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Who will plan Africa’s cities?

Jeremy Hickman — Tue, 28 Apr 2026 14:03:47 +0000

On the periphery: Missing urbanisation in Zimbabwe – Beacon Mbiba

Niki Wolfe — Mon, 27 Mar 2017 12:23:24 +0000

Zimbabwe’s 2012 census report suggests that notable de-urbanisation occurred between 2002 and 2012. Some external commentators have cited urban–rural migration and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme – jambanja – initiated in 2000 as the principal drivers of this phenomenon. During field research in the second half of 2016, I found that ordinary citizens and key informants – in politics, government and civil society – expressed bewilderment at suggestions that the country is de-urbanising. While the populations of the large cities appear to be growing slowly, if at all, unadjusted boundaries mean that the demographic growth associated with urban sprawl has not been captured. In-depth analysis also reveals rapid population growth in peri-urban areas that should be designated as urban, and in small and intermediate urban settlements.

Overestimation of the urban populations, and the rate at which urbanisation levels are increasing in African countries, is a consistent feature of international organisation reports.¹ But for Zimbabwe, underestimation seems to have occurred. While the rate of urbanisation may have slowed, the extent of the slowdown appears exaggerated and it is likely to be reversed when boundary changes are made. It is not inconceivable that Zimbabwe could still be majority urban by 2050.

By Beacon Mbiba

Zimbabwe – the headline figures
Urban Zimbabwe
Local level population dynamics: growth and mobility
Jambanja and a housing stampede
Boundary games
Towards a (majority) urban Zimbabwe?
Notes

Africa’s “rapid urbanisation” is controversial. In a provocatively titled 2010 Counterpoint, “Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanisation?”, and elsewhere, Deborah Potts has provided irrefutable evidence that it is a flawed generalisation.² In a significant number of countries the urbanisation level – the percentage of the population living in urban areas – has declined since the 1990s due to economic crises, de-industrialisation, epidemics or other causes. Furthermore, notable within- and between-country variations prevail.

Potts has shown convincingly that, despite abundant examples of countries experiencing rapid urban population growth but only gradual increases – or declines – in their overall urbanisation level, promotion of the “rapid urbanisation” narrative continues unabated. Flagship reports from leading international agencies including the World Bank and UN-Habitat have been slow to fully take this research data on board or have done so grudgingly. Most recently, the 2016 edition of the authoritative African Economic Outlook asserted that “Africa is urbanising at a historically rapid rate, bringing considerable opportunities and challenges”.³

Clearly, Africa’s urban population is increasing in absolute terms – in many countries, rapidly. Contention arises, in part, due to confusion of terms. “Urban growth” is equated to “urbanisation”, but there is an important distinction to bear in mind. Urban growth is the increase in urban population that occurs as a result of any or a combination of rural–urban migration, natural increase, boundary changes or reclassification of rural villages or territories into urban areas. Urbanisation occurs when population growth in urban areas exceeds that of the total national population. If urban and rural populations are growing at the same rate, urban growth is occurring, but not urbanisation. The distinction is about more than semantics: a decline in the proportion of the total population living in towns and urban settlements, signifying counter- or de-urbanisation, has important policy implications that should not be overlooked.

To its credit, in the State of African Cities 2014 report, and more forcefully in the Habitat III Regional Report for Africa, UN-Habitat accepted that urban population growth rates relative to national population growth rates are stagnant or very slow in many countries and regional variations are the norm. Furthermore, the average rate of urbanisation in 1990–2015 was below 2% for the majority of countries (see Figure 1). Despite saying that Africa is urbanising at a rapid rate, African Economic Outlook 2016 presents data for selected countries where only three – Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Tanzania – are categorised as having rapidly urbanised between 1980 and 2012. Seven are presented as typical of slow urbanisation of below 2% between censuses, while another five are presented as de-urbanising.⁴ Zimbabwe, together with Zambia, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic, is one of the countries flagged as experiencing de-urbanisation; and it features prominently in analyses of de-urbanisation in the 1990s.⁵

While accepting Potts’s exhortation to be wary of urban statistics and sceptical of the rapid urbanisation narrative, this Counterpoint urges that the pendulum should not swing completely to the other extreme. Rigorous analysis of evidence cited in support of de-urbanisation is also required. In the case of Zimbabwe, the de-urbanisation apparent in headline census figures since the 1990s seems to be exaggerated. De-urbanisation is not necessarily permanent – it can be reversed. Furthermore, although demographic and spatial conceptions of urbanisation are central to this discussion, it must be remembered that urbanisation also has economic, socio-cultural, political, infrastructural and services dimensions.

Figure 1: Real urbanisation growth rates in Africa, 1990 – 2015

Source: Plotted by author using data from UN DESA World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision

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Zimbabwe – the headline figures

Zimbabwe’s most recent census, conducted in 2012, found that the share of the urban population had declined from 35% of the total population in 2002 to 33%, indicating that the country had de-urbanised during the decade. Unlike other African countries where censuses have been erratic, or their results highly contested, Zimbabwe has conducted regular, credible censuses involving and endorsed by leading UN and other donor agencies. It is a data-rich country, although access to the disaggregated local area data has been difficult in recent years and extrapolation is sometimes required.

The headline figures have certainly attracted attention. During field research in the second half of 2016, I found that ordinary citizens and my key informants expressed bewilderment at suggestions that Zimbabwe is de-urbanising. In seeking an explanation for why the country should have seemingly experienced de-urbanisation, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation stated that it had been “driven by urban–rural migration” and that “a growing share of the population living in communal land and resettlement areas [suggested] de-urbanisation is being driven by the land resettlement programme”.⁶

The causal link between the Government of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) – or jambanja – and de-urbanisation needs careful interrogation. De-urbanisation was also observed in the previous intercensal period in the 1990s, long before jambanja. The reasons cited then included urban economic decline, household responses to HIV/AIDS, and the collapse of urban services, with retrenched workers and the terminally ill retreating to rural areas.⁷Jambanja and its socio-economic consequences remain highly contested, and their impact on urbanisation poorly understood. Whether Zimbabwe is really de-urbanising and, if so, to what extent jambanja has contributed to the process will require deeper investigation.

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Urban Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s national settlement framework has a seven-tier hierarchy of human settlements comprising metropolitan areas (Harare and Bulawayo), cities or municipalities, towns, and as many as 472 small urban centres in the form of “growth points”, district service centres and rural service centres. The official definition of an urban area in Zimbabwe is based on a combination of two criteria: namely a settlement designated as urban; and a compact settlement of 2,500 people or more, the majority of whom are employed in non-farm employment.⁸ Given the rural location of district and rural service centres, the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) categorises them as rural even if their population is above the 2,500 threshold – unless they have been reclassified as urban/towns, as was recently the case with Gokwe and Gutu Mupandawana. Similarly, among my key informants flummoxed by the suggestion that Zimbabwe is de-urbanising, the perception of “urban” excluded these small urban settlements.

In 2002, Zimbabwe had an urban population of 4,029,707 which grew by 6.31% to 4,284,145 in 2012, an increase of 0.63% per year. Unlike the 2002 census report, the 2012 report has no chapter devoted to urban population and migration data. As with all censuses, some discrepancies and anomalies are apparent. For example, it states that the urban population of Zimbabwe was 4,284,145;⁹ but if one adds the totals in each province for the “Urban Council Area population” plus “Growth Points and other Areas”, the total comes to 4,261,243.¹⁰ More significant is the information, based on the above-mentioned additions, that the urban population for Mashonaland Central Province is 71,332. This is a substantial decrease from the figure of 102,873 in the 2002 census report.¹¹ Enquiries with ZIMSTAT indicate that these are discrepancies for which they have not found an explanation. Why should Mashonaland Central Province’s urban population decline to this extent considering that this is the same region in which towns like Mvurwi are reportedly booming?¹²

Such anomalies aside, it is clear that the census totals signify quite slow growth in the number of urban dwellers. Between 2002 and 2012, the rural population increased by 15.46% compared to 6.31% for urban areas. A comparison of distribution of urban populations by province also shows minor changes between 2002 and 2012. There was a slight decline in Bulawayo’s share; and Harare accounted for 47% of the national urban population in 2012 (35% if Epworth and Chitungwiza are separated out), versus 46% in 2002 (36% if Epworth and Chitungwiza are separated out). In other words, according to these data the primacy of the capital, including its peri-urban satellite urban areas, increased slightly during the decade. The intercensal population change for the major urban areas is displayed in Figure 2, and for the provinces in Figure 3.

The difference between the growth rates of rural and urban populations can in part be attributed to higher total fertility rates in rural areas compared to urban areas. Total fertility rates of 2.8 for Bulawayo and 3.1 for Harare are much lower than the range of 3.6–4.3 for the other provinces.¹³ However, as the base population is large in the main cities, lower natural increase rates still result in significant aggregate population growth before we take migration into account.

Two further factors also need to be considered when analysing the urban population data: national and international migration patterns, and the impact of boundary changes or rigidity, addressed in more detail later. Although the census report states that internal migration patterns between the 2002 and 2012 censuses should be treated with caution as some provinces changed boundaries, some headline migration figures need mentioning. Zimbabwe has ten provinces including the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo. Lifetime interprovincial migration data show that Harare and Bulawayo “exhibited the highest in-migration rates” of 49% each, that is to say the percentage of people born outside these two urban provinces but resident there on census day. The report states that Harare was “the largest net gainer of population” from net migration, which accounted for 21% of its population on census day.¹⁴ Furthermore, Harare and Bulawayo exhibited the highest intercensal in-migration rate of slightly over 30%¹⁵ and net migration rates of 5.12% and 4.18% respectively, compared to negative net migration rates for five of the ten provinces.¹⁶ These statistics on internal intercensal migration do not attest to large-scale urban–rural migration.

Finally, therefore, it is important to recognise that although Zimbabwe’s demographic urbanisation rate may not be increasing, there is absolute urban population growth. As I will illustrate later in this Counterpoint, there is also significant urban spatial growth.

Figure 2: Population growth in Zimbabwe’s towns and cities, 2002 – 2012

Source: plotted by author using data from ZIMSTAT 2002 and 2012 census reports

Figure 3: Population growth in Zimbabwe by province, 2002 – 2012

Source: plotted by author using data from ZIMSTATS 2002 and 2012 census reports

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Local level population dynamics: growth and mobility

Although the census data on urbanisation and migration data are patchy, comparison of 2002 and 2012 urban statistics provides important insights on local-level changes. Figure 2 shows that except for Harare and a few other centres whose growth rates are low or even negative – as is the case for Bulawayo – there has been rapid population growth in small urban centres and peri-urban zones. On the face of it, while these figures fit global trends that show declining rates of urban growth as economies mature, on closer inspection the Zimbabwe story is more complex. This is where jambanja needs to be considered.

The initial impact of Zimbabwe’s violent land reform was internal displacement of thousands of former commercial farm workers, the majority of whom became homeless and sought shelter and livelihoods in urban and peri-urban areas.¹⁷ This process unfolded both before and after the 2002 census. But then came the “tsunami”, the military-style Operation Murambatsvina (“he/she who despises filth”) in 2005, during which the state destroyed houses and small enterprises deemed illegal. Hundreds of thousands of urban and rural households were affected. The epicentre of these clearances was in low-income urban and peri-urban areas where most of those internally displaced by jambanja were sheltering. Thus jambanja and rural resettlement in some respects led initially to rural depopulation and urban growth, which Operation Murambatsvina partially reversed.

The deepening socio-economic crisis also led to increased mobility, as households sought to spread risks and maximise their chances of survival by operating in multiple geographical and economic zones. By 2004, most urban households – irrespective of political persuasion – had secured plots within 100km of their urban homes where they would travel periodically or have some family members resident to grow crops and increase their food security. Those in rural communal areas also made similar decisions for multi-sited livelihoods without necessarily abandoning their old homes.¹⁸ This mobility and circularity – individuals and families moving in and out of rural and urban areas and circulating between different locations mainly to pursue informal economic activity – must not be underestimated. A census only records where individuals are on the night of the census.

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Jambanja and a housing stampede

The acute shortage of urban housing in Zimbabwe is well documented and widely acknowledged.¹⁹ High levels of overcrowding in existing stock, coupled with the government’s brutal restriction of squatter settlements, maintained the quintessentially European physical appearance of Zimbabwe’s urban areas for a long time after independence in 1980. All this collapsed with jambanja, as ZANU-PF elites used peri-urban land allocations to reward their supporters. The mechanisms of this patronage system took a variety of forms including politically aligned co-operatives. With jambanja, the bulk of peri-urban land that used to be privately owned farms became state land and legal obstacles to converting this land from rural to urban use were removed.

Initially, the majority of urban residents were hesitant about lining up for this land, but by 2010 a “stampede” was underway. A plethora of land dealers emerged who grabbed and allocated sites and/or plots for housing development.²⁰ These included political elites, corrupt government officials and professionals, self-made land barons, churches and traditional leaders in peri-urban areas. Private land owners cashed in by subdividing their plots for sale. Villagers converted agricultural land to residential use to accommodate urban dwellers on a rental basis. In the process they also fenced off adjacent public land; for example, grazing land in Seke, Goromonzi and Domboshawa rural areas in peri-urban Harare, in a process popularly known as Operation Garawadya (“eat first then questions later”).

These developments cumulatively led to the rapid growth of small towns and satellite towns around Harare such as Ruwa and Norton, as well as the peri-urban areas of Seke and Domboshawa. Simultaneously, increasing mobility, informality and the rise of a trader society reinforced the growth of border towns including Kotwa, Beitbridge and Plumtree; and highway settlements, most of them small rural service centres such as Ngundu and Mhandamabgwe (both in Chivi District, on routes to South Africa).

In seeking to understand the dynamics of Zimbabwe’s urban development, the government’s response to the expanding urban sprawl throughout the country must also be considered. It has conspicuously not unleashed an operation similar to Murambatsvina. Instead, demolitions have been small-scale and targeted.²¹ At the same time, there has been an overhaul of the land and development regulations typified by the urban housing policy. Housing space standards have been reduced from a minimum plot size of 300m2 to as low as 100m2.²² With government and local authorities bankrupt, the development process has been opened up to anyone who appears to have the means to participate.

Crucially, houses can now be developed even where there is no approved land-use layout plan, no cadastral surveys and no infrastructure. All these factors have contributed to urban spatial growth in rural areas. They have also contributed to de-urbanisation in the sense of loss of urban character, namely, growth of urban areas lacking the infrastructure, services and institutions Zimbabweans would normally expect.

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Boundary games

In a 2012 paper challenging myths of urban dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa, Potts underlined that much of the addition of large numbers of people to urban populations each year “appears to be increasingly derived from rural settlements being redefined as ‘urban’ having passed a definitional population threshold”.²³ The Mo Ibrahim Foundation reported that in Kenya’s 2009 census, the re-classification of rural and peri-urban areas as urban led to a 29% upsurge in the urban population.²⁴ Zimbabwe’s experience since the 1990s, however, has been different.

Instead of boundary changes to incorporate rural villages into urban areas, boundaries in Zimbabwe have remained static while urban sprawl and urban populations in rural jurisdictions have expanded. As a result, the 2012 census did not capture the urban demographic growth the spatial expansion has caused. The 2012 census enumeration tracts were aligned with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s 2008 elections boundaries. Other than for political expediency, it is not clear why this was necessary; ordinarily, statistics from the previous census should drive the delimitation of election boundaries not the other way round. The fractious politics of the country means that changing boundaries – or leaving them unchanged – is more a political issue than a response to urgent urban management issues. Decisions are taken with an eye to electoral advantages that may accrue. This undermines direct comparison of the 2012 census data with those of previous censuses. Reviewing the census report indicates that boundary rigidity has led to urban populations of many small settlements and undesignated urban areas being counted and reported as rural, even though the populations of these settlements were above the 2,500 threshold. For Harare, as described below, the population counted as rural is in the magnitude of hundreds of thousands.

In land-use and population terms, Figure 4a shows an example of the growth of urban populations in areas still designated as rural: Caledonia Farm, to the east of Harare. This is an organic growth area that now forms a continuation of the existing city. Even after a presidential proclamation (Statutory Instrument SI 119/2012) declaring the incorporation of Caledonia into Harare municipality, the area was still enumerated in the 2012 census as part of rural Goromonzi District (Ward 25), with a recorded population of 27,102. ²⁵As at September 2016, it was still politically represented as such. Yet by 2015, it had between 23,000 and 30,000 plots. Assuming an average of four people per plot, Caledonia’s population was no less than 100,000.²⁶

Another example is in Masvingo, where people have been settling on Clipsham and Victoria Ranch (see Figure 4b) to the south and southwest, respectively, of the city centre. The 2012 census counted both areas as part of Masvingo Rural District with Clipsham Farm as Ward 8 (population 9,020) and Victoria Ranch Farm as Ward 7 (population 5,211).²⁷ ZIMSTAT has resisted making available data for all the enumeration areas and relevant boundary information to enable comprehensive countrywide plotting of urban areas counted as rural wards. But the examples of Caledonia, Victoria Ranch and Clipsham clearly show that a huge urban population was counted as rural in 2012, due to boundaries that had not been changed to reflect urban sprawl.

Figure 4a

Figure 4b

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Towards a (majority) urban Zimbabwe?

The FTLRP initiated in 2000 led to rural–urban migration in the short term, which Operation Murambatsvina then partially reversed. The population of Zimbabwe’s large cities is still growing in aggregate terms, albeit the rate of growth may be slowing. Furthermore, the 2012 census did not capture the impact of spatial growth on the population statistics of these centres; and the urbanisation of rural areas is not fully recognised due to boundary rigidity. These are part of diverse temporal, regional and local variations that contradict the depiction of a generalised trend of de-urbanisation in Zimbabwe.

If any de-urbanisation is taking place, it is localised and driven by factors linked to historical communal land rights, regional and international migration and circulation, droughts, and social turbulence arising from state operations and political instability. Mobility is a better way to conceptualise the dynamics of Zimbabwe’s demographic and political economy, and rural–urban dynamics. High levels of mobility and circulation warrant caution in jumping to conclusions about Zimbabwe’s rate of urbanisation based on recent aggregate population statistics.

The 2013 Constitution has a provision that seeks to establish political certainty in the election process and ensure fairer elections through regularly making boundary changes to better reflect population distribution. Section 161 (1) states that “once every ten years, on a date or within a period fixed by the Commission, so as to fall as soon as possible after a population census, The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission must conduct a delimitation of the electoral boundaries into which Zimbabwe is to be divided”; and in doing so “ensure that no ward is divided between two or more local authority areas” (Section 161 (5) (a)). Clearly, delimiting local authority boundaries is intertwined with electoral and census boundaries. National elections are due in 2018 and one can expect that electoral boundaries should change to account for both the 2012 census results and any submissions various interested parties make.

When, in the near future, boundary changes are made, the urban population will show a dramatic increase since the 2012 census. Economic recovery would provide a further boost to urban investment and attract more rural–urban migrants. It is not inconceivable that Zimbabwe could still reach the 50% urbanisation level by 2050. Meanwhile, further comprehensive analysis of disaggregated socio-spatial census data is needed to enhance the understanding of urban transformation in the country.

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NOTES

1. Potts, Deborah, “Challenging the myths of urban dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa: the experience of Nigeria”, World Development 40(7), p.1383

2. Potts, Deborah, Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanisation?, Africa Research Institute, 2012; Circular migration in Zimbabwe and contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, James Currey, 2010; “Challenging the myths of urban dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa: the experience of Nigeria”, World Development 40(7), pp.1382–1393; “What do we know about urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa and does it matter?”, International Development Planning 34(1), pp.v-xxi; “Debates about African urbanisation, migration and economic growth: what can we learn from Zimbabwe and Zambia?”, The Geographical Journal 182(3), pp.251–264

3. African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme, African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities And Structural Transformation, p.146

4. Ibid., pp.161–2

5. Potts, Deborah, Circular migration in Zimbabwe and contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, James Currey, 2010; “Debates about African urbanisation, migration and economic growth: what can we learn from Zimbabwe and Zambia?”, The Geographical Journal 182(3), pp.251–264; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, African Urban Dynamics: Facts and Figures 2015

6. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, African Urban Dynamics: Facts and Figures 2015, p.11

7. See Potts Deborah, Circular migration in Zimbabwe and contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, James Currey, 2010; Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanisation? Africa Research Institute, 2012; “Debates about African urbanisation, migration and economic growth: what can we learn from Zimbabwe and Zambia?”, The Geographical Journal, 182(3): pp.251–264

8. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT), Population Census National Report 2012, p.25

9. Ibid., p.13

10. Ibid., Table 2.2 (C), p.28

11. ZIMSTAT, Population Census National Report 2002, Table 2.3, p.20

12. Scoones, Ian, “Mvurwi: from farm worker settlement to booming business centre”, zimbabweland, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2016/05/16/1654/, 16 May 2016

13. ZIMSTAT, Population Census National Report 2012, p.114

14. Ibid., p.31

15. Ibid., pp.30–32

16. Ibid., p.42

17. See Kamete, Amin, “Of prosperity, ghost towns and havens: mining and urbanisation in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30(4), 2012, pp.589–609; Marongwe, Nelson, “The fast track resettlement and urban development nexus: the case of Harare”, Harare: Zimbabwe Regional Environment Organisation (ZERO). Paper presented at the Symposium on Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post-Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe, Mont Clair, Nyanga, 26–28 March 2003; Banana, Evans, Chitekwe-Biti, Beth and Walnycki, Anna, “Co-producing inclusive city-wide sanitation strategies: lessons from Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe”, Environment and Urbanization 27(1), 2016, pp.35–54

18. Author’s observations during 1998–2006. See also Mutopo, Patience, Women, mobility and rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe: experiences of fast track land reform, Brill, 2014

19. Government of Zimbabwe, National Housing Policy 2012, Harare: Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing

20. See, for example, Government of Zimbabwe, Report of Audit Team on Issues of land management and land allocations in Chitungwiza Town and Seke Rural District, 2013; and Government of Zimbabwe, Report on the findings of the inter-ministerial team investigating issues at Caledonia Farm, 2015

21. See, for example, October 2016 demolitions in Harare’s southern zones, along the Masvingo Road; “Demolitions leave 300 families homeless along Harare–Masvingo Road”, Nehanda Radio, http://nehandaradio.com/2016/10/27/demolitions-leave-3000-families-homeless-along-harare-masvingo-road-pictures/ [accessed 1 November 2016]

22. Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, Circular 70 of 2004; Government of Zimbabwe, National Housing Policy 2012

23. Potts, Deborah, “Challenging the myths of urban dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa: the experience of Nigeria”, World Development 40(7), 2012, p.138

24. Ibid., p.11

25. E-mail from ZIMSTAT, September 2016

26. The national average household size is 4.2 people and 3.9 for Harare (see ZIMSTAT, Population Census National Report 2012, p.54). The Financial Gazette gave Caledonia Farm’s 2015 population as almost 100,000 (see “Caledonia children suffering in silence”, 7 May 2015, www.financialgazette.co.zw/caledonia-children-suffering-in-silence/)

27. Email from ZIMSTAT, September 2016

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Dr. Beacon Mbiba is Senior Lecturer in Urban Development Policy at Oxford Brookes University. His current research focuses on urban land, infrastructure planning, urban finance and rural-urban linkages.

This article references some findings from a study conducted by the Infrastructure and Cities for Economic Development (ICED) Facility, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of DFID. ICED is a facility set up to accelerate DFID’s infrastructure and cities initiatives across the world; for more information on ICED, please contact: iced.programming@uk.pwc.com.

The post On the periphery: Missing urbanisation in Zimbabwe – Beacon Mbiba appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

L’Émission de l’obligation municipale à Dakar : Le Conte de Deux Cités

Yovanka ARI — Fri, 15 Jul 2016 16:14:53 +0000

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La croissance des grandes villes d’Afrique est si rapide que les gouvernements centraux et municipaux s’en trouvent accablés. Il y a un manque de planification stratégique ; des lacunes dans la prestation de services de base aux résidents s’élargissent de plus en plus. Depuis les années 90, une décentralisation généralisée a beaucoup fait pour transférer la responsabilité de l’urbanisation aux autorités locales, alors qu’elles ne reçoivent qu’une part modique du revenu intérieur avec laquelle elles doivent s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités.1 Certaines autorités municipales – diligentes et proactives – sont en train d’étudier des moyens pour améliorer la génération des revenus ainsi que les possibilités de diversifier les sources de financement. Selon le contexte légal et réglementaire, l’appétit des investisseurs, ainsi que la solvabilité des emprunteurs et des projets d’investissement proposés, les obligations municipales seraient peut-être un mécanisme de financement valable pour certaines capitales d’Afrique. Ce Briefing Note décrit la tentative de la Ville de Dakar, capitale du Sénégal, de lancer la première obligation municipale de l’UEMOA (l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine), tout en évaluant les répercussions du blocage de cette initiative par le gouvernement central.

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Capitale contestée
Confusion de pouvoirs
Les investissements de Dakar
Faire son marché
Dakar évaluée… puis bloquée
Financer l’urbanisation de l’Afrique
Sources

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Capitale contestée

Pendant les années 2000, le Président Abdoulaye Wade cherchait à promouvoir Dakar en tant qu’une destination importante d’investissements. Un vaste programme de construction avait créé alors des routes, des centres commerciaux, des hôtels, ainsi que des créations plus controversées : le Monument de la Renaissance africaine, la Porte du Millénaire… En 2008, Dakar a accueilli le Sommet de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique (OCI). Commencent alors des travaux pour créer un nouvel aéroport international. La grande vision de Wade évoquait celle du Président Léopold Sédar Senghor, faisant écho aux années 60.

La plupart des Dakarois ne voyaient pas les avantages de cette nouvelle infrastructure. « Les routes ne se mangent pas » affirmait-on souvent à Dakar, ville où seulement une personne sur cinq trouvait un emploi à temps plein. La pénurie chronique d’emplois et de logements abordables, émeutes de la faim, services de transports inadéquats et embouteillages, inondations, gestion erratique des déchets, conduites d’égout cassées, pannes de courant fréquentes… Tels sont les traits de l’« autre » Dakar. En ce qui concerne les bidonvilles et les colonies de squatters où vivent 40 % de la population – ainsi que dans de nombreuses zones d’entreprises et de logements formels – l’Etat reste largement inefficace. Pour Amadou Diop, professeur de géographie, les « caractéristiques clés » de sa ville seraient « la croissance effrénée, l’occupation désorganisée et déséquilibrée des terres, une crise manifeste, et un environnement en déclin ».2

En 2009, Khalifa Sall du Parti Socialiste a été élu Maire de Dakar, délogeant alors un allié de Wade. Sall a promis d’améliorer la ville – surtout pour les habitants les plus défavorisés – et de garantir une plus grande participation du public dans les affaires de la ville. Réélu en 2014, Khalifa Sall était vu comme le porte-drapeau de la participation active des gouvernements locaux à travers l’Afrique, en tant que secrétaire général de l’Association internationale des maires francophones (AIMF) et président de Cités et gouvernements locaux unis d’Afrique (CGLUA). En 2012, Dakar a accueilli le Sommet Africités, la réunion triennale de CGLUA qui rassemble des milliers d’experts et de fonctionnaires venus des quatre coins du continent. D’ailleurs, Khalifa Sall a insisté sur l’adoption d’une Charte africaine du gouvernement local, tout en exigeant la création d’un Conseil supérieur de l’union africaine des autorités locales. Aux yeux de Sall, il fallait que ce soient les plus proches de la population – c’est-à-dire, les autorités locales – qui constituent le moteur du développement favorable aux défavorisés, sinon celui-ci ne se réalisera jamais.

Dakar est depuis longtemps le champ de bataille principal où s’affrontent des intérêts commerciaux et politiques. Par exemple, au début du mandat du maire, entre son administration et Wade éclate un conflit a éclaté sur la gestion des déchets dans la capitale. En cas d’inondations, l’on discute invariablement la responsabilité de remédier aux dégâts. Si Khalifa Sall et le président actuel, Macky Sall, se sont unis pour renverser Wade, et que les deux ont souvent exprimé leur volonté de collaborer pour le bien de Dakar, ils restent quand même des adversaires politiques. Lorsque les partis politiques s’affrontent, comme au cours des élections locales de 2014, cette rivalité est d’une pertinence primordiale. Dans la perspective du rythme et de l’efficacité du développement de la capitale du Sénégal, le programme de décentralisation joue un rôle également important.

Confusion de pouvoirs

Le Code des Collectivités Locales du Sénégal (1996) a été élaboré dans le but d’apaiser les adversairespolitiques du gouvernement d‘Abdou Diouf, président alors depuis 1981. Cette législation prévoyait le transfert de pouvoirs considérables aux autorités locales dans le cadre de la décentralisation et de la dévolution. La loi promouvait d’ailleurs la participation citoyenne et la planification régionale. Sa rhétorique s’appuyait sur le principe de subsidiarité, pour rapprocher le gouvernement de la population. Qui plus est, l’article 58 de la loi 96-07 dispose que nulle fonction ne doit être transférée aux autorités locales sans le transfert de ressources adéquates, provenant de recettes de certains impôts, de subventions, sinon des deux. Dans le cas de Dakar, il n’en a jamais été ainsi. L’Etat refuse, de manière systématique, de transmettre les fonds aux municipalités : à celles surtout entre les mains de l’opposition. Des transferts financiers erratiques, arbitraires, manquant de transparence, font partie intégrale de la décentralisation sénégalaise et décrédibilisent gravement l’objectif déclaré.

A Dakar, la prédominance continue de l’Etat trouve son incarnation administrative dans le préfet du département de Dakar – nommé par le gouvernement – et son incarnation fiscale dans le percepteur, qui constitue le comptable externe de la ville. Ces deux individus ont les pouvoirs nécessaires pour intervenir dans l’administration de la ville, ainsi que la capacité de la superviser. En revanche, la Ville de Dakar ne dispose d’aucun mécanisme qui oblige le gouvernement central à payer ses dus. Mises en place par l’Etat, plusieurs initiatives visant à augmenter les finances des autorités locales ont échoué. Pour la période de 2008-2012, la moyenne annuelle des indemnités versées à la Ville de Dakar – apparemment pour financer les fonctions que lui transférait la décentralisation – représentait la somme modique de 322 millions FCFA (650 000 $US)3 , soit moins de 1 % du budget municipal.

Sans le transfert régulier des ressources auxquelles elle a légalement droit, la Ville de Dakar n’est pas en mesure de s’acquitter de l’ensemble des responsabilités – importantes, d’ailleurs – qui lui sont dévolues.4 Les possibilités d’augmenter les ressources en améliorant la perception locale de revenus sont limitées parce que la fiscalité est hautement centralisée. Si la Ville a réussi à augmenter ses propres recettes de presque 40 % dans la période de 2008–2012, elle ne contrôle que moins de 10 % du total de ses revenus, qui proviennent pour la plupart de frais perçus pour les pancartes publicitaires. Après vingt ans, la décentralisation n’a pas encore apporté ce qu’elle avait promis au début aux résidents de Dakar.

Le cadre de la décentralisation crée un chevauchement important des systèmes de gouvernement local et national. Alors que leurs relations au quotidien se caractérisent par l’harmonie, il se produit fréquemment une « confusion de pouvoirs » qui complique et qui contrecarre la planification et l’administration locales. Des ambiguïtés dans la définition des responsabilités respectives forment un obstacle de taille à une collaboration plus efficace entre les gouvernements central et municipal à Dakar.

Les investissements de Dakar

Khalifa Sall s’était promis que le conseil municipal devrait prouver sa crédibilité quant à la compétence de son administration, que les limites financières ne réduiraient pas le conseil à l’inaction. « Dès le début, nous avons pris la décision d’investir les ressources de la Ville – telles qu’elles étaient – dans toutes les fonctions dont nous sommes responsables : les fonctions sociales, culturelles, sportives, et autres », nous a affirmé le maire.6 Parmi les premières initiatives dans le cadre de l’éducation, on comptait un programme de distribution de lait, des uniformes scolaires gratuits et des ordinateurs pour les écoles primaires, et des examens médicaux gratuits – chaque année – pour les enfants. Et dans le cadre des grands programmes de travaux publics, appuyés par le programme des « bénévoles dakarois » visant les jeunes sans travail, on a entrepris par exemple l’amélioration du revêtement des routes et le désensablement du centre-ville.

Sall a cherché des fonds de toutes parts. Dans le but d’accéder aux prêts et à d’autres fonds externes, Dakar avait été évaluée dans le cadre d’un examen du programme « Dépenses publiques et responsabilité financière » (PEFA) : cela l’a aidé dans sa mission.7 Première entité sous-nationale à se faire évaluer dans ce programme, la performance de la Ville de Dakar était mixte. Selon l’examen, Dakar « [n’avait] pas de programme de réformes, encore moins de programme pour gérer les finances publiques »8 L’on a souligné des insuffisances dans la planification et dans les prévisions. Cependant, cet examen PEFA a initié certaines améliorations : par exemple, dans la comptabilité, l’on publiera par la suite les audits et les évaluations.

Des réformes ont permis à Dakar de faire des emprunts. En 2008, l’Agence Française de Développement a fait un prêt concessionnel de 10 millions d’euros (16 millions $US) sur 20 ans pour améliorer l’éclairage des rues. Avec Sall à la barre, on a aussi accordé des prêts commerciaux : 3,6 milliards FCFA (7,2 millions $US) venus d’Ecobank pour reconstruire un marché au centre-ville ; de la Banque Islamique du Sénégal, un prêt de 2,1 milliards FCFA (4,1 millions $US) sur trois ans pour des feux de circulation ; et de la Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement, 9,7 milliards FCFA (19,5 millions $US) pour la réfection des routes et des places de parking. A ce jour, le service de la dette et les remboursements de prêt s’effectuent à temps.

« L’expérience des investissements dans les feux de circulation, les routes, les chaussées, nous a beaucoup appris », dit Khalifa Sall. « Nous avons décidé, après, d’entreprendre un programme pour réduire réellement la pauvreté. » On a planifié d’importants investissements dans une zone commerciale de 10 ha à Petersen, à l’extrémité nord de la municipalité de Dakar-Plateau. Dans une stratégie de réorganisation du centre-ville, l’on a prévu un nouveau marché de 13 milliards FCFA (26 millions $US) pouvant abriter au moins 4 000 des marchands ambulants et commerçants de Dakar. Démarche controversée, le maire avait interdit le commerce de rue – après de nombreuses séances de consultation auprès des associations de commerçants pour leur expliquer ses projets et pour entendre leurs objections. Malgré l’objectif de « réduire la pauvreté », visant d’ailleurs les marchands de rue, les relations entre les autorités et les marchands ambulants restent volatiles, parfois même acrimonieuses.

Le regroupement des marchands ambulants du centre-ville dans un seul endroit avait un atout supplémentaire : la décongestion du Plateau et de la partie la plus au sud de la péninsule. Selon la Banque Mondiale, la congestion routière à Dakar, aggravée par le commerce de rue, coûterait 108 milliards FCFA (216 millions $US) en perte de revenus, chaque année. En diminuant sa dépendance financière au gouvernement central, le programme visait d’ailleurs à générer des revenus dont la ville avait grand besoin. Le défi consistait à trouver les fonds nécessaires : 20 milliards FCFA (40 millions $US). En 2012, les revenus d’exploitation de Dakar s’élevaient à 36,5 milliards FCFA (73 millions $US) ; ses dépenses en capital étaient de l’ordre de 11 milliards FCFA (22 millions $US).

Faire son marché

C’est dans le contexte d’une immense agitation politique – la course aux élections présidentielles 2012 – la course aux élections présidentielles 2012 – que Sall établit ses projets. « D’un jour à l’autre, le maire ne savait pas s’il allait être jeté en prison [par Wade], ou si les maires seraient tous abolis », affirme Khady Dia Sarr, directrice du « Dakar Municipal Finance Programme » (DMFP), équipe constituée au sein du bureau du maire et composée de quatre cadres sénégalais et d’un expert externe.9 Malgré la possibilité de sources alternatives, l’émission d’une obligation municipale comportait des attraits indéniables. Elle permettrait à la Ville de Dakar d’emprunter une somme importante sous forme de montant forfaitaire, à un taux inférieur à celui des emprunts commerciaux. Elle serait d’ailleurs le signe de sa détermination à ne pas dépendre des financements concessionnels, ainsi que la preuve de sa confiance dans ses capacités à gérer er des investissements générateurs de recettes. Selon Dieynabo Dabo, la coordinatrice du DMFP, les préparatifs de l’émission d’une obligation représentaient « un processus tout nouveau » pour le maire, le DMFP, et toute l’administration municipale. « Personne ne savait au juste ce qu’il fallait faire. » Ayant finalisé ses projets au mois de mai, le DMFP a été lancé officiellement en septembre 2012.

Dans la plupart des pays d’Afrique, les entités sous-nationales n’ont pas droit aux emprunts. Peu nombreuses sont les municipalités pouvant établir leur solvabilité en fonction des flux de trésorerie, un profil d’endettement, ou des antécédents de crédit suffisants pour dissiper les craintes des investisseurs concernant les remboursements. Rares sont celles pouvant démontrer des antécédents adéquats de planification stratégique, de gestion des dettes, ou d’administration compétente. A cet égard, Dakar ressemblait à la plupart des capitales d’Afrique. Ses revenus auto-générés, comme ses ressources, étaient réduits ; son budget dépendait énormément du gouvernement ; ses capacités techniques restaient limitées. En revanche, après l’examen PEFA, la Ville avait établi une Direction de la Planification et du Développement Durable (DPDD) capable de démontrer que Dakar avait une stratégie de développement crédible ; de plus, elle pouvait faire preuve d’une gestion des dettes compétente.

Les préparatifs de l’émission d’obligations municipales sont d’une importance primordiale. Vue la méfiance des membres des services de planification, d’administration, et de finances municipaux, il fallait qu’ils se sentent pleinement consultés et intégrés dans le processus. Dans ce but, l’on a institué un nouveau conseil consultatif englobant la société civile, des représentants des entreprises, des chefs religieux. L’on a mis en œuvre un nombre d’initiatives visant une professionnalisation de l’administration de la ville et une amélioration de l’expertise : du DPDD, pour approfondir le plan stratégique de Dakar ; de la Direction Générale des Finances, pour maximiser la perception des recettes ; de la Direction du Développement Urbain, pour aider à la conception et à la construction du projet d’investissements.

Il fallait aussi savoir comment s’y prendre avec le cadre réglementaire : il était nécessaire que l’obligation respecte les exigences de l’autorité émettrice, le Conseil Régional de l’Épargne Publique et des Marchés Financiers (CREPMF) de l’UEMOA, dont le siège est à Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire). Au début de 2014, une équipe de la Banque Mondiale a fait le suivi de l’examen ; elle a donné des conseils à la Ville sur la mise en œuvre d’améliorations supplémentaires dans la gestion des recettes fiscales. La réussite d’une émission dépend d’un projet d’investissements crédible, des communications proactives, et du choix du bon moment.

Dakar évaluée… puis bloquée

Dès le début, l’on a demandé à l’agence de notation internationale Moody’s de fournir une cote de crédit confidentielle pour la Ville de Dakar. Pour ce faire, l’on a évalué par exemple son aptitude à prendre des décisions, la qualité de sa planification budgétaire, sa gestion des actifs et des créances, ainsi que la prévisibilité de ses revenus. Cette cote servirait de repère permettant de mesurer les améliorations éventuelles avant l’obtention d’une notation publique, officielle. Vu que l’obligation serait lancée dans le marché régional de l’UEMOA, c’est une agence régionale de notations – Bloomfield, basée en Côte d’Ivoire, agréée par le CREPMF – que l’on a choisie à cette fin.

En septembre 2013, après un réexamen rigoureux de ses finances, durant trois mois, Dakar a reçu une notation A3 à court terme et une notation BBB+ à long terme. Une telle cote de qualité (« investment-grade ») aurait suffit à justifier l’émission de l’obligation, selon les directives du régulateur ; cependant, la Ville a aussi fixé une garantie partielle de 50 % du montant principal de l’obligation de la part de l’Agence des Etats-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) pour augmenter encore plus la solvabilité de la transaction. « Le rehaussement de crédit de la part d’un garant éminent tel que l’USAID a dissipé certaines des inquiétudes concernant les défaillances dans les pires des cas », affirme Jeremy Gorelick, principal conseiller financier et technique du DMFP.

La Ville ayant reçu sa notation, il était possible de structurer l’obligation. Le montant de l’emprunt a été fixé à 20 milliards FCFA (40 million $US), à rembourser sur une période de sept ans. L’on a proposé un taux d’intérêt annuel de 6,6 %. Pendant les deux premières années, aucune partie du montant principal de l’emprunt ne serait remboursable ; cependant, l’USAID avait stipulé un fonds de réserve pour financer les premiers remboursements. Une compagnie dakaroise a été chargée d’organiser la commercialisation et le placement de l’obligation par l’entremise de 18 intermédiaires financiers parmi les huit pays de l’UEMOA. En janvier 2015, après les retards provoqués par les élections locales de 2014, le lancement de l’obligation sur la Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières d’Abidjan, était imminent. La couverture médiatique commence alors, de même que le forum itinérant pour investisseurs. La demande des investisseurs aurait été forte ; en février, le CREPMF émit le visa autorisant l’émission de l’obligation.

Deux jours avant le jour du lancement officiel, le ministère de l’économie et des finances a suspendu l’avis de non-objection qu’il avait accordé au projet en juillet 2014. Il a souligné certaines « objections techniques », ce qui a bloqué l’émission de l’obligation. Dès lors, se soulèvent des questions, des doutes concernant : le niveau d’endettement de la Ville ; la responsabilité de l’Etat, en cas de défaillance, pour la moitié de l’émission non couverte par l’USAID ; l’appartenance politique du promoteur immobilier, bénéficiaire potentiel de la construction de la nouvelle zone à Petersen ; la légalité de l’émission au regard de l’Acte III de la décentralisation. Le 5 mars, CREPMF retire le visa autorisant l’obligation.

Khalifa Sall déclarera que rien n’avait changé depuis la décision du gouvernement permettant l’entreprise du processus. Le préfet et le percepteur – nommé par le ministère de l’économie et des finances – avaient approuvé la légalité budgétaire et générale de l’émission. Bien des alliés du maire voyaient le blocage comme une attaque ad hominem contre lui. Lors des élections locales de 2014, il avait battu la première ministre, Aminata Touré, candidate nommée par le gouvernement pour le déloger et s’assurer le contrôle de la capitale. Ayant gagné son deuxième mandat de maire, la possibilité qu’il mène une campagne présidentielle contre Macky Sall se révélait plus probable : l’influence de la politique nationale sur la gestion de la capitale sénégalaise se voyait confirmée de nouveau.

Financer l’urbanisation de l’Afrique

A ce jour, la rapide urbanisation ne constitue pas un moteur clé de la croissance économique en Afrique subsaharienne. Elle se caractérise par : la prolifération de bidonvilles non planifiés et dénués de services essentiels ; l’explosion du chômage chez les jeunes ; l’escalade dans la dégradation et les risques environnementaux. En général, les projets du gouvernement ne tiennent pas compte de la grande majorité des résidents de la plupart des grandes villes, ni de leur activités économiques informelles, dont dépend un avenir plus prospère. Il existe une insuffisance chronique de financement urbain.

Selon une étude de 2012, le déficit d’investissements municipal d’Afrique aurait été de 25 milliards $US chaque année : « Malgré ce besoin pressant, la plupart des gouvernements locaux d’Afrique ont un accès restreint aux marchés des capitaux et ne disposent pas de finances du secteur privé pour les infrastructures. »10 La diversification des finances est d’une nécessité urgente. Les grandes villes d’Afrique ne peuvent plus vivre en dépendant d’indemnités inadéquates du gouvernement central ou de financements concessionnels (par donation) qui sont limités. Une plus grande autonomie financière est essentielle. Le rôle primordial des gouvernements locaux dans la réalisation des Objectifs de Développement Durable (ODD) a été reconnu dans le Programme d’Action d’Addis Ababa de 2015 ; en octobre 2016, ce rôle sera souligné au sommet mondial Habitat III.

Dakar a fait preuve d’une approche innovatrice devant ses exigences de financement. Dirigée par un maire dynamique, compétent, la tentative de faire d’importants investissements pro-pauvres, générateurs de revenus, financés par une obligation municipale, a beaucoup de leçons à enseigner à d’autre villes. Le DMFP était bel et bien une initiative locale. Les préparatifs de l’émission obligataire n’ont pas nécessité une armée de technocrates externes ; il a suffi d’un noyau d’administrateurs municipaux compétents, appuyés si nécessaire par des institutions externes de financement du développement. Il a fallu que certains services municipaux améliorent l’exécution de quelques fonctions de base : la planification, la communication, la collaboration ont servi dans ce but. En amenant la Ville au point de lancer son obligation, le DMFP a aussi souligné le potentiel du renforcement des finances municipales en Afrique.

Il y a une grande marge d’amélioration dans l’administration fiscale par ou au nom des villes, dans la génération des recettes, et dans le contrôle des coûts. Par exemple, à Dakar, l’administration municipale a facilement amélioré la collecte inefficace du gouvernement central des recettes locales, en vertu d’une entente de partage de revenus ; les impôts fonciers restent gravement négligés comme source de revenus municipaux.11 Les marchés obligataires régionaux existants constituent les bases de l’émission obligataire municipale et étatique pour les investisseurs africains en monnaies locales. Toutefois, il serait possible de les renforcer à l’aide d’une industrie de notation de crédit intérieur qui soit plus développé, plus abordable. Un développement du cadre réglementaire des marchés obligataires régionaux entraînerait une hausse dans la confiance des investisseurs, pour favoriser la mobilisation intérieure de plus nombreux actifs financiers d’Afrique.

Les ressources humaines et économiques de l’administration municipale de Dakar n’excèdent pas celles de la plupart des capitales africaines. Ses antécédents financiers n’étaient pas parfaits. Or, la Ville a réussi à construire un argument convaincant de sa solvabilité et à élaborer une transaction bancable qui dépassait de loin les ratios standard du service de la dette pour municipalités. Ces facteurs, avec la garantie de l’USAID, ont attiré un groupe d’investisseurs prêts à s’y engager. En décembre 2014, le DMFP a reçu le Prix Guangzhou, établi en 2012 par l’CGLUA et la ville de Guangzhou. Le projet de Dakar était le seul de l’Afrique parmi les 259 entrées soumises.

A l’image de bien de capitales, Dakar se compose en fait de deux cités. C’est la volte-face du gouvernement central, au dernier moment, qui a bouleversé l’émission de l’obligation : ce qui souligne que Dakar est un prix politique farouchement disputé, tout en constituant le centre tristement sous-financé et le cœur de l’activité économique du Sénégal. Cette dualité représente une barrière importante au développement socio-économique de beaucoup de capitales du monde. Cependant, en Afrique, la nécessité de la contourner est particulièrement pressante. Pour que l’urbanisation devienne un moteur du développement, il faudra prioriser la collaboration et le développement avant les partis politiques – passage complexe et tendu, difficile à réaliser partout.

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1. Selon CGLUA, les dépenses des gouvernements locaux dans la plupart des pays d’Afrique constituent moins de 10 % des dépenses nationales, contre la moyenne de 25 % des pays OCDE.
2. Diop, Amadou, « Dakar », chapitre 3, in Bekker, Simon (éd.), Capital Cities in Africa, HSRC Press, 2011, p.42.
3. Comme moyenne approximative pour la durée (2012-14) du Programme des Finances Municipales de Dakar, le taux d’échange utilisé ici sera de 500 FCFA pour 1 $US.
4.La Ville a des responsabilités dans neuf domaines : la gestion du patrimoine, de l’environnement, et des ressources naturelles ; la santé, la population, et l’action sociale ; sports et loisirs pour les jeunes ; la culture ; l’éducation ; la planification régionale ; la planification urbaine et le logement.
5. Diop, Amadou, op. cit., p.40.
6.Les citations dans le texte proviennent d’entretiens à Dakar en mai/juin 2014, sauf indication contraire.
7.L’examen PEFA a été financé par le Mécanisme consultatif sur les infrastructures publiques et privées (PPIAF) – fonds multidonateur. Le cadre PEFA établit 31 indicateurs principaux ; il a été instauré en 2005 pour évaluer les gouvernements centraux.
8.Ville de Dakar: Evaluation de la Gestion des Finances Publiques Municipales: Rapport PEFA sur les performances, 30 janv. 2009, p. 68.
9. A l’automne 2011, le DMFP a obtenu une subvention de 500 000 $US de la Fondation Bill & Melinda Gates pour réaliser l’évaluation de faisabilité. Un engagement ultérieur de la Fondation fournira jusqu’à 4,9 millions $US. Il fallait que le projet génère des revenus et qu’il profite aux pauvres en zones urbaines, selon une exigence spécifique. Le PPIAF, le’USAID, l’AFD, et Cities Alliance ont eux aussi fourni de l’aide.
10.Paulais, Thierry, Financing Africa’s Cities: The Imperative of Local Investment, World Bank and Cities Alliance, 2012.
11. V. Monkam, Nara & Moore, Mick, « Les avantages de l’impôt foncier pour l’Afrique », Africa Research Institute, janv. 2015.

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Sustainable funding for Africa’s cities

Yovanka ARI — Fri, 27 May 2016 11:46:55 +0000

Governments are being overwhelmed by the rapid growth of Africa’s cities. Strategic planning has been insufficient and the provision of basic services is worsening. Since the 1990s, widespread devolution has substantially shifted responsibility for coping with urbanisation to local authorities, yet municipal governments across Africa receive a paltry share of national income with which to discharge their responsibilities.

Responsible city authorities are examining how to improve revenue generation and diversify their sources of finance. Following the creation of a sustainable development goal for cities (SDG 11), and ahead of the Habitat III summit in October 2016, ARI invited three speakers to draw upon their experiences on financing options and the urgent need for a proactive approach on the part of national and municipal governments. It coincides with the publication of a new ARI briefing note Dakar’s municipal bond issue: A tale of two cities.

Professor Susan Parnell, Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences, University of Cape Town, and the African Centre for Cities (event podcast 07.13 – 25.45)

We are all interested in Africa, in cities and in financing. But the community of urban scholars and practitioners is not well defined. People do not always agree on the way cities should be studied, or what is important, and do not approach the issue of financing and Africa’s cities from the same direction.
The availability of finance is subject to global ideas and capital flows, but is also shaped and captured by local politics and administrative systems. Understanding how this interaction plays out in the case of African urban finance is made much more complex by the fact that while money flows it also gets “fixed” very quickly in a particular type of investment; by the nature of the built environment, for quite some time. There are real conflicts internally in fiscal systems, but many other factors are also shaping urban financing.
We are in a moment of fundamental change. The discussion about scaling up financing to Africa’s cities has been catalysed by a wider global discussion about sustainable development and cities. The sustainable development goals (SDGs) and discussion about the post-2030 development environment have played a part. So too have a number of major multilateral agreements – the Paris Agreement on climate change is one, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is another. There has been a global realignment of thinking about what we want, with ramifications for where money will potentially go and shifts in the value system with regard to humanitarian aid, health and biodiversity. These changes are as important as the technical process of capital allocation. The normative base has changed in an attempt to do things differently.
One of the things that has emerged is that the importance of the sub-national is being emphasised, as well as universality: cities across the world will determine how well we do with the SDGs.
A number of other important shifts are emerging. For example, Africa has pushed hard to promote in these multilateral agreements a focus on territorial systems and development, not just individual cities. There is also greater emphasis on professionalisation of delivery of sustainable development, whereas previously the emphasis was more on grassroots organisations and participation. The two needn’t be in competition, but the shift has important ramifications for financing and there may be some “push-back”. In this context we are also seeing an increasing aspiration for evidence-based interventions, including in financing.
Implicit in the shift described is the strong argument that cities are the future; and that Africa’s cities, along with Asia’s cities, are the critical sites of intervention. Africa is not being treated as a blank slate exactly, but the continent offers the potential for rolling out a whole raft of innovative and radical practices. Plenty of innovation is already taking place, of course, but there is a sense that African cities offers the most scope for improvement and transformation. This is the context for discussing the financing of cities, and the way this financing is done will be critically important.
A word of caution. At the risk of being rude, finance people have no clue about the constraints they are about to encounter when they begin to engage with African cities and the interplay between all sorts of things – planning, law, finance, the building of administrative capacity, corruption etc. The enormous complexity is poorly understood and there is limited time in which to understand it better.

Dr Beacon Mbiba, Senior Lecturer, Urban Policy and International Development, Oxford Brookes University (event podcast 26.00 – 48.15)

It is important to be aware of the history of the social and political dimensions that are barriers to the mobilisation of financial resources in cities.
A lot has changed in Africa since Habitat II in 1996. The continent is politically more stable, governments are more confident and assertive on the back of economic growth and are determined to dictate what happens rather than be dictated to. Africa now has a coherent strategy – the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
It appears that the people, civil society and local groups, who were predominant in 1996, have become more marginalised. Governments are now to the fore in formulating the input to Habitat III. There are positives and negatives to this.
The main challenges in Africa are very rapid urban population growth (although it must be acknowledged that rural population growth is also rapid); and a chronic infrastructure shortage with regards to transport, energy, water and sanitation. Although proper sanitation is accessible by many more people now than a decade ago 2005, the proportion of people with access has not improved. It is a similar story with access to water. Of course there is much diversity between countries and cities: Accra is not Takoradi and it is not Addis Ababa. The countries with higher economic growth have been able to spend more on urban infrastructure.
The quality of local government will be critical to the sustainability of urban development. We need to have better planning, the political will to manage local finances and resources, and an improvement in local-central relations. Strong, accountable, democratic, participatory local governance is necessary.
This imperative raises important questions about resources. At present, finance raised by local governments in Africa is paltry by comparison with elsewhere. Most funding comes from central government but often it doesn’t pay; as for urban authorities, they often don’t even collect revenues that are due to them. We need to better manage what we have. At least 30% of local government revenue should be self-generated. Ideally, financing should come from land tax or rates, but in most cases land is poorly managed. Urban authorities and elites are the biggest culprits when it comes to non-payment for services.
Since Habitat II, new sources of finance have emerged. One of the most significant – China – isn’t “new” at all. It’s an old partner of Africa. Remember the TAZARA railway. It is now financing many urban projects which traditional western sources of finance wouldn’t touch with a bargepole, such as the Addis Ababa light railway. Such projects can have a major impact on mobility, social inclusion, densification and increased productivity and economic diversification. A journey across Addis which a few years ago took me 2 hours now takes 35 minutes on the light railway. For the poor, especially, this is a significant improvement, although we must bear in mind that cost recovery systems and debts incurred by city authorities often place a greater burden on the poor than the better off.
There is a need for a new social compact between central and local governments. Since 1996, decentralisation laws have been passed in most countries in Africa, yet this has not been pursued in earnest. Political tension between the centre and the local remains high. Most capital cities are controlled by the opposition. This frustrates constructive, sustainable development.
Experimentation by the World Bank and others to see what might make local governments perform better has yielded many positive results. Introducing performance based incentives can work. For example, if you raise more tax locally/ share audited accounts (crucial for project management) with citizens/ introduce more participation in local government decision-making, you will receive a new tranche of funding. We need to ensure that such improvements in governance become sustainable and are not simply abandoned at the end of a programme. Citizen participation and better central-local relations are crucial to sustainability.
Financing should not be seen in isolation. It is intimately connected to the political and social dimensions of urban management and development. So too is the important issue of physical planning.
Informality predominates in African cities. Some big businesses even operate informally. Some city administration operate informally and outside the law. This phenomenon will continue to effect the entire political economy in Africa. At the same time, Africa has resources which it is not tapping effectively. More of what is lost needs to be captured.

Jeremy Gorelick, lead technical adviser, Dakar Municipal Finance Program; lecturer, Johns Hopkins University (event podcast 49.00 – 73.10)

While it is true that the financial sector is ill-prepared for conditions in Africa, it is equally true that city leadership is ill prepared for financiers. It is alarming how many cities think they can launch a municipal bond issue without actually having established a credit history. There are many steps to go through before borrowing commercially from external investors. City leaders are often not prepared to take the time to do the work on structuring and planning projects or assessing appropriate financing packages.
Municipal bonds are attracting a good deal of attention in African capitals, but more traditional sources of funding should not be overlooked: taxes, concessional grants from central government or international donors, user charges for services, and property income.
In many cities, potential investors are confronted by deterrent factors including: high levels of indebtedness; an unwillingness or inability to demonstrate how loans will be repaid; a weak institutional framework, notably when responsibilities have been transferred through devolution without a concomitant transfer of necessary skills to carry them out; weak project management skills and feasibility assessments for the ongoing maintenance and management costs of a project; and shallow domestic or regional financial markets for listing new securities.
Additionally, potential financiers have to consider the enabling environment in a country. Is central government genuinely supportive of local government? Will a mayor or administration’s commitment to a project survive a change in city leadership? Does the city has a credible master plan? Does the project serve its purported purpose – do the users actually care about it? These are all important questions which will routinely be asked.
Dakar’s finances in 2011 were not bleak, but neither was the outlook promising. The cost of the planned investment budget exceeded available revenue and this deficit was set to widen. But Dakar showed what can be done. It had a record of creditworthiness, having repaid some concessional project loans. The leadership was committed to public participation in the planning of the proposed project, a new market in downtown Dakar that would offer subsidised rents to street traders. The proposed investment project was revenue generating. As a result, the city secured a reasonable rating from an external ratings agency and a credit guarantee for 50% of the principal amount of the loan from USAID. However, Dakar’s experience was also instructive in another, less positive respect: the central government’s refusal, for political reasons, to allow the bond issue to go ahead highlighted a tension that exists in many countries in Africa.
If central governments are not more supportive of local governments and remain unwilling or afraid to decentralise in the way they have said they will, the sustainable provision of external financing for Africa’s cities will be very problematic.

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Dakar’s municipal bond issue: A tale of two cities

Yovanka ARI — Fri, 20 May 2016 10:43:52 +0000

May 2016

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Central and municipal governments are being overwhelmed by the rapid growth of Africa’s cities. Strategic planning has been insufficient and the provision of basic services to residents is worsening. Since the 1990s, widespread devolution has substantially shifted responsibility for coping with urbanisation to local authorities, yet municipal governments across Africa receive a paltry share of national income with which to discharge their responsibilities.1 Responsible and proactive city authorities are examining how to improve revenue generation and diversify their sources of finance. Municipal bonds may be a financing option for some capital cities, depending on the legal and regulatory environment, investor appetite, and the creditworthiness of the borrower and proposed investment projects. This Briefing Note describes an attempt by the city of Dakar, the capital of Senegal, to launch the first municipal bond in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) area, and considers the ramifications of the central government blocking the initiative.

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Contested capital
A confusion of powers
Dakar Invests
Going to the Market
Dakar rated…and blocked
Funding Africa’s urbanisation
Sources

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Contested capital

During the 2000s President Abdoulaye Wade sought to establish Dakar as a major investment destination and transform it into a “world-class” city. A massive construction programme created new roads, shopping malls and hotels, as well as controversial creations such as the Monument de la Renaissance Africaine and Porte du Troisième Millénaire. In 2008, Dakar played host to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit. Work commenced on a new international airport. Wade’s grand vision echoed that of President Léopold Sédar Senghor in the 1960s.

For most Dakarois, the benefits of new infrastructure were elusive. “You can’t eat roads” was a common saying in a city where only one in five could find full-time employment. The chronic shortage of jobs and affordable housing, food price riots, poor transport services and traffic congestion, flooding, erratic waste management, broken sewage pipes and frequent power cuts typified the “other” Dakar. In the slums and squatter communities where 40% of the population live, and in many formal housing and business areas, the state is largely ineffectual. Amadou Diop, a professor of geography, has described “the key characteristics” of his city as “uncontrolled growth, unorganised and unbalanced land occupation, a marked crisis and a declining environment”.2

Khalifa Sall of the Parti Socialiste was elected Mayor of Dakar in 2009, unseating an ally of Wade. He promised to improve the city, especially for its poorer residents, and to ensure much greater public participation in its affairs. Sall was re-elected in 2014 and by then had emerged as a standard bearer for active local government throughout Africa as general secretary of the International Association of Francophone Mayors (AIMF) and president of the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA). In 2012, Dakar hosted Africities, UCLGA’s triennial gathering of thousands of local government experts and officials from across the continent. Khalifa Sall also pressed for the adoption of an African Charter on Local Government and the establishment of an African Union High Council on Local Authorities. For Sall, those closest to the people – local government – must drive pro-poor development or it will not occur at all.

Dakar has long been the key battleground for competing political and business interests. Early in Khalifa Sall’s first term, for example, conflict erupted between his administration and Wade over waste management in the capital. When flooding occurs, responsibility for making good the damage is always disputed. Although the parties of Dakar’s mayor and the current president, Macky Sall, joined forces to unseat Wade, and the two frequently voice their willingness to work together for the betterment of Dakar, they are political rivals. When party politics are to the fore, as they were during the 2014 local elections, this becomes particularly relevant. Equally significant to the pace and efficacy of the development of Senegal’s capital is the country’s ongoing decentralisation programme.

A confusion of powers

Senegal’s 1996 Municipal Administration Code was formulated to placate political opposition to the government of Abdou Diouf, president since 1981. The legislation provided for the transfer of significant powers to local government through decentralisation and devolution, and promoted citizen participation and regional planning. The rhetoric articulated the principle of subsidiarity, bringing government closer to the people. Furthermore, Article 58 of Law 96-07 stipulates that no function should be transferred to local government without the transfer of adequate resources, provided by receipts from certain types of tax, grants or both. This has never been the case for Dakar. The state has routinely withheld funding from municipalities, particularly those in the hands of opposition parties. Erratic, arbitrary and non-transparent financial transfers are a feature of Senegal’s decentralisation that severely undermines its stated purpose.

In Dakar, the continued predominance of the state is personified administratively by the government appointed préfet du département de Dakar and fiscally by the percepteur, in effect the city’s external accountant. Both are empowered to intervene in, as well as oversee, city administration; but the city of Dakar has no mechanism to force central government to pay its dues. Several initiatives set up by the state to increase local authority financing have not been successful. Allowances to Dakar, ostensibly to fund the functions transferred by decentralisation, averaged a paltry FCFA322m (US$650,000)3 per annum in 2008-12, less than 1% of the city’s budget.

Without the regular transfer of the resources to which it is legally entitled, Dakar cannot fulfil all its devolved responsibilities, which are significant.4 There is limited scope to increase resources by improving local revenue collection because taxation is highly centralised. Although the city succeeded in increasing its own revenues by almost 40% in 2008–12, it has control over less than 10% of its total revenue, mostly generated from fees for advertising billboards. After two decades decentralisation has yet to deliver what it originally promised to the residents of Dakar.

The framework of decentralisation creates considerable overlap between national and local government systems. While relations on a day-to-day basis are mostly harmonious, a “confusion of powers”5 frequently complicates or frustrates local planning and administration. Ambiguity in the definition of responsibilities is a key stumbling block to more effective collaboration between central and municipal governments in Dakar.

Dakar invests

Khalifa Sall was determined that the city council should gain credibility for competent administration and not be reduced to inaction by financial limitations. “We took the decision at the outset to invest the city’s resources, such as they were, in all functions we are responsible for – social, cultural, sport and others”, the mayor told ARI.6 Early initiatives in education included a school milk programme, free school uniforms and computers for elementary schools, and free annual medical examinations for children. Major public works involving the “Dakar volunteers” programme for unemployed youth included paving and sand clearance from the city centre.

Sall sought funding wherever he could. He was helped by Dakar having undergone a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) review of its financial management system with a view to accessing loans and other external finance.7 T he city was the first subnational entity in Africa to be assessed in this way and its performance was mixed. The review judged that Dakar “[did] not have a programme of reforms, still less a programme of the management of public finances”8. Inadequacies in planning and forecasting were highlighted. Nevertheless, PEFA provided the impetus for improvements, for example in accountability, by making audits and evaluations public. Reforms were sufficient to enable Dakar to borrow. A €10m (US$16m) 20-year concessional loan had already been secured from Agence Française de Développement in 2008 to pay for street lighting improvements. Under Sall, commercial loans were approved: FCFA3.6bn (US$7.2m) from Ecobank to rebuild a downtown market; a three-year FCFA2.1bn (US$4.1m) loan from Banque Islamique du Sénégal for traffic lights; and FCFA9.7bn (US$19.5m) from the West African Development Bank for road rehabilitation and parking. To date, debt service and repayments of these loans have been made on time.

“We learned from the experience of investing in traffic lights, roads and pavements,” says Khalifa Sall. “Next, we decided we would undertake a real poverty reduction project”. A major investment in a 10ha commercial zone in Petersen, at the northern extremity of Dakar- Plateau municipality, was planned. As part of a strategy to reorganise the city centre, the zone included a new FCFA13bn (US$26m) market with affordable space and facilities for 4,000 or more of the city’s marchands ambulants – street vendors – and shopkeepers. The mayor banned street trading, a controversial move, but held frequent consultations with trader associations to explain his plans and hear objections. Although “poverty reduction, with the street vendors” is the objective, relations between the city authorities and marchands ambulants remain volatile and at times acrimonious.

If many of the marchands ambulants of downtown Dakar could be concentrated in a single location, there was another potential benefit. It would decongest Dakar-Plateau and the southernmost part of the peninsula. The World Bank estimates that Dakar’s traffic congestion, exacerbated by unregulated street trading, costs FCFA108bn (US$216m) in lost income a year. The project would also generate much-needed revenue for the city, reducing its financial dependency on the central government. The challenge was raising the required FCFA20bn (US$40m). In 2012, Dakar’s operating revenues were FCFA36.5bn (US$73m) and its capital expenditure FCFA11bn (US$22m).

Going to the market

Sall’s plans were drawn up against a backdrop of immense political turmoil in the run-up to Senegal’s 2012 presidential election. “From day to day, the mayor didn’t know if he’d be thrown in jail [by Wade]. Or if mayors would be abolished altogether,” says Khady Dia Sarr, director of the Dakar Municipal Finance Programme (DMFP), a team of four Senegalese professionals and one external expert established in the mayor’s office.9 Although alternatives existed, the attractions of issuing a municipal bond were clear. It would enable the city to borrow a large amount in a lump sum and at a cheaper rate than commercial borrowing. It would also signal a determination by the city not to rely on concessional financing and confidence in its ability to manage a large revenue-generating investment. Preparation for a bond issue “was a whole new process” for the mayor, DMFP and the city administration, according to DMFP’s co-ordinator Dieynaba Dabo. “No one knew exactly what to do.” Having finalised its plan in May, DMFP was officially launched in September 2012.

In most African countries sub-national entities are not allowed to borrow. Few municipalities are able to establish creditworthiness based on cash flow, debt profile and credit history to allay investor concerns about repayment of the loan. Few can show an adequate record of strategic planning, debt management and competent administration. In this context, Dakar was no different to most African capitals. Its self-generated income and resources were slight, its budget was substantially dependent on central government and its technical capacity limited. But following the PEFA assessment the city had established a Department of Planning and Sustainable Development (DPDD) capable of demonstrating that Dakar had a credible development strategy; and it had a short record of competent debt management.

The preparation for a municipal bond issue is crucial. The mayor and DMFP had to make cautious council members and the city’s finance, administration and planning departments feel involved and fully consulted. A new consultative council was established, which included civil society, business representatives and religious leaders. Small initiatives professionalised city administration and bolstered the expertise of the DPDD, to enhance Dakar’s strategic plan, the Department of Administration and Finance, to maximise revenue collection, and the Department of Urban Development, to help with the design and construction of the investment project.

The regulatory framework also had to be navigated: the bond needed to comply with the requirements of the issuing authority, WAEMU’s Conseil Régional de l’Épargne Publique et des Marchés Financiers (CREPMF), with headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Early in 2014, a World Bank team followed up on the PEFA review and advised the city on implementing further improvements in its fiscal revenue management. A successful issue is dependent on a credible investment plan, proactive communications and good timing.

Dakar rated… and blocked

At the outset, international ratings agency Moody’s was commissioned to provide a confidential credit rating for Dakar. The process appraised, among other things, the quality of the city’s decision making, budgetary planning, asset and debt management, and the predictability of revenues. The rating provided a benchmark against which improvements could be made before obtaining an official, public rating. Given that the bond would be launched in the WAEMU regional market, Bloomfield a ratings agency, based in Côte d’Ivoire and accredited by CREPMF, was selected.

In September 2013, after a rigorous three-month re-examination of its finances, Dakar received an A3 short-term rating and BBB+ long-term rating. Although this investment-grade rating would have been sufficient under the regulator’s guidelines for bond issuance, the city secured a partial guarantee for 50% of the principal amount of the bond from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to further enhance the transaction’s creditworthiness. Jeremy Gorelick, lead technical and financial adviser to DMFP, commented that “the presence of a credit enhancement from a well-respected guarantor like USAID helped to relieve some of the concerns about worst-case default scenarios.”

Once the city received its rating, the bond could be structured. The loan amount was set at FCFA20bn(US$40m) to be repaid after seven years. Annual interest of 6.6% was offered to investors. For the first two years none of the principal amount of the loan would be repayable, but USAID stipulated a reserve fund to finance the first such repayments. A Dakar-based firm was mandated to arrange the marketing and placing of the bond through 18 financial intermediaries in the eight WAEMU countries. In January 2015, after delays partly caused by the 2014 local elections, the launch of the bond on Abidjan’s Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières, the regional securities exchange, was imminent. Press coverage and a regional investor roadshow began. Investor demand was reported as strong and in February CREPMF issued the visa authorising the issue to proceed.

Two days before the official launch date, Senegal’s ministry of the economy and finance suspended a written avis de non-objection it had given to the project in July 2014, presenting certain “technical objections” that blocked the bond issuance. Concerns and questions were raised about the city’s level of indebtedness; the potential liability of the state in the event of default for the 50% of the issue not covered by USAID’s guarantee; the political affiliation of the real estate developer who stood to benefit from the construction of the new Petersen commercial zone; and the legality of the issue under Act III of decentralisation. On 5 March, CREPMF withdrew the visa for the bond.

Khalifa Sall responded that nothing had changed since the government had given its permission to proceed. The préfet and the percepteur, an appointee of the ministry of the economy and finance, had approved the general and budgetary legality of the issue. Many of the mayor’s allies saw the block as being directed at Khalifa Sall personally. In the 2014 local elections he defeated the prime minister, Aminata Touré, put up as a candidate by the government to unseat him and win control of the capital. With the possibility of the mayor standing for the presidency against Macky Sall appearing more likely after he secured a second term as mayor, the influence of national politics on the management of Senegal’s capital was once again confirmed.

Funding Africa’s urbanisation

To date, rapid urbanisation has not been a key driver of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. It is characterised by the proliferation of unplanned slums devoid of basic service provision, spiralling youth unemployment, and escalating environmental hazard and degradation. The overwhelming majority of residents of most cities and their informal economic activity, on which a more prosperous future depends, are largely ignored by government master plans. There is a chronic shortfall in urban financing.

A 2012 study estimated Africa’s “municipal investment gap” at US$25 billion per annum. The report observed that “despite this pressing need most African local governments have limited access to capital markets and no private sector finance for infrastructure”.10 Diversification of funding is urgently required. Africa’s cities cannot continue to rely on inadequate handouts from central government and limited donor-funded concessional finance. Greater financial autonomy is a necessity. The crucial role of local governments in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was recognised in the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda; and it will be re-emphasised by the Habitat III global summit in October 2016.

Dakar showed an active, innovative approach to its funding requirements. Led by a dynamic, competent mayor the attempt to make a substantial pro-poor, revenue-generating investment funded by a municipal bond has much to teach other cities. DMFP was very much an indigenous initiative. The preparation for the bond issue did not require armies of external technocrats; a core of competent municipal administrators was sufficient, supported by external development finance institutions where necessary. Key city departments were required to carry out a few basic functions better and this was achieved through planning, communication and collaboration. By taking the city to the point of launching its bond, DMFP also highlighted the potential for bolstering municipal finance in Africa.

There is considerable scope for better tax administration by or on behalf of cities, improvements in revenue generation and cost control. For example, in Dakar the city administration could readily improve on inefficient central government collection of local taxes under a revenue-sharing agreement; and property tax has been seriously neglected as a source of municipal income.11 Existing regional bond markets are the foundations for municipal and state bond issuance in local currencies to African investors, but they could be bolstered by a more developed, affordable domestic credit ratings industry. Further development of the regulatory framework in regional bond markets would boost investor confidence and facilitate domestic mobilisation of more of Africa’s financial assets.

The human and economic resources of Dakar’s city administration are no greater than those of most African capitals. Its financial history was imperfect. Yet the city succeeded in building a convincing argument for its creditworthiness and crafting a bankable transaction that significantly exceeded standard debt service ratios for municipalities. These factors, combined with the USAID guarantee, attracted the core group of investors prepared to commit to investment. In December 2014, DMFP was awarded the Prix Guangzhou, initiated in 2012 by UCLGA and the city of Guangzhou. Dakar’s project was the only one from Africa in a field of 259 entries.

Like many capitals, Dakar is in fact two cities. A central government volte-face that subverted Dakar’s bond issue at the eleventh hour underscored that it is a fiercely contested political prize as well as being the direly underfunded centre and hub of Senegal’s economic activity. This duality has proved a significant obstruction to economic and social development in many capitals worldwide. But in Africa the need to circumvent it is particularly pressing. If urbanisation is to become an engine for development, collaboration and development will have to be prioritised over party politics – a complex and fraught transition to achieve anywhere.

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1.Local Governments Africa (UCLGA), local government expenditure in most African countries is less than 10% of national expenditure vs. an average of 25% in OECD countries

2. Diop, Amadou, “Dakar”, Chapter 3 in Bekker, Simon (ed.), Capital Cities in Africa HSRC Press, 2011, p.42

3. An FCFA500 : US$1 exchange rate has been used throughout as an approximate average for 2012–14, the duration of the Dakar Municipal Finance Programme.

4.The city has certain responsibilities in nine areas: estate, environment and natural resource management; health, population and social action; youth sports and leisure; culture; education; planning; regional planning; urban planning and housing.

5. Diop, Amadou, op. cit., p.40

6.All those quoted in the text were interviewed in Dakar in May/June 2014 unless otherwise indicated.

7.The PEFA assessment was funded by the multi-donor Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). The PEFA framework has 31 principal indicators and was introduced in 2005 to evaluate central governments.

8.Ville de Dakar: Evaluation de la gestion des finances publiques municipales: Rapport PEFA sur les performances, 30 Jan. 2009, p. 68

9. In Autumn 2011 DMFP received a grant of US$500,000 from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to conduct the feasibility study. It received a subsequent commitment from the foundation to provide up to US$4.9m. A specific requirement of the grant was for the project to be revenue-generating and to benefit the urban poor. PPIAF, USAID, Agence Française de Développement and Cities Alliance also provided assistance.

10.Paulais, Thierry, Financing Africa’s Cities: The Imperative of Local Investment, World Bank and Cities Alliance, 2012

11. See Monkam, Nara and Moore, Mick, “How property tax would benefit Africa”, Africa Research Institute, Jan. 2015

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Who Really Governs Urban Ghana? – Mohammed Awal and Jeffrey Paller

Niki Wolfe — Wed, 27 Jan 2016 12:37:26 +0000

Ghana is one of Africa’s most urbanised – and rapidly urbanising – countries. In the past three decades, the number of city dwellers has risen from four to 14 million; more than 5.5 million live in slums. Urban growth exerts intense pressure on government and municipal authorities to provide infrastructure, affordable housing, public services and jobs. It has exacerbated informality, inequality, underdevelopment and political patronage. Some commentators warn of an impending urban crisis.

Policymakers and international donors continue to prescribe better urban planning, slum upgrading, infrastructure investment and “capacity building” to “fix” African cities. While these are necessary, the success of any urban strategy depends on an informed appraisal of the political dynamics of urban neighbourhoods that define governance in Ghana’s cities.

Slums will play an increasingly important role in Ghanaian politics. They create opportunities for politicians, entrepreneurs, traditional authorities and community leaders. Migrants and settlers make competing claims on land and ownership, forming new communities and constituencies in the process. Informal networks pervade formal political institutions and shape political strategy.

Political clientelism and the role of informal institutions are deepening alongside the strengthening of formal democratic institutions. Yet the way that urban neighbourhoods are really governed, how “hidden” informal networks interact with formal politics, and how citizens hold their leaders to account, are too often overlooked.

By Mohammed Awal and Jeffrey Paller

The political machine
How to win at politics
The rules of the game
“I speak and then you speak”
Landlords and housing
Crisis? What crisis?
Notes

Ghana is widely regarded as a successful model of multi-party democracy in Africa. The country has an active legislature with a strong and credible political opposition; an independent judiciary; growing, free and vibrant media that provide extensive coverage of public affairs and fierce debate of political issues; and an assertive civil society. Among its defining features is the conduct of successive, relatively free and fair competitive multi-party elections, with peaceful transfers of power. In 2008, John Atta-Mills won the presidential election in a run-off by just 0.46% of votes cast; in 2012, the margin of victory was less than 3%.

In 1988, Ghana embarked on a comprehensive decentralisation programme to bolster democratisation, devolve resources and encourage a more participatory approach to local development. The country is administratively divided into 10 regions and 216 districts, with three tiers of sub-national government at regional, district and sub-district levels. At the district level Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) are responsible for development planning, revenue collection, service delivery and internal security. Decentralised local governance is presented as an effective response to local administrative and development needs.

Democratic governance is not benefiting the public good

Despite the apparent success of democratisation, Ghana’s political framework combines multi-party politics and entrenched clientelism rooted in informal networks. The system generates intense competition between ruling and opposition coalitions, which strains relations between party elites and lower ranks, weakens institutions and leads to poor commitment to effective devolution. It encourages ruling elites to pursue short-term strategies to win elections, at the expense of long-term policy choices that might deliver inclusive economic growth to mitigate inequality, unemployment and poverty reduction.

Economic policy and management have failed to deliver macroeconomic stability or appropriate responses to the continued informalisation of the economy.¹ Election-related fiscal indiscipline is normal. Moreover, rent seeking and corruption, particularly by the country’s ruling and bureaucratic elites, have become more pervasive. Democratic governance is not benefiting the public good.

The transfer of power and responsibilities to sub-national government remains incremental, paradoxical and challenging. Problems of accountability, institutional autonomy, participation and poor service delivery typify local government across the country. While the rhetoric of decentralisation speaks of making democracy a reality, the process has in effect been used as a political tool to maintain central government control, investing significant powers in non-elected authorities and sustaining a patronage system developed over decades that undermines the nation’s already weak institutions. Politicians, mayors, and traditional authorities use MMDAs, which comprise elected and appointed members, as a means to further personal and party interests.

Under the current system of decentralised governance, citizens – particularly the poor – are limited in their ability to influence policy, monitor government and hold it accountable. While citizen participation is at the core of Ghana’s decentralised system in law, the scope for civic engagement is in fact limited, selective and state defined. Citizens and civil society have to wrestle political space for themselves. Influence can be exerted through informal networks that not only pervade formal political institutions but also shape the behaviour of political actors. Democracy in Ghana is best understood as a dominant presidential system reliant on informal networks.

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The political machine

“Competitive clientelism” and the associated power struggles that take place in the ranks of Ghana’s political parties have negative consequences for urban governance.² Local assembly representatives are formally apolitical, but have close ties to political parties – and party priorities often direct resources into election campaigns, rather than investing in roads, streetlights or other public goods. While governance is formally structured, the distribution of political power takes place outside official channels.

Competition for power in Ghana has become increasingly intense, especially in cities, with more resources at the government’s disposal and greater sophistication in how political parties mobilise support. “Toilet wars” in Accra and Kumasi are a good example of this strong competition between rival party activists and loyalists for the control of a public service – to the detriment of consistent, universal provision of that service.³

Ghana is one of the most urbanised countries in Africa. According to World Bank data, in 2014 53% of the population lived in towns and cities. The country has urbanised rapidly: since 1984, the urban population has increased from four to 14 million, with an estimated 5.5 million (39%) living in slums.⁴ During the colonial period and into the independence era, city planning in Accra did not take indigenous and migrant communities into account. They were largely ignored by the state and left unregulated. Even today, planners refuse to accept the legality of slum settlements.

Rapid urbanisation exerts pressure on governments to provide jobs, housing, transport and other public services. Despite the deepening of democracy and political decentralisation in Ghana, urban neighbourhoods are under-resourced and informal economic and political networks dominate. But the growing urban population and its associated socio-economic and political dynamics have made Ghana’s cities central to the country’s political, governance and development processes.

Citizens interact and engage with elected officials, but not always in conventional ways

In an April 2013 survey of 16 Accra slum communities, 94% of respondents had a voter identification card, 24% had a passport, 48% had a bank account and 42% had a national identification card.⁵ Two-thirds were employed in the informal economy. The results of the survey run contrary to portrayals of slums as havens for vagrants and criminals cut off from the state. The role of the state and the relationship between informal networks and government officials merits close attention. Citizens interact and engage with elected officials, but not always in conventional ways. Slum politics is messy, complex and misunderstood.
The consolidation of multi-party politics is giving way to entrenched urban political machines. Cities offer politicians large voting blocs – and more. Parties rely on activists, “foot soldiers” and “macho-men” to patrol polling stations during voting and registration periods, attend rallies and mobilise voters.⁶ “Political parties find muscle [in slums]”, explained former Accra mayor Nat Nunoo Amarteifio; “we [in the municipality] also had our own connections with them”.⁷

In their influential volume Africa’s Urban Revolution, Susan Parnell and Edgar Pieterse write: “Learning where power lies in the city can be as challenging as persuading those in power of the need for change”.⁸ The majority of studies on African urban politics and planning emphasise the need for institutional change without first uncovering the roots of power. Policymakers devise lofty schemes to transform property rights, elections, administrative duties and economic regulation without understanding the role of existing incentives and where power lies. While this “grand” reform agenda is necessary, the success of any urban policy reform depends on a proper understanding of the political economy that underlies the power and political dynamics of cities.

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How to win at politics

Elections serve as an important context for political jockeying and competition – both central aspects of democratic governance. However, the way Ghanaian citizens really hold their representatives to account is often ignored. There is a failure to capture the meanings that leaders and followers attach to the political process, thereby neglecting the expectations that citizens have of their leaders and the incentives that motivate their representatives in the struggle for political power. There is a great deal more to the practice of politics in urban communities than casting votes.

The way Ghanaian citizens really hold their representatives to account is often ignored

Christianity has emerged as a powerful force in Ghanaian politics. In January 2012, Edwin Nii Lante Vanderpuye of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a candidate in the contest to become the member of parliament (MP) for Accra’s Odododiodio constituency, held a late-night prayer service at the Missions to Nations Church. The constituency is one of 27 in the Greater Accra Region and includes the Ga Mashie and Old Fadama slums. The Odododiodio Network of Churches sponsored this public and symbolic event.

Vanderpuye’s objective was to gain “spiritual support” for his bid. As he embarked on his campaign, he asked for God’s help in making the constituency better; his religiosity increased his appeal as a community leader and bolstered his electoral chances. Residents understood that although the candidate’s education and occupation were important, “what he really needs, what really matters, is the spiritual vote”.⁹

Historically, family lineage, in contrast to the performance of government, ideology or even programmatic ideas, has been the most decisive factor in the selection of a leader. In this respect, Vanderpuye already had an implicit advantage over his rivals as a member of the Lante Djan-We clan, the first to celebrate the Homowo Festival, the most important annual ceremony for the Ga people.

Having established and reaffirmed his strong personal links to the community, Vanderpuye set about building a political family. As an aide to former president John Atta Mills, he used his personal networks to create economic and educational opportunities, especially for young voters. He paid school fees for children in the community and contributed financially to funerals and birthday parties of influential, politically connected residents. Vanderpuye also supported the establishment of athletic and social clubs to organise disparate clusters of young people who were frustrated at the performance of the incumbent MP. In the words of one voter: “It is not that he is rich, but he has a link… He’s all around. When you go to Brong Ahafo, he has friends. Go to Western, he has friends. Go to the North, he is known there”.¹⁰

Informal institutions underlie – and are defining characteristics of – the democratic process in urban Ghana

During the election campaign, Vanderpuye handed out rice, clothes and other small gifts at rallies. He paved the alleyway in front of his family home and claimed that he would do the same for the entire community if he was voted in. This complemented the familial language he used in speeches and further personalised local politics.

Vanderpuye’s strategy proved especially effective among younger voters and he defeated his rival by 19,698 votes, securing 63% of the vote. The conduct of his campaign exemplifies how informal institutions underlie – and are defining characteristics of – the democratic process in urban Ghana. Victory rested on the support of personal networks: Vanderpuye did not promise public goods for all, but improvements and opportunities for certain communities in return for their backing.

The margin of victory for Vanderpuye was deceptively large: the campaign was contentious throughout. Elsewhere in Accra, electoral battles were conducted on similar lines and some were even more closely fought. In Ayawaso Central – which includes the slums of Alajo, Kotobabi and parts of New Town – New Patriotic Party candidate Henry Quartey won by just 635 votes out of a tally of 66,859. The NDC’s Nii Armah Ashietey won Korle Klottey, where the Abuja and Avenor slums are located, by 1,275 votes out of a total of 74,407.

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The rules of the game

Aspiring political leaders in Ghana spend a long time building a following. Typically, they step into formal positions of power only after proving their credentials by serving their neighbourhoods for many years. Informal authority rests on “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”.¹¹ These rules constrain and enable the behaviour of residents over time and transcend ethnicity, class and political affiliation. Leaders, including politicians and chiefs, build support by extending their social networks, accumulating wealth, being family heads and religious figures – they are friends, entrepreneurs, parents and preachers.¹² Personal rule persists in Ghanaian society despite the strengthening of formal democratic institutions.

Politicians in urban constituencies make strategic calculations to gain the support of slum dwellers, as Vanderpuye’s campaign exemplified. They visit slums to show solidarity with victims of fires and floods; distribute food and clothing to vulnerable populations, such as kayayei (head porters); attend “outdoorings”, funerals and weddings of local leaders; and pray with pastors and imams at local churches and mosques. Showing influence and possession of the financial resources to improve the lives of residents is increasingly important. Individuals and social groups receive private or “club” goods on the basis of their support for a political party or candidate. This relationship weakens issue-based pressure, allowing political elites to shy away from responding to major structural challenges, and greatly politicises development.

Everyday interaction is a crucial – but poorly understood – component of how accountability is generated between leaders and citizens in the absence of formal mechanisms. It better reflects how Ghanaians understand and experience “accountability as public, relational and practised in the context of daily life”.¹³ Accountability is much more than just voting leaders out of office.

Complex, shifting interactions enable citizens, community leaders, and municipal workers alike to demand their “democratic dividend”

Formal mechanisms of democratic accountability are seldom accessible for the poorest. But urban residents have found other ways to hold leaders to account that fit within informal networks and social norms. Slum neighbourhoods are not homogenous, but collectively they are increasingly important providers of opportunity for many different types of people and organisations. Complex, shifting interactions enable citizens, community leaders, and municipal workers alike to demand their “democratic dividend”.

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“I speak and then you speak”

“Dignified public expression”¹⁴ based on respect, rather than the implicit threat of removal from office, forms the basis of complex constituent–representative relations and political accountability in Ghana. It is relational and practised in the context of daily life. It fosters individuals’ belief that collective action will make a difference and provides an important means of translating information or needs into action. A dynamic process of talking and listening between constituents and representatives characterises Ghana’s urban politics.

In Akan-Twi, Ghana’s most widely spoken indigenous language, the word for democracy – Ka-bi-ma-menka-bi – translates as “I speak and then you speak”. For many Ghanaians, democracy is the process of free political expression between equals. It ensures that those who are affected by decisions are included in the decision-making process. Bonds of respect must develop between representatives and constituents, reinforced by concepts of reciprocal claim-making, shame and honour. Trust is generated if leaders are able and willing to give an account of their actions.

Political accountability is therefore a complex web of a community’s overall trust in a leader and its perception of the leader’s ability to get things done. In the words of a focus group participant in Agbogbloshie:

“A good assemblyman is one that listens to people when they call on him, one that calls the people to meetings to discuss ways to improve… one who listens to your plight anytime you call on him even at night, one that will come to your community and when you call him, take your concerns and present them at the assembly, so as to make sure all your problems are solved.”¹⁵

It is important to note that patron–client relations and practices developed well before multi-party politics, and were particularly evident during the national struggle for independence. Structures of local authority that have developed through a long, historic settlement process have not been replaced by “modern” elections.

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Landlords and housing

The struggle for political power in Ghana’s cities hinges on the control of access to housing and the provision of tenure security. This is most readily apparent in Accra. Historically, neither the state, nor private developers have been able to meet demands for secure, quality and affordable housing. UN-Habitat estimates that 5.7 million new rooms are needed in Ghana by 2020. At present, up to 90% of housing is built and governed informally, outside of local authority control.¹⁶

Three types of informal settlement exist in urban Ghana: extra-legal, indigenous, and purchased or legitimate (see map).¹⁷ The type of settlement determines sources of legitimacy and authority. Ownership of property is in the hands of non-state providers, who rely on local informal social networks embedded in daily community life. They have withstood and adapted to the arrival of multi-party politics; indeed, the expansion of political parties in Ghana has strengthened their power.

In a context of weak formal institutions and an acute housing shortage, local leaders establish territorial authority by founding new neighbourhoods, taking in migrant “guests” and strangers, selling land as de jure or de facto landlords, and serving as representatives and speakers for social networks and interest groups. In all slums, leaders can gain legitimacy by resolving property disputes, thereby achieving status and prestige, while also extracting rents from claimants and defendants.

In purchased settlements – regarded by the authorities as legitimate because of the way in which the neighbourhood’s land was acquired from customary authorities – landlords have an incentive to provide housing to those who need it. Providing affordable and secure housing to followers increases their legitimacy and authority, giving them the necessary political capital to compete for formal positions of power. Unusually for an African city, in Accra housing in purchased settlements is administered as a common or public good.

In indigenous settlements – neighbourhoods governed by customary norms of the ethnic group – traditional authorities benefit from selling land to the government at inflated prices. The ambiguity of the land tenure regime allows them to allocate land multiple times and to demand rents and tributes. Recognised by the state as legitimate owners, landlords are not incentivised to go through formal channels to secure goods and resources. Instead they use the powerful political resource of indigeneity to secure developments for their own, not the wider, community. Housing is administered as a club good.

Landlords in most slum communities serve as parental figures in people’s daily lives

Extra-legal settlements – neighbourhoods that the government has not authorised and are illegally inhabited – provide young social and political entrepreneurs opportunities to make money, develop a following and amass power. By taking advantage of insecure and informal property rights they can operate “public services” such as shower and toilet businesses, scrap recycling and transport. In Old Fadama, for example, there are approximately 400 shower operators.

Extra-legal settlements are not entirely “off the map” in the way that is often portrayed. Government officials own land and businesses in these communities and residents are often tipped off about imminent evictions. Politicians and state bureaucrats empower local political entrepreneurs by protecting de facto landlords in exchange for political support. Housing is administered as a private good.

Insecure property rights provide the urban poor unique opportunities to start businesses, control housing markets, and govern resources and services. These opportunities are not equally accessible to everyone, but depend on local power dynamics. Landlords in most slum communities serve as parental figures in people’s daily lives and can provide security and protection; for example, to young migrants and others in need of work. As one resident explained: “If you have a problem you just go to him. Even if he does not solve it, he will guide you to solve it”.¹⁸ Understandings of security of tenure coincide not with the formal housing market and state-sanctioned land access, but with informal norms of legitimacy and authority.

Land ownership and control lie at the heart of grassroots political struggles

Although in some cases landlords serve as party representatives, assembly members or MPs, more commonly they act as brokers between politicians and residents. In Accra, they function in the system that the well-organised NDC “machine” orchestrates and oversees. Land ownership and control lie at the heart of grassroots political struggles. In a context where goods and services are mostly distributed privately through entrenched networks of political patronage, state-organised schemes to build multi-storey tenements and create individual title for all residents threaten control and authority. They can undermine landlords, divide communities, and contribute to deadlock and the persistence of informality.

Local land and property disputes are not trivial. They are the reason that ambitious slum-upgrading schemes stall or do not work for the benefit of those slum dwellers who are most in need. Property disputes have threatened the success of the UN-HABITAT-sponsored Slum Upgrading Facility in Ashaiman; severely slowed the process of upgrading Ga Mashie; and entirely stymied plans for improving Old Fadama. The provision of public services and access to housing remains a central issue that divides groups in slums and is further politicised in the era of multi-party politics.

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Crisis? What crisis?

Slums are the products of failed policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional land markets, unresponsive financial systems and a fundamental lack of political will. Each of these failures adds to the toll on people already deeply burdened by poverty, and constrains the enormous potential for human development that urban life offers.

Many planners and policymakers assert that Ghana’s cities are in crisis. This is a simplistic, over-dramatic depiction. Urban neighbourhoods are certainly under-resourced and dominated by informal economic and political activity. But they also offer significant political and economic opportunities, and scope for change.

The grassroots political economy and social and political networks that govern urban Ghana are central to achieving sustainable and inclusive urban development. This is especially true in the case of providing adequate affordable housing. Before ambitious slum-upgrading schemes will work, underlying land tenure issues must be resolved. This requires political solutions that have winners and losers, rather than the merely administrative or technical ones that organisations such as the World Bank, UN-Habitat and other international NGOs advocate.

Ghanaian city dwellers need to have incentives to follow policy prescriptions and play by “official rules”. Registering land and businesses should be profitable. Relocation to new neighbourhoods should consider local architectural, social and economic preferences. Providing public goods and services to newcomers should accrue electoral advantages. These are just a few suggestions. Planning and finance are not the foremost problems: poorly understood politics is.

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NOTES

1 Awal, M., “Ghana: Democracy, Economic Reform and Development, 1993-2008”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 14 (1), 2012, pp. 97–118.

2 Whitfield, L., “Competitive clientelism, easy financing and weak capitalists: The contemporary political settlement in Ghana”, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Working Paper, 27, 2011.

3 Ayee, J., and Crook, R., “‘Toilet wars’: urban sanitation services and the politics of public-private partnerships in Ghana,” 2003.

4 World Bank, “Rising through cities in Ghana”, Apr. 2015.

5 Paller, J., “African Slums: Constructing democracy in unexpected places”, PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2014 (unpublished).

6 Bob-Milliar, G., “Political party activism in Ghana; factors influencing the decision of the politically active to join a political party”, Democratisation, 19 (4), 2012, pp. 668–89.

7 Interview with Jeffrey Paller, 22 March 2012.

8 Parnell, S., and Pieterse, E. (eds), Africa’s Urban Revolution, Zed Books, 2014, p. 10.

9 Informal conversation with Ga Mashie resident, Accra, 18 January 2012.

10 Interview with Rev. Robert Esmon Otorjor, Accra, 27 June 2012.

11 Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S., “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, 2 (4), 2004, pp. 725–40.

12 Paller, J., “Informal Institutions and Personal Rule in Urban Ghana”, African Studies Review, 57, 2014, pp. 126-8.

13 Paller, J., “Dignified public expression: The practice of democratic accountability”, Working Paper (unpublished), p. 6.

14 Ibid.

15 Focus group discussion participant, Agbogbloshie, 9 June 2012.

16 UN-HABITAT, “Ghana housing profile”, 2011.

17 Paller, J., “Informal Networks and Access to Power to Access to Power to Obtain Housing in Urban Slums in Ghana”, Africa Today, 62 (1), 2015, pp. 31–55.

18 Focus group discussion participant, Tulako-Ashaiman, 3 June 2012.

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Urban violence in Africa: Understanding civic conflict

Yovanka ARI — Thu, 09 Oct 2014 12:05:05 +0000

On Wednesday 8 October 2014, ARI, in partnership with the Sheffield Institute for International Development (SIID), hosted a discussion focusing on contemporary cases of urban violence in Africa. Dr Tom Goodfellow explored violent protest in Uganda, Dr Paula Meth reflected on gender-based violence in South Africa and Zainab Usman discussed Boko Haram violence in Nigeria.

Key Information

In 2013 ARI launched publications and hosted events scrutinising the state of urban planning law and the education of urban planners in Africa.
This was followed in February 2014 by a book launch of “Africa’s Urban Revolution”, edited by Edgar Pieterse and Susan Parnell of the African Centre for Cities. A review of the book can be found here
Civic conflict refers to diverse but recurrent forms of violence between individuals and groups and can include organised violent crime, gang warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest over state failure such as a poor or absent service delivery. Civic conflict can sometimes overlap with civil conflict; however it differs from it in that civic conflict is ultimately a demonstrative or reactive process, demanding participation and response but rarely seeking to take control of formal structures of power.
Graph depicting the growing prevalence of riots and protests over more conventional forms of violent conflict (Source: ACLED 2013 dataset)

Protest as Voice
Dr Tom Goodfellow

The stark statistic that three times more people die each year from interpersonal violence rather than from war is where Dr Tom Goodfellow began his discussion on civic conflict. Cities are not intrinsically violent. In seeking to understand what drives violence, with a specific focus on Uganda, Tom made three key observations:

Violence can be caused by increasing proximity to others but that people still flee to urban centres to escape conflict and cities can in fact be centres of solutions to conflict.
Protests or riots can become a norm of civic conflict when formal ways of participation are blocked or controlled by a central state authority, referencing the Buganda Riots (2009) and Walk to Work Protests (2011) in Uganda.
In Uganda, President Museveni has been able to manipulate the political environment so that protestors are given space to perform and express a voice without necessarily being heard or posing a threat.

Video of speaker presentations and the Q&A session:

To select the recording for a particular presentation, click the Playlist menu on the top left

Tom Goodfellow’s slides:

Download a PDF of Tom Goodfellow’s slides

Housing Violence
Dr Paula Meth

Violence in the home and public realm are increasingly intersecting and overlapping. Paula emphasised the need to understand the location of this conflict and to recognise that men and women are both vulnerable. Reflecting on her research in South Africa she made three key observations to the audience:

Domestic violence is more likely in informal housing settlements where there is a lack of privacy and space, as this exacerbates tensions.
There is a general failure to recognise fully the male experience of violence, as both perpetrators and victims (often they can be both), particularly in cities.
The formalisation of housing can reduce levels of violence. In South Africa, the government funded re-housing programme has provided improved quality of living, which in turn enhances a citizen’s sense of worth. However, it can also create new form of violence as people compete for new homes in what is a highly politicised process. Moreover, formal structures, with their enhanced privacy, can inadvertently conceal domestic violence.

Paula Meth’s slides:

Download a PDF of Paula Meth’s slides

POLITICISING VIOLENCE
ZAINAB USMAN

Zainab Usman remarked on the deterioration of trust amongst communities in Northern Nigeria that had lived in peace before the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2011. Reflecting on the composition of the Federal State of Nigeria and the escalating violence in 2014 that has caused thousands of deaths, Zainab made three critical observations:

Whilst the central government has the capacity to address the insurgency, it lacks the political will to do so.
In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for February 2015, it is in the political interest of the ruling party to do little about instability in what is generally regarded as an opposition stronghold; but the opposition is also wont to exploit the situation for political ends.
The diverging political narratives around the insurgency are merely illustrations of the governance challenges bedevilling every aspect of Nigerian society.

Questions/Answers

Q. The panel was asked to reflect on the masculinities of violence at national, street and household level:

PM: Gender violence is not just economic or political but needs to be understood through a cultural norms lens too.

TG: Protests are quite masculine in the way and space in which they occur. Urban protests are often very male-dominated in terms of who participates.

Q. What about the theme of migration in urban violence as it links closely to identity and belonging or ethnicity; does this have a substantive impact on civic conflict?

PM: There is a rural-urban dimension as men in particular can feel a loss of manhood by moving from rural areas, where they have power or authority, to urban locations, where this authority can be eroded. Half of refugees live in urban areas so they obviously experience urban violence, but how they influence the process is not yet clear.

ZB: The border with Cameroon has been a major exchange point for Boko Haram activity but the extent to which this has fuelled the insurgency is not clear.

TG: In Kampala, migrants have not yet played a central role in violence; but in Northern Uganda there was a migration dynamic, related to the conflict, where young men challenged the role of traditional of elders; creating a crisis of masculinity. Adam Branch has written about this.

Q. What is the effect of gated communities/ integrated cities on urban violence and what is the relationship between the two regarding access to services/poverty?

PM: Gated communities are an emerging phenomenon on the continent and create settings where domestic violence can be very well-hidden. Some research suggests that they can be sites of increased domestic violence – but still the poor want to live in these areas. This is mainly because they reduce the risk of another type of urban violence – crime.

TG reflected on the issue of governable space and making space ungovernable, both of which are intimately linked to violence. He noted that this can include space beyond the control of the state and space that state exclusively controls.

Q. Does Boko Haram activity fuel and trigger further violence at the community level or do communities foster resilience?

Referring specifically to the bombings in Jos, ZU said she believed that the event had actually fostered a greater sense of community unity and resilience rather than creating divisions. However she acknowledged that in other areas this might not be the case and that violence, at the community level, may be caused the insurgency.

Audio podcast:

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Video of speaker presentations and the Q&A session:

To select the recording for a particular presentation, click the Playlist menu on the top left

Recommended reading:

Legal Manoeuvres and Violence: Law Making, Protest and Semi-Authoritarianism in Uganda (Wiley Online Library content, access restricted, login required)

‘The Institutionalisation of “Noise” and “Silence” in Urban Politics: Riots and Compliance in Uganda and Rwanda’

Toying with the law? Reckless manipulation of the legislature in Museveni’s Uganda

From ‘civil’ to ‘civic’ conflict? Violence & the city in fragile states

Boko Haram and the competing narratives

Related ARI content:

Conflict in Cities: In conversation with Jo Beall

Event Summary: Africa’s Urban Revolution

View all of our urban-themed work

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Interview with Jules Dumas Nguebou

Yovanka ARI — Wed, 13 Aug 2014 11:18:15 +0000

In this insightful and detailed interview, Jules Dumas Nguebou discusses how participatory budgeting has developed in Cameroon, where it has enabled communities that are normally marginalised to have vital infrastructure built for their use. Participatory budgeting illustrates that significant progress can be made when local resources are effectively mobilised and demonstrates that foreign donors and the state are not required for access to water, education and employment to be improved.

Jules also discusses how participatory budgeting can help cultivate local democracy by giving groups that are normally silenced a say on the issues they face in their daily lives. However, participatory budgeting can only fulfil its potential if there is engagement, political will and an effort to educate citizens.

Jules is co-ordinator of the Society of Booklovers, a civil society organisation that has been at the forefront of the introduction and expansion of participatory budgeting in Cameroon. The organisation was one of the inspirations for our recent paper: The Booklovers, the Mayors and Citizens, which explains how participatory budgeting has developed in a country without engrained traditions of participation or public service.

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Participate! Grass-roots democracy & development in Africa

Yovanka ARI — Thu, 07 Aug 2014 06:00:16 +0000

On July 10^th, Africa Research Institute hosted a panel discussion entitled “Participate! Grass-roots democracy & development in Africa’. The event marked the launch of “The Booklovers, The Mayors and The Citizens”, a paper about grass-roots democracy in Cameroon’s capital, Yaoundé.

The event was opened by Jules Dumas Nguebou (The Society of Booklovers, Cameroon), who spoke about his work implementing participatory budgeting in Cameroon’s capital, Yaoundé. A response was given by David Satterthwaite (IIED).

Photographs, video highlights and an audio podcast from the event can be found below.

Event Highlights:

Event audio in full:

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Qui va prendre en charge l’aménagement des villes africaines? – Babatunde Agbola and Vanessa Watson

Yovanka ARI — Mon, 03 Mar 2014 15:28:50 +0000

Téléchargez ce Counterpoint en français

Download or Read this Counterpoint in English

Les grandes villes africaines connaissent une croissance et une transformation rapides. En l’absence de politiques d’aménagement appropriées, elles deviendront de plus en plus chaotiques et inefficaces et de moins en moins viables. Dans de nombreux pays, les lois relatives à l’aménagement du territoire remontent à l’ère coloniale et sont donc incapables de répondre aux problématiques urbaines contemporaines. Le manque d’aménagement urbain et de professionnels de la gestion, capables d’apporter des réponses à la complexité du milieu urbain à l’aide d’approches favorables aux pauvres progressives, exacerbe le dysfonctionnement des grandes villes.

Alors que les spécialistes de l’aménagement cherchent à former leurs étudiants dans le cadre du système existant, les programmes d’aménagement urbain et rural enseignés à l’université sont aussi dépassés que la législation relative à l’aménagement. Certains pays africains ne disposent d’aucune école d’aménagement. La réforme et la revitalisation des formations (et de la législation) relatives à l’aménagement pourraient apporter une contribution significative à un développement urbain plus durable et plus équitable en Afrique subsaharienne.

écrit par Vanessa Watson, Professeur en Aménagement urbain et régional à l’Université du Cap (Afrique du Sud), et Babatunde Agbola, Professeur de Développement Urbain et régional à l’Université d’Ibadan (Nigeria).

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Africa’s Urban Revolution

Yovanka ARI — Tue, 25 Feb 2014 17:59:59 +0000

On February 20th, Africa Research Institute (ARI) hosted a panel discussion to launch Africa’s Urban Revolution, a new volume published by Zed Books and edited by Susan Parnell and Edgar Pieterse from the African Centre for Cities. ARI’s two guest speakers were Jo Beall, Director of Education and Society at the British Council, and Sean Fox, Lecturer in Urban Geography and Global Development at the University of Bristol. Read on for a summary of the key arguments.

Susan Parnell introduced the discussion by explaining how Africa’s Urban Revolution feeds into broader efforts to develop a distinctly African approach to analysing the continent’s cities.

Sean Fox challenged a “flawed line of reasoning” that has “dominated our thinking about the dynamics of Africa’s urban transition”, which he summarised as follows:

“Urbanisation is fundamentally an economic process that’s driven by people migrating from rural to urban areas in search of economic opportunity”
“Rapid urban growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been accompanied by a complementary expansion of formal waged employment opportunities, i.e industrialisation, and it’s therefore abnormal, undesirable, distorted”
“We should try to prevent what is often referred to . . . as over-urbanisation by discouraging or restricting people from moving from rural to urban areas. “

Sean argued that “urban policy” in Sub-Saharan Africa has been misguided because, very often, the key assumptions underpinning these conclusions are incorrect. What has actually taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1970s is “urbanisation without growth”, whereby cities have continued to grow despite economic stagnation and contraction. Furthermore, rural-urban migration is not the primary cause of the recent urban growth seen on the continent. Cities are actually expanding from within, thanks to high fertility rates and a diminution in mortality rates.

These misconceptions about what is driving urban growth in Africa have encouraged bad policy, and spurred “an overemphasis on population mobility – that is migration – rather than the demographic . . . changes in fertility and mortality”. In turn, this has led to governments and aid agencies justifying expenditure on rural development as a strategy for slowing down urban poverty.

Sean also highlighted the subtle differences between urban growth, which refers to an increase in the urban population in absolute terms, and urbanisation; the “change in the percentage of the population living in cities”. This point is analysed in detail by Deborah Potts in her ARI Counterpoint “Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanisation?”

To conclude, Sean emphasised that the evolution of Africa’s cities “should be of concern to everybody around the world”, as there will likely be over a billion people living in African cities by 2030, which is more than the urban and rural populations of Europe and North America combined.

The second panellist, Jo Beall discussed the main ideas raised in her chapter on conflict and post-war transition in African cities, co-authored with the University of Sheffield’s Tom Goodfellow. Their intention was to look past the “noir” and dystopian portrayals of African cities to “see what really happened to cities in different kinds of conflict”. They also wanted to explore what role cities could play in supporting reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. The research resulted in a heuristic model, “which is basically a typology of different kinds of conflicts”, and an assessment of “the relationship between cities and those particular kinds of conflicts”.

Also Read: Interview with Jo Beall about conflict in cities

The first type is “sovereign conflict”, which involves direct intervention by international actors, such as the UN, African Union or other states; the US-intervention in Somalia in 1993 is one such example. In sovereign conflicts, taking control of cities is crucial because of their political and economic significance.

Secondly, “civil conflict” refers to situations where the government is being challenged by organised armed groups, such as local warlords or rebels. “The relationship between cities and civil conflict is much more complex”, Jo remarked. For instance, despite on-going armed conflict in the DRC, “Kinshasa was a haven for peace” because the government retained firm control of the city. On the other side of the country, Goma has also remained relatively peaceful serving as the hub of war economy. It has been “in the interests of people engaged in [the] conflict to keep Goma going”. While civil conflicts are generally played out in rural areas, they are often “instigated by urban actors who resented something about the urban context”.

The final category is that of “civic conflict”, which usually results from the failure of governments to provide basic services. Both citizens and the state can perpetrate civic conflict. When carried out by citizens, civic conflict can take the form of gangs, riots and protests. Conversely, the Zimbabwean government’s campaign to clear slums in Harare – known as Operation Murambatsvina – is a clear example of civic conflict perpetrated by the state.

Jo also discussed how conflict can drive urban growth. Gulu, a provincial town in northern Uganda, was a place of refuge for people caught up in the 20-year-long civil war. In 2014, Gulu is the Uganda’s second largest city and is suffering from huge pressure on urban services. “So although the city is at peace . . . the potential for civic conflict to grow in that city is huge,” Beall posited.

The presentations were followed by a lively audience-driven discussion. Carole Rakodi, one of the book’s other contributors, pithily stated that “conflict is inherent to cities”, due to factors such as competition for resources and the mix of identities brought together within urban spaces. Deborah Potts broadly agreed with Sean’s main points but maintained that rural-urban migration is still an important driver for urban growth and is sensitive to economic factors. Questions and responses also covered ‘resource-boom towns’, burgeoning youth populations, a sense of belonging to a city and the linkages between urban policies in different countries – among much else.

Event Highlights:

Event audio in full:

Ahead of the event we sat down with Susan Parnell, who co-edited the book, to talk about the state of Africa’s cities today. Sue reflected on the legacy of urban planning, highlighted the effects of global environmental changes on cities in Africa, and offered advice to donors. She compellingly tackled the anti-urban bias in development and considers Africa’s future as “opportunely urban”.

Full interview with Susan Parnell:

Africa’s Urban Revolution: a review – by Hannah Gibson

Conflict in Cities: In conversation with Jo Beall – by Melanie Archer

The post Africa’s Urban Revolution appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

For town and country: A new approach to urban planning in Kenya

Yovanka ARI — Thu, 05 Dec 2013 13:19:41 +0000

Download the full Policy Voice

Urban and regional planning is under the spotlight in Kenya. The 2009 National Housing and Population Census forecast that the percentage of Kenyans living in urban settlements will increase from 32 percent to 54 percent by 2030. Residents of Nairobi await the details of a new city master plan. The devolution of power and allocation of central resources to the 47 county governments created by the 2010 constitution is under way – a process that requires integrated development plans to be in place.

In the post-independence era, urban planning was deployed as a tool for “modernisation” in Kenya. But in the 1980s and 1990s modernisation was supplanted by autocracy and straitened economic circumstances. In turn, planning became a means for securing control, exclusion and further enrichment of political and economic elites redolent of the colonial era.

Legislation based on outdated and inappropriate models such as the UK’s 1947 Town and Country Planning Act was routinely used to carry out mass evictions and demolitions in informal settlements in Kenya. By the end of the 20th century, the planning profession had become irrelevant or discredited to all but its few beneficiaries.

In this timely Policy Voice, Professor Peter Ngau describes in detail how he and colleagues at the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (DURP) at the University of Nairobi – and other institutions – have sought to revitalise the education and training that planners receive and encourage the adoption of more progressive approaches among planning professionals. Curricula reform, research and innovation, close links with other planning schools in Africa, and working partnerships with civil society organisations in informal settlements are the bedrock of the effort to ensure that Kenya’s future urban planners are equipped to manage rapid urban transformation.

The post For town and country: A new approach to urban planning in Kenya appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

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