loans for urban infrastructure, construction contracts and industrial investments. Yet there is much misunderstanding and misinformation about China’s involvement, not to mention a significant dose of anxiety and prejudice. “Chinese aid” doesn’t always come in the forms that are often assumed.

I have recently started a new research project focusing on how the increasing role of Chinese agencies is reshaping ideas and practices of urban development in Africa, with a specific focus on Ethiopia and Uganda. This means asking what Chinese engagement means for the kinds of infrastructure projects that get implemented, the types of industries and jobs created, and the way governments acquire and manage urban land for development.

Moreover, it involves asking how this changing landscape of development co-operation is reshaping prevailing ideas about what constitutes a “good”, “well planned”, “modern” or “sustainable” city. We also need to better understand how South-South urban development cooperation is influencing, supporting or impeding what the “old” donors are doing, now that they have rediscovered the importance of cities.

To help kick-start the project and map the field of existing research relevant to its themes, I organised a workshop, hosted by the Africa Research Institute (more of ARI’s urban work is available here).

Discussions explored issues ranging from the physical form of “new towns” built by Chinese firms on the outskirts of African capitals; to how China’s aspirations about its own modernity are being shaped through its engagements on the continent; to the politics of urban emulation in Africa; to how international investors can profit from cities that never even get built.

As well as showcasing the breadth of emerging research on these issues, we broke into a number of more focused groups, guided by participants’ own interests and ideas. Some considered the nexus between local and global science, or between science and ideology, and how multinational consultants from different backgrounds tussle to define the urban policy space in Africa. The complexity of establishing ownership of decision-making in this multifaceted environment was a point of much debate.

In other sessions, there were interesting reflections on “layers of influence”, and how the engagement of “new donors” at the municipal or provincial level leads to very different outcomes than national-level engagement. For example, Brazilian development co-operation in Africa can be effective at pushing democratisation reforms in cities, but this mode of influence dissipates at the national level where governments often deliberately ignore strategies for democratic deepening.

Another set of questions centred on the apparent convergence of northern and South-South donor approaches. As international practitioners in Africa modify their approaches in response to each other’s ideas and practices, new opportunities emerge for African governments to pursue their own visions of urban modernity, tapping into sources of Chinese finance but also new aid-backed investment ventures.

It has often been said that international development aid is at a crossroads. But with seismic political changes on both sides of the Atlantic occurring at the same time as a period of unprecedented Chinese confidence, the statement rings particularly true. Africa’s evolving cities vividly reflect this reality. The availability of finance for urban development appears to be rising, with skylines following suit.

However, alongside a degree of convergence between North-South and South-South co-operation tensions are simmering beneath the surface. For example, the palpable excitement in China about deepening involvement in urban industrial projects in countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia comes at a time when traditional donors are feeling the strain of supporting regimes with questionable democratic and human rights credentials. Ironically, it is they who have helped over the past two decades with the groundwork to make those countries so attractive to Chinese engagement today, by assisting with building state capacity, instituting land reforms and trying to create business-friendly environments.

It is, of course, important to remember the real drivers of change in African cities don’t come from any international donor or investor. Many of the most exciting transformations are the result of “home-grown” economic innovation, political consolidation and fierce determination to tackle structural challenges. Yet it is undeniable that some of the main external inspirations for these processes – and funding to support them – have come from elsewhere in the global South.

What does all this mean at a time when China’s regime is not, as many hoped, moving towards democratic opening but rather political closure, at the same time as taking on the mantle of champion of globalisation? When aid is demonised in the West as never before? When the leader of the declining former world superpower has nothing better to say about Africa than that it is where his friends go “to try and get rich”?

If Africa is indeed undergoing an urban revolution, it is taking place in the context of a sea change in global geopolitics. The kinds of urban transformation evolving in this context are exciting, if sometimes unsettling – but are only just beginning to emerge. Watch this space.

Tom Goodfellow is a Senior Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Sheffield, and an Associate Fellow of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute and Sheffield Institute for International Development. He tweets @GoodfellowTom

The post The geopolitics of African urban transformation appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Cameroon has been officially at war against Boko Haram since 2014. Although the jihadist group has been considerably weakened since its apogee in 2014-15, it is not yet defeated – as the mid–2017 increase in suicide attacks demonstrated. In the Far North region, approximately 2,000 civilians and soldiers have been killed, and more than a thousand abducted. The army has killed an estimated 1,500–2,100 Boko Haram fighters and arrested nearly a thousand suspected members.

Boko Haram’s impact is not limited to battle casualties. An internal government report of September 2016, seen by Crisis Group, lays bare the damage to infrastructure. Destroyed or damaged facilities in the three border divisions of Mayo Tsanaga, Mayo Sava and Logone et Chari include more than 40,000 houses, dozens of villages, hundreds of markets, 128 schools and 30 health centres. The total damage is estimated at US$450m.

The Far North was the poorest part of the country before the conflict, with 74% of the four million inhabitants living below the poverty line, compared to a national average of 37.5%. Boko Haram has preyed on the population, looting and burning villages, and extorting protection money. The war has worsened an already precarious economic situation, led to large-scale displacement and put huge additional strain on the disadvantaged population.

A paralysed economy

In addition to the prevailing insecurity, emergency measures put in place by the government after suicide attacks in Maroua in mid-2015 have severely disrupted agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, trade and tourism. Agricultural production in the Far North has fallen by two–thirds: lands in the border regions have been inaccessible for three years, and up to 2016 the cultivation of crops that grow above a certain height – including staples like maize and sorghum – was prohibited for security reasons.

The closure of the border with Nigeria has been disastrous for thousands of small traders, who have been forced to make lengthy and costly detours of 100–200 km on bicycles or motorbikes. The cost of essential imports such as cooking oil, sugar, flour and other processed products from Nigeria has consequently risen, price rises being only partly offset by the declining value of the naira.

Everywhere in the region, movement has been impeded. In 2014, the road connecting the important market town of Kousseri with the southern part of the country was closed for several months. Until 2016, many other heavily used roads could only be passed with military escort. Boats were banned on Lake Chad, the Logone River (at the behest of the Chadian authorities) and other waterways. The impact of the prohibition of motorbikes, imposed to prevent drive-by attacks by Boko Haram, has been devastating for drivers and passengers alike.

Tourism has collapsed. Its stunning landscapes once made the Far North the second-most visited region of Cameroon but, since 2014, European countries and America have advised their citizens against travelling there and Cameroonian tourists have unsurprisingly stayed away. According to the head of the regional tourism office, several hotels and dozens of restaurants have closed down, resulting in the loss of many jobs.

Development needs but emergency assistance

People have shown remarkable resilience and adaptability in the face of the onslaught on their livelihoods, exemplified by hosting refugee and displaced communities. Their response stems from the region’s diverse and interconnected history. In the 1980s, economic specialisation by ethnic groups, such as fishing for the Kotoko, livestock farming for the Choa Arabs, agriculture for the Mafa, was eroded by worsening poverty and desertification. Many were forced to move, broaden their expertise and diversify. Faced with even tougher economic realities, communities have developed varied survival strategies.

Unfortunately, national authorities and international development partners have made little attempt to capitalise on local potential. The danger is that Boko Haram violence reinforces a common perception in Yaoundé, the national capital, of the Far North as a hopeless case, far from “Cameroun utile” (the coastal and central areas that were the main focus for the colonial powers and remain the core of the country’s economy).

The post Cameroon’s Far North: Emergency Approach to Sustainable Development Plan appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Podcast

Further Reading

“Cameroon’s descent into crisis: the long history of anglophone discord” (IRIN, 4 October 2017)

“Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis isn’t about language, but economic deprivation” (Amindeh Blaise Atabong, Quartz Africa, 9 October 2017)

“Cameroon: A Worsening Anglophone Crisis Calls for Strong Measures” (Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 130, 19 October 2017)

“The Anglophone Dilemma in Cameroon” (Ateki Seta Caxton, ACCORD Conflict Trends, Issue 2, 2017)

“Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads” (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 250, 2 August 2017)

“Cameroon and the tumultuous autumn of an African patriarch” (FT View, 28 March 2017)

The post Interview with Nkongho Felix Agbor Balla by Edward Paice appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

In West Africa, it seems that the time for coups is over and that cherub-like constitutional revisions are in fashion. The heads of state have learned their lesson: they no longer seek to cling to power but to “modernize” it. In Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mali, constitutional revisions propose to contribute to lasting peace and to consolidate democracy. Still modernization, brought by this inflation of new Constitutions, should not be rejected by a restive political-social context.

In Mali and the Ivory Coast, plans for constitutional revision were underpinned by requirements enshrined in the peace agreements reached at the end of the crises which struck these two countries. The need to strengthen institutions and reconcile peoples was the main driver. However, in the sub-region, the only constitutional revision project which seems to strengthen the institutions and the rights of the people, at least on paper, is that of Burkina Faso. This was announced, from the start, through the type of commission set up to develop said project. Unlike the committees of experts from Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, whose members were carefully selected by the government,

Whatever the stated objectives of democratic consolidation of these plans to revise the Constitution, the political context in which they are introduced depends on all its success, and especially its failure.

In Senegal opposition is bothersome

In Senegal, President Macky Sall poses as a defender of democracy, by showing his wish to modernize the Senegalese institutional system through 15 measures . According to him, the 2016 Constitution strengthens the powers and independence of the Constitutional Council and inscribes new rights and duties of the citizen in the new fundamental text. Ostensibly, Senegal consolidates democracy by reducing the presidential mandate from seven to five years, but this measure will not be effective until 2019. Also, in the new Constitution, President Macky Sall expressly recognizes “the rights of the opposition and its leader ”.

And yet, this constitutional revision project quickly lost its sincerity: just a few days before the constitutional referendum, Khalifa Sall, rising figure of the Socialist Party, the former ruling party, and Mayor of Dakar, is imprisoned in a matter of alleged embezzlement of public funds. This incarceration resembles, according to several figures of the Senegalese opposition, a personal settlement of accounts against a politician who seems to be the only one capable of putting Macky Sall in difficulty during the presidential elections of 2019.

Teen looking for his dolphin

In Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO) seeks to end a decade of fratricidal tensions by proposing major changes to the 2000 Constitution which carries the seeds of the 2002 – 2007 civil war. In October 2016, the Ivorian President has carved out important powers by creating a Vice-Presidency of the Republic, considered as a maneuver to oust the former rebel leader Guillaume Soro, current President of the National Assembly and therefore number two in the order of succession to the presidency of the republic.

In the new Constitution, Ouattara however regulates the thorny question of the nationality of the parents of the candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. Only one of the two parents must be of Ivorian nationality, a change provided for in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements signed in January 2003. The new Constitution also proposes the creation of a Senate of which a third of the members will be appointed by the head of the state. The creation of this second chamber of parliament has just been postponed to a later date due to social crises and recent mutinies which would have tested the coffers of the state.

IBK’s personal ambitions

In Mali, the same scenario with a few exceptions. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) for some months aspired to accommodate the Algiers Agreements signed in May 2015, in a new Constitution which would revise that of 1992. As if the powers of the President were not great enough, the draft constitutional revision of 2017 proposed a strengthening of the powers of the head of state. The latter could have, if the Constitution had been approved, appoint the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Court of Accounts and a third of future senators. He could also have amended all the articles of the Constitution by parliamentary means, without the need for a referendum stamp.

However, the definition of the “ high treason crime ” with which ministers and heads of state can be charged in the exercise of their functions is welcome. Also, the representation of the Malian diaspora in Parliament, and the introduction of proportional representation ballots in the mode of election of deputies can be considered as positive measures for democracy. Indeed, these allow a more equitable representation of all regions of the country in the hemicycle.

Following numerous demonstrations by the living forces of the nation fiercely opposed to the draft Constitution – notably under the platform “  Ante a banna », The revision project was suspended as a whole. The citizens were right to sound the alarm: among about thirty innovations brought to the Constitution of February 25, 1992, there was only the creation of a Senate which was in direct link with the Algiers Agreements. Among the innovations, one consisted in giving immunity from prosecution to the President of the Republic for the duration of his mandate. Another was to lift the requirement that ministers declare their assets when they take office. These had an almost non-existent relationship with the peace process underway and did not seem to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, on the contrary!

Despite the wishful thinking on the part of the heads of state of West Africa, these referendums are perceived in national opinion as presidential early, which crystallize the tensions between opposition and ruling party, divide the opinion and threaten an already fragile societal balance. In Senegal, Mali and Ivory Coast, the new Constitutions or draft texts now allow a revision of the basic text, without resorting to a referendum. This means that the people, under the guise of a modern democracy, indeed lose their most fundamental rights. Where reality is as hard as iron, myth loses its place of honor.

Kamissa Camara is the Africa Director of PartnersGlobal in Washington DC and a political analyst affiliated with the Center for African Studies at Harvard University.

Mahamadou Konaté is a professor and political analyst in several elite schools in Mali, including the National Staff School and the Alioune Blondin Beye Peacekeeping School . He is based in Bamako.

Have constitutional changes in West Africa contributed to peace and democracy or the opposite?

In West Africa, an era of coups d’état seems to have given way to a more sedate period of constitutional reforms. Heads of state have learnt that rather than seeking to cling to power, they can seek to “modernize” it. In Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mali, constitutional revisions have been framed as a means to promote peace and consolidate democracy. But the socio-political context in which such modernization has occurred is critical to understanding this trend.

In Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, constitutional reforms stemmed from the provisions of post-conflict peace agreements. The primary drivers of such changes were the need to strengthen institutions, and to reconcile parties to the conflict. The only country in the region where constitutional changes would seem to strengthen the rights of citizens, at least on paper, is Burkina Faso. This was made clear from the outset with the choice of commission established to draft the new basic law. In contrast to the committees of experts carefully selected by the governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, the constitutional commission in Burkina Faso is representative of different social groups, including the opposition and faith-based organizations.

Whatever the stated objectives of such constitutional reforms, the political context in which they are initiated can determine their success, or their failure.

Opposition blues in Senegal

In Senegal, President Macky Sall has positioned himself as a defender of democracy, displaying a desire to modernize national institutions through a series of 15 reforms . Taking him at his word, the 2016 constitution strengthens the independence of the Conseil Constitutionnel and introduces new citizen rights and obligations. Ostensibly, democracy in Senegal is being consolidated through the reduction of the presidential term of office from seven to five years; however, this change will not be effective until 2019. In promulgating the new constitution, President Sall has expressly acknowledged “the rights of the opposition and its leader.”

Yet the constitutional reform project promptly lost its credibility when only days before the referendum, Khalifa Sall, a rising star in the Parti Socialiste (the former ruling party) and Mayor of Dakar, was detained over the alleged misappropriation of public funds. According to several opposition figures, this arrest was the result of a desire to settle scores with a political rival – perhaps the only man who could challenge the incumbent in the 2019 presidential elections.

ADO searches for a successor

In Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO) sought to bring to an end a decade of fratricidal tensions by overhauling the 2000 constitution, which had sowed the seeds for the 2002-2007 civil war. In October 2016, the Ivorian president carved out changes to executive authority by creating the position of vice-president, widely interpreted as a move to side-line former rebel leader, Guillaume Soro, who as president of the National Assembly was then number two in the constitutional succession order.

The new constitution resolves, once and for all, the thorny question of nationality. Presidential aspirants must prove that at least one of their parents is Ivoiran, a change foreseen in the Linas-Marcoussis Accords , signed in January 2003. The new constitution also lays the foundations for a Senate, in which one third of seats would be appointed by the head of state. The establishment of this second chamber of parliament has so far been delayed; a result of social and military unrest and its impact on cost to the exchequer.

IBK’s personal ambitions

In Mali, the story is broadly the same, albeit with certain exceptions. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) has, in recent months, endeavored to integrate the Algiers Accor ds, signed in May 2015, into a new constitution modeled on the 1992 basic law. As if executive authority was not sufficient, amendments proposed to further strengthen the powers of the president. If the 2017 draft constitution had been approved, the head of state would have been able to appoint the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the national audit body ( Cour des Comptes ), and one third of Senators. Additionally, the executive would have been able to amend any article of the constitution through a vote in parliament, without the need for a popular referendum.

Nevertheless, the proposed constitution did include certain welcome measures, such as plans to define “ high treason ”, accusations of which can be levelled at ministers and the head of state in the conduct of their office. Equally, plans for the Malian diaspora to be represented in the legislature, and to use proportional representation for the election of MPs can be seen as positive developments for Malian democracy. Indeed, these would offer to more equitable parliamentary representation for all regions of the country.

Following a number of demonstrations by activists opposing the planned constitution – notably under the banner of ”  Ante a banna  “, the proposals were dropped. Citizens were right to sound the alarm: among the 30-odd changes to the Constitution adopted on February 25, 1992, only the creation of a Senate stemmed directly from the Algiers Accords. One innovation proposed was to give the President immunity from prosecution during his term of office. Another was to waive the requirement for ministers to declare their assets upon assuming office. Such moves have next to no relationship with current peace process, and cannot be seen as strengthening democracy or the rule of law.

Whatever the pious vows of West African heads of state, constitutional referendums are viewed locally as presidential elections ahead of time. They escalate tensions between the opposition and the ruling party, divide popular opinion and threaten to disrupt fragile social equilibriums. In Senegal, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, new constitutions or draft texts have opened the door to further revisions without plebiscites. Thus, under the guise of a modern democracy, citizens are being deprived of one of their most fundamental rights – a say in changes to the basic law.

Kamissa Camara is Africa Director at Partners Global in Washington, DC, and a political analyst affiliated with the Center for African Studies at Harvard University.

Mahamadou Konaté is a lecturer and political analyst at numerous institutions in Mali, notably the National Staff School and the Alioune Blondin Beye Peacekeeping School . He is based in Bamako.

The post En Afrique de l’Ouest, les révisions constitutionnelles ont-elles contribué à la consolidation de la paix et de la démocratie, ou l’inverse ? appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

What is the NRM?

The NRM is a dominant party, meaning that it has effectively monopolised all the available avenues into political office in most of the country. Paradoxically, it is also an extremely weak organisation. Rather than being a muscular protector of an established political class, the NRM does not enforce even its most basic internal rules regarding campaigning and candidate selection. In the 2016 elections, as in the past, it did not stop candidates defeated in party primaries from standing for parliament as independents (so-called “NRM-Independents”). This occurred in almost every constituency, and in many the NRM-Independent beat the party’s official candidate. In the rural areas of central and western Uganda, where the NRM receives most of its support, this kind of intra-NRM competition dominates local politics, and is the reason why more than 50% of NRM incumbents who stood for re-election in 2016 lost.

The question is: why do challengers to incumbent politicians so often chose to operate within the NRM rather than the opposition? One reason is that after more than 30 years in power, people have come to see it as the inevitable party of government, and therefore the only one whose members have a chance both of commanding influence in Kampala and effecting local change. Another is the physical and social pressure placed on opposition candidates in NRM rural strongholds.

There is also a conceptual and historical explanation. After so long in power, the NRM has come to be seen more as a forum for local politics than the dominant player in national politics. This dates back to the first two decades of the NRM era, when the “Movement System” of no-party competition barred political parties to mitigate sectarianism. In its place, the regime promoted individual merit as the measure of a candidate’s political legitimacy, and localised political mobilisation through its decentralisation programme. With the return to multi-party politics before the 2006 election, the Movement became a formal political party – today’s NRM – that inherited the culture of internal competition of its predecessor.

The true strength of the NRM today is not that it is rigid and powerful enough to control the dynamics of local politics, but is flexible enough to absorb them. It is common to find political newcomers in party primaries denouncing local corruption, the poor state of services or the broken promises of incumbents while supporting the NRM and Museveni’s re-election. This makes it all the more confusing to read reports that people keep voting for the NRM. In reality, they are voting within the NRM.

Support for the president in the NRM’s rural heartlands is in many ways conditioned by this localisation of political grievance. Compared with parliamentary candidates, who are seen by the voters as potential champions of local development, Museveni cuts more of a monarchial figure – a man in control of the political establishment, but aloof from the petty squabbles of the constituency. While no local power-broker can say that he or she “owns” the NRM brand, this is not the case for Museveni, who is inseparable from the party and its history.

Patronage

Money is critically important at all levels of Ugandan politics. It is common to see campaigning politicians handing cash to voters, or promising to do so in the event of victory. The most extravagant displays of this practice are by the president himself, who hands out paper bags containing hundreds of millions of shillings to supporters at campaign rallies and on regional tours. Museveni also routinely promises implausible sums to various funds for marginalised social groups like youth, women and elders.

Rita Abrahamsen and Gerald Bareebe argue that the president effectively buys elections with these demonstrations of largesse. But images can be deceiving. Very little of what is dished out actually reaches voters. Instead, most of the cash that does find its way into voters’ pockets comes from local candidates, most of whom go heavily into debt to finance their campaigns. In 2016, any genuine contender for a parliamentary seat needed to spend in excess of £100,000 (UGX483 million) to have a realistic chance of victory. Candidates spend this on community donations, facilitating vast networks of agents and dispensing cash or gifts after rallies. This decentralised pipeline of election spending – not Museveni’s donations – is the driver of increasing monetisation of Uganda’s recent elections.

For both Museveni and local candidates, however, spending money is usually less a matter of straightforward material persuasion than of projecting an image of generosity, wealth and power. Image is likely to mobilise votes on election day, as voters still expect their representatives to “deliver” on election promises of development and distribution. Campaign spending is therefore better understood as a necessary rather than sufficient condition for winning votes in Uganda. In fact, there is a lively public discourse against “vote buying” or “vote bribery” – sharp insults often used to delegitimise the campaigns of candidates that people do not like or trust.

Coercion

Elections in the NRM era have involved varying degrees of coercion and violence. The first full multi-party elections in 1996 were mostly peaceful, but the more closely fought 2001 and 2006 polls witnessed severe intimidation by soldiers and NRM militias. The 2011 election, in which Museveni arrested his declining trend to win 68%, reverted to being a more peaceful affair. In the lead up to the 2016 campaign, the likelihood of violence was again a major talking point. However, despite a few high profile actions – such as the arrest of presidential candidates Kizza Besigye and Amama Mbabazi and the occasional teargas-quelled riot – most areas were spared a repeat of the 2001 and 2006 experiences. Two factors help explain why.

First, political violence in Uganda (as under many regimes) does not have to be repeatedly deployed in order to remain effective. Often, Ugandans only need to be reminded – through rhetoric and symbolism – of the consequences of state intimidation, which they well remember. The 2016 election campaign featured the presence of police-trained “crime preventers”, and newspaper reports speculating a return of 2001-era NRM militias. In the event, the former turned out to be mostly harmless and the latter false – but that does not mean they were ineffective.

Second, and somewhat puzzlingly, is that Museveni’s authoritarian rhetoric is often a source of comfort rather than distress to voters. The period before Museveni took power in 1986 saw the wholesale collapse of the state in many rural areas. Contrary to the impression of most outsiders, those old enough to remember this time usually recount the anarchy of banditry and local violence enabled by the absence of the state, not just the abuse of power by Museveni’s predecessors. The atrocious human rights record of previous regimes remains vivid in people’s memories; the historical narrative that sustains Museveni is that he alone can maintain stability in Uganda. While many voters are infuriated by the NRM’s use – or threats – of force to stay in power, there are plenty who see in the president’s language confirmation of a regime “strong” enough to keep the peace and prevent the general collapse of order.

Context matters

A dominant party system, patronage, a degree of coercion – all appear at first glance to be crude instruments of averting fair democratic competition. But each of these three NRM characteristics rests on deeper and more complicated contexts that can easily be obscured. The NRM does not, in the most mechanical sense, simply control, buy, or intimidate its way into power. Instead, its success is contingent on an embedded and complex array of ideas, histories and processes. This in no way affirms the regime’s claim to be genuinely democratic. Rather, it cautions against the assumption that authoritarianism in countries like Uganda is a necessarily simplistic form of maintaining power. Only by avoiding this trap can we grasp the wider lessons of the 2016 elections – and begin to assess where Ugandan politics is going and what will happen when the Museveni era finally comes to an end.

Sam Wilkins is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

Richard Vokes is Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Development Studies at the University of Adelaide

They are the guest editors of a special issue of the Journal of Eastern Africa Studies entitled “The NRM regime and the 2016 Ugandan elections”. This online briefing draws extensively on papers presented in that edition.

The post The subtleties of authoritarianism in Museveni’s Uganda appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

A radical approach would see the existing political arrangement replaced by regional economic and administrative units with minimal federal government interference, emulating the system Nigeria had at independence. A more realistic alternative is for greater powers to be devolved to Nigeria’s 36 states as a way of improving development, governance and economic performance. This was debated in July as part of an ongoing constitutional review process and 24 proposals were voted through by the Senate and House of Representatives. These included a commitment to devolve greater powers to states relating to power generation, railways and youth; ensure the financial autonomy of state legislatures; and strengthen the transparency, administration and financing of Nigeria’s 774 local government authorities. Providing the measures receive approval from two-thirds of Nigeria’s state legislatures they will be passed to the Office of the President for assent.

Nigeria’s states are “hardly considered bastions of governing best practices”, so are they deserving of more powers?

Nigeria’s failing states

Excluding Lagos, Rivers and Delta, the remainder of Nigeria’s 36 states are entirely dependent on the federal government’s monthly allocations for survival. They have completely failed to leverage this income, together with human capital and natural resources, to create economic opportunities for their residents. Weak accountability – state assemblies are mostly little more than rubber stamps for the wishes of the governor – allow those governors to invest federal allocations freely in white elephant projects and patronage. In 2015, poor management of funds, coupled with less federal funding due to lower oil prices, led to 27 states receiving a bailout of ₦662 billion (US$2.1 billion) from the federal government to cover recurrent expenditure.

The performance of state governments on the delivery of certain basic services exclusively mandated as their responsibility in the 1999 Constitution* is far from convincing. Primary education is a glaring example. Almost a third of Nigerian states have youth literacy rates under 40%. In 2016, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, ranked Nigeria last in primary education while UNICEF believes that Nigeria has the highest number of out of school children – 10.5 million – in the world.

On paper, restructuring Nigeria to empower more decentralised structures may be a good idea. However, the only way it can deliver improvements is simultaneous efforts are made to fix the underlying institutional weaknesses and democratic shortcomings that characterise governance at state and local levels.

Reform before restructuring

If Nigeria continues to have closed political systems where barriers to entries are so high that only the elites can contest for office, then it is hard to imagine how restructuring would lead to state governments becoming more representative of their constituents. The Senate did recently pass a bill to reduce the minimum age required to run for governor and other public offices. It also needs to scrutinise financial barriers to political participation: party nomination forms for governorship races cost as high as ₦10 million (about US$30,000) whilst those looking to be elected to the House of Representatives have to pay ₦2 million (about US$6,000).

Without concerted efforts to bring about more transparent and accountable state assemblies, greater fiscal autonomy is unlikely to improve their performance. Civil society, and increasingly social media platforms, can play an important role in improving this civic engagement but only if they are given the space and opportunity to do so. The recently debated NGO Regulation Bill, which if passed would “regulate and stifle their activities”, is not a positive development in this regard.

The current federal framework has failed to deliver significant improvements in the lives of most Nigerians. However, if restructuring fails to address the institutional underpinnings of economic and political inclusiveness and democratic accountability, the result will not be very different from the current status quo.

Nwamaka Ogbonna is a research analyst working on private sector development in Africa

*Parts 1 and II of the Second Schedule to Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution list federal and state responsibilities in full

The post Is Nigeria in need of restructuring? appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Alleging the elections were rigged, Odinga is contesting the results at the Supreme Court.  The Court is required to hear the case and deliver a verdict by 1 September.

NASA has yet to publicly produce compelling evidence of fraud.  A partial analysis of the constituency tabulation results forms (Form 34B), shows a scattering of mathematical errors and inconsistencies.  These do not appear to be of the scale required to overturn Kenyatta’s margin of victory.  Further analysis of these forms, and their counterparts issued at the polling station (Form 34A), may indicate localised electoral fraud, mismanagement, or human error.

If the IEBC figures are broadly correct, what statistical trends does the data reveal?  What may explain the scale of Kenyatta’s victory?  A preliminary analysis of the election data available at county level suggests four trends:

1. Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in a larger number of the most populous counties, whether or not these areas were JP strongholds.
2. Across the country, Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in more counties than Odinga.
3. Kenyatta generally achieved higher turnout in his areas of core support; turnout figures for Odinga were weaker in key areas of his support, notably the coast.
4. Kenyatta was more consistent than Odinga in picking up support in areas where a third party candidate had performed well in 2013. There were no strong third party candidates for president in 2017.

Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in more of the most populous counties

Kenya’s 47 counties vary considerably in population.  In 2017, 11 counties accounted for more than seven million of the valid votes cast, nearly half the total cast nationwide.  More than 400,000 valid votes were cast in each of these counties, which span Kenya’s political spectrum.  They include big cities and more rural areas and are spread through western, central and eastern areas of the country.  They are nearly evenly divided between areas of support for Kenyatta/JP and areas of support for Odinga/NASA.

Compared to the 2013 election, Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in all but one of these counties, as shown in Table 1.  Even a modest increase in vote share is significant given the number of votes on offer in these areas.  Meanwhile, Odinga’s share of the vote increased in only six of these counties, and decreased in five counties.

Table 1: Counties with more than 400,000 votes cast, and swing in vote share by candidate, 2017 election

Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in more counties than Odinga

Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in 41 of 47 counties, and lost ground in six.  Odinga increased his share of the vote in only 16 counties, and did worse in the remaining 31.

In nine counties, Kenyatta achieved a 9.5% or better improvement in his share of the vote, as shown in Table 2.  Most of these counties – six of nine – were won by Odinga.  The results suggest Kenyatta was able to make in-roads in areas where he performed poorly in 2013.

Table 2: Kenyatta’s share of the vote, 2013 versus 2017, and swing in share of the vote

In comparison, as seen in Table 3, Odinga achieved a similar or better swing in his share of the vote in only four counties: Vihiga, Kakamega, Bungoma and West Pokot.  In contrast to the shift in support for Kenyatta, in three of these four counties Odinga was already strong, having performed well in 2013.  Only in West Pokot was Odinga able to increase his share of the vote at Kenyatta’s expense.

Odinga’s improved performance in these counties was largely at the expense of third party candidates.  Crucially, Kenyatta was also able to increase his share of the vote in three of these four counties, again largely at the expense of third party candidates.

Table 3: Odinga’s share of the vote in 2013 and 2017, swing in share for Odinga and Kenyatta, and swing in share of the vote for third party candidates

Higher turnout in areas of Kenyatta’s core support

18 counties reported voter turnout of 80% or more. Kenyatta triumphed in 14 of these 18 counties.

Of the five counties with turnout of 70% or lower, Odinga won four of them, including, critically, the highly populated coastal counties of Kilifi and Mombasa.  Odinga/NASA voters appear not to have been as effectively mobilised as supporters of Kenyatta/JP.  In coastal counties such as Kwale and Mombasa, which voted heavily for Odinga, turnout fell from the levels recorded in 2013.

Table 4: Comparison in turnout in selected coastal counties, 2013 versus 2017

Kenyatta took more of the 2013 third party vote than Odinga

In 2013, third party candidates took 5% of the vote or more in 12 counties, as shown in Table 5.  In 2017, only one county, Isiolo, saw a third party candidate take more than 5% of the vote.  Discounting Isiolo, Kenyatta increased his share of the vote in all 11 other counties, by an average 8.2%.

Odinga’s performance was more mixed.  His share of the vote decreased in four of 12 counties.  In Vihiga, Bungoma and Kakamega, most, but not all, of the support for 2013 third party candidate Musalia Mudavadi, now aligned with NASA, did transfer to Odinga.

Table 5: Third party share of the vote, 2013 and 2017, and swing to Kenyatta and Odinga, 2017

Preliminary conclusions

Analysis of these election results suggest Kenyatta and the JP ran a better campaign, even in areas historically opposed to the party and its candidate. JP better mobilised voters in areas of both strength and relative weakness, and focused on areas with the greatest number of registered voters.  By increasing his support in almost all areas of the country, Kenyatta appears to have demonstrated a broader national appeal to Kenyans.  These trends suggest that voters did not only consider ethnic or tribal identity in casting their votes, as the swing towards Kenyatta cannot solely be explained by shifts in demography.

In contrast, Odinga and NASA failed to mobilise more voters in their areas of strongest support. Despite potentially favourable economic and political circumstances, the opposition was apparently unable to significantly increase its appeal to Kenyans in key electoral districts across the country. Odinga failed to win over enough voters who had supported third party candidates in 2013. Collectively, even if Odinga increased his share of the vote relative to 2013, it appears he underperformed in too many areas of the country to win in 2017.

N.B. All data was sourced from the IEBC’s public results database.  All findings are preliminary and subject to confirmation of the final figures and cross-referencing against original Forms 34A and 34B.

Aly Verjee is a visiting expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

The post Kenya’s 2017 presidential elections: a preliminary results analysis, by county appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

It is not a secret that Kenya has been suffering the consequences of a ravaging drought for about a year now. Q1 2017 GDP growth stood at 4.7 percent largely due to a notable contraction in agriculture. The 1.1 percent contraction in agriculture is obviously informed by the drought. For example, the drought has decimated the production of tea one of Kenya’s key exports; production is expected to drop by 12 to 30 percent. Livestock production has also been devastated with estimated losses of 40 to 60 percent of livestock assets particularly in the North East and Coast. Maize farmers in Uasin Gishu continue to generate measly yields from their farms.

The question becomes, how did this happen? This is the first major drought to affect the country since the advent of devolution. Are there issues that have emerged in the context of devolution that allowed the drought to grip the country to the extent it has? The answer seems to be yes.

The first issue is budget allocations to agriculture. According to the International Budget Partnership (IBP), national government allocated the sector as follows: 2 percent in 2015/16, 1.3 percent in 2016/2017 and 1.8 percent in 2017/18. As IBP points out, the Maputo Declaration 2003 calls for allocation of at least 10 percent of total national budget towards agriculture. The average expenditure on agriculture in Africa is 4.5 percent; Kenya’s national allocations are sub-par. These paltry allocations may be due to the fact that that agriculture isn’t an attractive sector to finance. Infrastructure remains a priority for national and (it seems) county governments because physical assets can be pointed to as proof of ‘development’. The same cannot be done with agriculture, as a result agriculture seems to wallowing in financial neglect.

The second concern is the lack of coordination between county and national government. It is still not clear who is responsible for what in the agriculture sector. While agriculture has been devolved, the truth is that the national government through the Ministry of Agriculture, is still a key player in the sector. In the work I have done at county level, it has become abundantly clear that neither county nor national government are of the view that they are fully in charge of the sector. As a result, the sector is wallowing in a lack of ownership riddled by a lack of collaboration and coordination between the two levels of government. This is surely a contributing factor that allowed the drought to reach the scale it did.

The third is a breakdown in support services to small holder farmers and poor early warning systems; both of which should sit in the county government. It has been noted that extension services that rural farmers in particular used to enjoy are no longer there. Aside from subsidies in fertiliser for example, small holder farmers on whom most Kenyans rely for food, need continuous support to make their farms more productive, limit post-harvest loss and make sure their products reach markets. County governments also seem to have failed in the early warning systems that should have signalled the crisis as they are present at grassroots levels. County governments seems to be having difficulty in playing their role in the sector and it is not clear why. Perhaps it may be a combination of a lack of technical capacity as well as limited financial allocations to the sector.

What is clear is that the situation detailed above cannot continue to happen. National and County government need to not only prioritise agriculture in terms of budget allocations but also solve the coordination problem that is so clear.

Anzetse Were is a development economist and weekly columnist for Business Daily Africa.

The post Is Kenyan agriculture being neglected under devolution? – Anzetse Were appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

In an ARI blog series launched in 2016, “NIGERIA: HAVE YOUR SAY”, Nigerians from many different walks of life reflect on aspects of sub-national government from Borno in the north-east to Lagos in the south-west; and from Sokoto in the north-west to Enugu in the south-east. There are no overtly self-serving or politically partisan inclusions.

ARI aims to provide a platform that will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of local governance in Nigeria and to draw attention to suggestions for improvement.

“The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed and accordingly, the government of every state shall, subject to Section 8 of this constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils” (Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria)

Functioning local government is pivotal to the development of communities, especially when the central and state governments are in effect absent. Lagos State’s 20 local government areas (LGAs) were supplemented in 2003 with the establishment of 37 local council development areas (LCDAs), entities not statutorily approved by the National Assembly but with the same function as LGAs.  A Supreme Court judgement ruled the creation of the LCDAs as “valid but inchoate”.

For the 57 local authorities to perform their constitutional role, adequate financing is essential. Without it, the provision of social services and infrastructure is impossible. The Lagos State government continues to hold the purse strings, only disbursing funds to cover the running costs of each local government body despite the constitutional requirement that 20.6% of the Federation Account must be allocated to this tier of government. Also in contravention of the constitution, the state has failed to hold any local government elections since 2011.

Grassroots democracy curtailed

When local elections were staged in October 2011, at the start of former governor Babatunde Fashola’s second term, prospective councillors promised to improve deplorable roads and under-resourced health care facilities during a campaign characterised by voter apathy.The credibility of the polls was challenged by opposition parties who cited as evidence of fraud various electoral irregularities and the fact that the incumbent party – the Action Congress of Nigeria – won all 57 seats. It was clear that support for the governor was a prerequisite for victory. Any residual semblance of LGA/LCDA independence disappeared after the elected officials’ mandate expired in October 2014 and no new election was called.

The state government, charged with organising local elections, attributed its inability to do so to the failure of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conclude its compilation of the national voter register in time. In place of elected LGA/LCDA chairmen, 57 “sole administrators” were appointed by Fashola in late 2014. When Akinwunmi Ambode was elected governor the following year, he oversaw a new round of appointments, bringing in his people to oversee the management of local government. This action has undermined local democracy: the appointees are directly responsible and accountable to the governor rather than the electorate.

This system of governance dates back to Nigeria’s Second Republic. During the early 1980s,“caretaker committees” ran local governments throughout the federation. They were staffed with party loyalists appointed by the state government. Since the return to multi-party democracy in 1999, political elites’ fear of losing contested elections, and the access that comes with a government position, has preserved the existence of unelected local officials.

“Sole administrator” systems also exist in neighbouring Oyo, Osun and Ondo states. In Lagos, this has undermined the principle of checks and balances between the electorate and the state legislature and executive, facilitating corruption and impunity. Local government is supposed to be independent. Instead, it has been deprived of its autonomy and reduced to a mere appendage of the state government. The Lagos State House of Assembly is complicit in this process as – in theory – its approval is required for the governor’s nomination of LGA/LCDA heads. In reality, it is an institution in the pocket of the governor.

In Baruwa, Ayobo-Ipaja LCDA, for example, local council leader Hon. Abiodun Agbaje may be fully aware of the deplorable road conditions experienced by residents, but he is unable to address these infrastructure challenges without the support of the state and/or the governor – the holders of the purse strings. This is the reality facing almost all the LGAs/LCDAs in Lagos State.

A small step in the right direction?

In January 2017, Governor Ambode announced that local government elections would be conducted on 22 July – 33 months overdue. This marks progress of sorts. Without improvements to the quality and transparency of the polls a clean sweep for the incumbent party – as happened in Ogun, Ebonyi, Benue, Jigawa, Taraba and Yobe states – is almost certain. The Lagos State Independent Electoral Commission, charged with conducting local council elections, continues to be heavily influenced by the will of the governor. Nevertheless, even though opposition groups are unlikely to make inroads, the polls do at least give them a chance to broadcast their views about the shortcomings of governance and service delivery.

Seun Akinyemi is an independent researcher based in Lagos.

The post Undemocratic governance and local administration in Lagos State appeared first on Africa Research Institute.