{"id":636,"date":"2011-04-19T16:04:28","date_gmt":"2011-04-19T16:04:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/?p=636"},"modified":"2016-03-21T17:07:52","modified_gmt":"2016-03-21T17:07:52","slug":"old-tricks-young-guns-elections-and-violence-in-sierra-leone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/old-tricks-young-guns-elections-and-violence-in-sierra-leone\/","title":{"rendered":"Old Tricks, Young Guns: Elections and violence in Sierra Leone"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a title=\"Old Tricks, Young Guns: Elections and violence in Sierra Leone\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/03\/BN-1102-Old-Tricks-Young-Guns.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft size-medium wp-image-4763\" style=\"border: 1px solid black;\" src=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra-Leone-BN-212x300.jpg\" alt=\"Sierra Leone BN\" width=\"212\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra-Leone-BN-212x300.jpg 212w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra-Leone-BN-170x240.jpg 170w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra-Leone-BN.jpg 527w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><em>April 2011<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a title=\"Old Tricks, Young Guns: Elections and violence in Sierra Leone\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/03\/BN-1102-Old-Tricks-Young-Guns.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Download PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Sierra<\/strong><em><strong> Leone is acclaimed as one of Africa\u2019s most successful post-conflict states. But the country\u00a0remains fragile. Every election since independence has been attended by violence. Support for\u00a0political parties is polarised on ethnic and regional lines, and underwritten by patronage. Youth\u00a0unemployment is endemic. Amid early preparations for the 2012 presidential, parliamentary and local\u00a0council elections, these notes examine the causes of electoral strife, and suggest measures for\u00a0mitigating future violence.\u00a0<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"message-box-wrapper none\">\n<div class=\"message-box-title\">KEY POINTS<\/div>\n<div class=\"message-box-content\"><div class=\"shortcode-list bullet\"><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Peaceful transition from civil war, sustained economic growth<\/li>\n<li>Corruption rife, new Anti-Corruption Act implemented<\/li>\n<li>Election violence customary, perpetrated with impunity<\/li>\n<li>Burgeoning youth unemployed, marginalised and manipulated<\/li>\n<li>All party agreement to avert election violence<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Green shoots, deep roots<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Sierra Leone\u2019s 11 year civil war is infamous for images of child\u00a0soldiers and amputees, and for the trade in \u201cblood\u201d\u00a0diamonds. In January 2002, a peace ceremony marked the\u00a0official end of the conflict. By 2004, 72,000 fighters from\u00a0various factions were disarmed and demobilised. The\u00a0international peacekeeping force \u2013 whose peak strength of\u00a017,500 made it the largest ever deployed by the United\u00a0Nations \u2013 was withdrawn in 2005.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Sierra Leone\u2019s army, which had effectively ceased to exist in\u00a0the latter years of the war, was reformed after a recruitment\u00a0drive. The new force, comprising 8,500 troops, received\u00a0extensive training from the UK-led International Military\u00a0Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). The police service has\u00a0been restructured and retrained. Despite low salaries,\u00a0discipline in the army and police has improved.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read:\u00a0<a title=\"Comparing Elections in Sierra Leone and Ghana\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/blog\/comparing-elections-in-sierra-leone-and-ghana\/\" target=\"_blank\">Comparing elections in Sierra Leone and Ghana<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Successive post-war presidential and parliamentary elections\u00a0have been won by different parties. In 2002, Ahmad Tejan\u00a0Kabbah and the Sierra Leone People\u2019s Party (SLPP) were the\u00a0victors. In 2007, Ernest Bai Koroma and the All People\u2019s\u00a0Congress (APC) carried the vote. Both elections were declared\u00a0free, fair and credible by international observers. Neither\u00a0result was seriously contested by the defeated party.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">President Koroma \u2013 formerly the managing director of an\u00a0insurance company \u2013 has impressed international donors\u00a0with bold declarations to \u201crun Sierra Leone as a business\u00a0concern\u201d, combat corruption and reduce dependence on\u00a0foreign aid. New laws and regulations, including a more\u00a0transparent tax code, have been framed to attract private\u00a0investment. According to financier and philanthropist\u00a0George Soros, Sierra Leone has \u201cthe genuine potential to\u00a0become a leading African economy\u201d (1).<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_4765\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_economic_growth_in_perspective.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4765\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4765\" src=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_economic_growth_in_perspective-300x255.jpg\" alt=\"Source: African Economic Outloook\" width=\"300\" height=\"255\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_economic_growth_in_perspective-300x255.jpg 300w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_economic_growth_in_perspective.jpg 618w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-4765\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Source: African Economic Outloook<\/p><\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Commercial agriculture, infrastructure, health and education\u00a0are pillars of an ambitious \u201cAgenda for Change\u201d launched by\u00a0President Koroma in 2008. Funding for agriculture increased\u00a0from 1.7% of the government\u2019s budget in 2007 to 10% in\u00a02010 (2). Free health care for pregnant women, nursing mothers,\u00a0and children under five was introduced in April 2010. Provincial\u00a0roads have been rebuilt. A US$92m investment in Bumbuna\u00a0Hydroelectric Dam, a project initiated in 1970, has created a\u00a0facility capable of generating 50 megawatts of electricity.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Sierra Leone remains beset by privation which predates the\u00a0war. Two-thirds of the population subsists on less than\u00a0US$1.25 per day. Almost half the population is\u00a0malnourished. Maternal and infant mortality rates are\u00a0among the highest in the world, and average life expectancy\u00a0is 48 years. Youth unemployment is entrenched. While Sierra\u00a0Leone\u2019 s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is forecast to expand\u00a0by an annual average of 4.7% in 2008-12,3 a sustained\u00a0growth rate of 10% is required to combat unemployment\u00a0and poverty effectively (4).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Corruption is rife in Sierra Leone. A 2006 review by the UK\u2019s\u00a0Department for International Development (DFID) accused\u00a0the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of failing to meet its\u00a0objectives, and recommended a curtailment of funding for\u00a0the organisation (5). President Koroma\u2019s government has\u00a0sought to restore a measure of confidence. The 2008\u00a0Anti-Corruption Act sanctioned the ACC to prosecute\u00a0without prior approval from the attorney-general. By 2011,\u00a011 convictions had ensued, including that of a minister\u00a0within President Koroma\u2019s inner circle.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Election violence, and accountability<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Sierra Leone has held 11 parliamentary and five presidential\u00a0elections since independence in 1961 (*). All have been\u00a0accompanied by violence. In the 1967 elections, the ruling\u00a0SLPP used new public order legislation and rarray boys\u2013 thugs\u00a0\u2013 to stymie opposition. A premature announcement by the\u00a0SLPP-appointed election commissioner that incumbent Prime\u00a0Minister Albert Margai had won the ballot triggered\u00a0nationwide riots. A retraction of the announcement in favour\u00a0of Siaka Stevens and the APC was followed by a coup d\u2019etat.\u00a0Stevens was reinstated after a counter-coup at the end of 1968.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The 1973 election was boycotted by the SLPP, amid\u00a0allegations that APC supporters were preventing its\u00a0candidates from entering nomination centres. SLPP\u00a0candidates were reportedly kidnapped. In 1977, voting took\u00a0place under a state of emergency. The APC employed its\u00a0youth wing and the Internal Security Unit \u2013 commonly\u00a0referred to as \u201cI Shoot U\u201d \u2013 to harass SLPP politicians and\u00a0supporters. In eight constituencies, polls could not be held.\u00a0In 1982, more than 50 people were killed in an election\u00a0conducted in a one party state.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"center\"><p>\u201cYears of bad governance, endemic corruption\u00a0and the denial of basic human rights created\u00a0deplorable conditions that make conflict\u00a0inevitable\u201d\u00a0Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections were a\u00a0test of Sierra Leone\u2019s stability. The campaigns became so\u00a0violent that President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah threatened to\u00a0suspend the vote and impose a state of emergency. Dozens\u00a0were injured in clashes in Freetown and in Kono, a major\u00a0swing district. The SLPP presidential candidate, Solomon\u00a0Berewa, accused opposition supporters of intimidating his\u00a0voters. Reports of an assassination attempt on Ernest\u00a0Koroma, the APC\u2019s candidate, caused riots and the\u00a0abandonment of his campaign in the south-east.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Perpetrators of violence act without fear of prosecution.\u00a0While some are party loyalists, others are \u201chired hands\u201d. The\u00a0failure to prosecute those responsible exacerbates a lack of\u00a0respect for the rule of law. It underpins a popular perception\u00a0that the use of violence is an acceptable \u2013 even legitimate \u2013\u00a0means of securing power.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Misshapen identities<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In post-independence Sierra Leone, political loyalties\u00a0polarised along ethnic and regional lines. The largest ethnic\u00a0groups, the Mende and Temne, each comprise about 30% of\u00a0Sierra Leone\u2019s population. The Mende and other smaller\u00a0tribes in the south and east have traditionally supported the\u00a0SLPP. The APC is favoured by the Temne, Limba and other\u00a0tribes in the north, and the Krio community in the west.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read:\u00a0<a title=\"Diehards and democracy: Elites, inequality and institutions in African elections\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/press-room\/press-releases\/diehards-and-democracy-elites-inequality-and-institutions-in-african-elections-2\/\" target=\"_blank\">Diehards and democracy: Elites, inequality and institutions in African elections<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Electoral loyalties have not been determined by\u00a0long-standing ethnic enmity. Beyond the realm of politics,\u00a0friendships and marriages between ethnic groups are\u00a0common. But the espousal of particular ethnic and regional\u00a0groups by candidates for national leadership is ingrained.\u00a0Ethnic and regional identities have been a convenient \u2013 and\u00a0effective \u2013 means of mobilising support during elections.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Within voting blocs, loyalties are not immutable. In the 2002\u00a0elections, the SLPP made inroads in the north \u2013 traditionally\u00a0an APC stronghold. As the incumbent government, the SLPP\u00a0garnered some credit for its role in ending the civil war. The\u00a0gains were reversed in 2007, when both parties performed\u00a0badly outside their traditional power bases.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The emergence of a third major political party added dynamism\u00a0to the 2007 elections. The People\u2019s Movement for Democratic\u00a0Change (PMDC) was formed by Charles Margai, nephew of\u00a0Sierra Leone\u2019s first prime minister and son of the second, after\u00a0his defeat by Solomon Berewa in the SLPP leadership contest.\u00a0The new party secured a competitive advantage by capitalising\u00a0on discontent with the indictment of Samuel Hinga Norman by\u00a0the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the UN-backed tribunal\u00a0established to try those accused of being most responsible for\u00a0atrocities committed during the civil war.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The PMDC attracted strong support from the Kamajors, who\u00a0had formed the backbone of a Mende militia led by Norman\u00a0and regarded his indictment as a betrayal by the SLPP. The\u00a0defection of the Kamajors effectively split the Mende vote. In\u00a0Freetown and the Western Area, where the SLPP had won\u00a0more than half the seats in the previous election, the APC\u00a0captured all 21 seats in 2007. The SLPP accused the PMDC of\u00a0handing victory to Ernest Koroma and the APC.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Patronage and the public purse<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Loyalty to political parties in Sierra Leone is sustained by \u2013\u00a0and sustains \u2013 entrenched patronage networks, and\u00a0corruption. Politicians routinely use office, and state\u00a0resources, to reward party faithful. Supporters \u2013 civilian or\u00a0military \u2013 are provided with money, jobs and services.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_4764\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_2007_parliamentary_election_results.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4764\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4764\" src=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_2007_parliamentary_election_results-300x264.jpg\" alt=\"2007 Parliamentary Election Results (Source: Sierra Leone National Electoral Commission) \" width=\"300\" height=\"264\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_2007_parliamentary_election_results-300x264.jpg 300w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/Sierra_leone_BN_2007_parliamentary_election_results.jpg 622w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-4764\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Source: Sierra Leone National Electoral Commission<\/p><\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the decade after independence, Sierra Leone\u2019s premiers\u00a0sought to consolidate power through preferential\u00a0appointments. Albert Margai, prime minister from 1964-67\u00a0and leader of the SLPP, filled the senior ranks of the army,\u00a0civil service and judiciary with his supporters \u2013 regardless of\u00a0experience or merit. His cabinet was almost exclusively\u00a0Mende. Under Siaka Stevens, head of state from 1968-85 and\u00a0founder of the APC, the process was intensified in favour of\u00a0supporters from the north.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The use of public funds to secure and reward political loyalty\u00a0undermined state institutions. Hospitals and schools fell into\u00a0disrepair. Salaries of junior civil servants often went unpaid.\u00a0Teachers and nurses demanded illegal payments to\u00a0supplement their salaries. Those unable to pay were denied\u00a0access to education and health services. By 1985, when\u00a0Stevens was succeeded by General Joseph Momoh, the\u00a0Sierra Leonean state existed only in name.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read:\u00a0<a title=\"Tanzania and Senegal: Inside the Machine\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/publications\/briefing-notes\/tanzania-and-senegal-inside-the-machine\/\" target=\"_blank\">Tanzania and Senegal: Inside the Machine<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Local paramount chiefs have reinforced political divisions. In\u00a0the 1960s, Albert Margai granted chiefs the right to allow \u2013\u00a0or ban \u2013 political meetings. Anyone deemed to have\u00a0misused this authority was deposed or exiled. Siaka Stevens\u00a0instructed chiefs not to allow SLPP candidates to campaign\u00a0in their territories, and to order their people to vote for the\u00a0APC. In 2007, the Office of National Security reported cases\u00a0of chiefs seeking to disrupt or curtail campaigning.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Entrenched electoral loyalties and corruption have created a\u00a0commonly-held belief that elections are \u2018winner takes all\u2019\u00a0contests. Voters presume that the SLPP will reward the south\u00a0and east, and the APC will favour the north and west. Defeat\u00a0at the ballot box will entail exclusion and disadvantage for\u00a0an electoral term.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Youth, and muscle<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Youth groups have become a more potent force in Sierra\u00a0Leone\u2019s elections than ethnicity or regionalism. The young\u00a0have been most disadvantaged by endemic corruption, and\u00a0have suffered most from the disintegration of state services.\u00a0In the 1980s, Sierra Leone\u2019s literacy rate was just 15% (7).\u00a0Education suffered further as schools closed during the civil\u00a0war. Many young men and women joined the various\u00a0factions \u2013 some voluntarily, but many by force.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<blockquote class=\"center\"><p>\u201cThe youth problem has become chronic\u201d.\u00a0President Ernest Bai Koroma (8)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Sierra Leone is beset by a burgeoning generation which has\u00a0received no formal education and possesses few skills. An\u00a0estimated 800,000 young people, about 14% of the\u00a0population, are unemployed or work for no remuneration (9).\u00a0Those who have jobs are often exploited, enduring abject\u00a0conditions for negligible pay. A 2010 UN Security Council\u00a0briefing noted that a growing number of young men are\u00a0\u201cidle, concentrated in urban areas and frustrated by social marginalisation\u201d (10). Unemployed young men are susceptible\u00a0to manipulation and exploitation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read:\u00a0<a title=\"The more things change\u2026 2012 elections in Sierra Leone \u2013 by Jonathan Bhalla and Sareta Ashraph\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/blog\/elections-in-sierra-leone\/\" target=\"_blank\">The more things change\u2026 2012 elections in Sierra Leone<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the 2007 election campaigns, political parties employed\u00a0high profile ex-combatants from various rebel groups. Ernest\u00a0Koroma hired Idrissa Kamara, a former Armed Forces\u00a0Revolutionary Council (AFRC) commander known as\u00a0Leatherboot, and mid-ranking former Revolutionary United\u00a0Front (RUF) fighters to join his personal security unit.\u00a0Solomon Berewa engaged Hassan Bangura, or Bomblast,\u00a0also a former AFRC commander who became\u00a0second-in-command of the West Side Boys. The PMDC was\u00a0backed by the Kamajors. These alliances were designed to\u00a0gain political clout, but youth groups \u2013 and unemployed\u00a0young men in particular \u2013 were responsible for most of the\u00a0violence during the 2007 campaigns.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Party \u201ctask forces\u201d, established to handle security and protect\u00a0party property, are a feature of elections in Sierra Leone.\u00a0Young men are brought into the party youth wings \u2013 for\u00a0token payments or promises of future benefits \u2013 to\u00a0intimidate voters and break up opposition rallies. Their\u00a0loyalty is not guaranteed. Many hold membership cards of\u00a0more than one party, and switch allegiances for greater\u00a0reward. There is profound distrust between politicians and\u00a0marginalised youth. With few opportunities for betterment,\u00a0the young pose an escalating threat to post-war stability.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Twenty twelve<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The 2012 presidential, parliamentary and local government\u00a0elections will be won by the APC or the SLPP. The PMDC\u2019s\u00a0popularity has waned since 2008, and the SLPP appear to\u00a0have regained the support of the Kamajors. In September\u00a02010, a UN Security Council resolution stressed the \u201cpotential\u00a0for an increase in tensions during the preparations for and\u00a0the period leading up to the 2012 elections &#8230; due to political,\u00a0security, socio-economic and humanitarian challenges\u201d (11).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Predictions of electoral violence are well-founded. In March\u00a02009, the SLPP headquarters was attacked after five days of\u00a0clashes between supporters of the two main parties in\u00a0Freetown, Kenema, Gendema and Pujehun District. A joint\u00a0communiqu\u00e9 condemning the fighting was issued by all\u00a0parties, but violent confrontations occurred during other\u00a0by-elections in 2010. Rumours of negotiations between\u00a0prominent ex-combatants and the APC and SLPP abound.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A December 2010 local council by-election in Kono was\u00a0preceded by \u201cincidents of political violence and intolerance\u201d (12). The SLPP office in Koidu City, and buildings\u00a0associated with APC officials, were vandalised. Senior SLPP\u00a0officials, including two presidential candidates and the\u00a0deputy minority leader of parliament, sustained injuries in\u00a0attacks allegedly carried out by APC supporters. SLPP MPs\u00a0boycotted parliamentary proceedings in protest.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Distrust between the APC and the SLPP is intense. In\u00a0December 2010, two SLPP members were given ministerial\u00a0positions in a cabinet reshuffle. Both appointees were\u00a0promptly suspended from the SLPP.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Recommendations<\/h2>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the run-up to Sierra Leone\u2019s 2012 elections:<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>The joint communiqu\u00e9 signed in April 2009 must be fully\u00a0implemented<\/strong>. All political parties agreed to co-operate \u201cin\u00a0preventing all forms of political incitement, provocation and\u00a0intimidation\u201d that might encourage violence. No one has ever\u00a0been prosecuted for violent conduct during elections. Donors\u00a0should exert pressure on the government to ensure that all\u00a0outbreaks of violence are investigated, and the perpetrators\u00a0prosecuted. Those who recruit malefactors and those who\u00a0incite violence should be deemed equally responsible.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>The effective and impartial conduct of state institutions\u00a0will be a prerequisite for free, fair and peaceful polls<\/strong>.\u00a0Sierra Leone\u2019s National Electoral Commission, Political Parties\u00a0Registration Commission, Office of National Security, police\u00a0and electoral offences courts, jointly have the authority to\u00a0prevent an escalation of illegal and violent behaviour. These\u00a0institutions must be unequivocally supported by political\u00a0parties and donors. The UN Secretary-General\u2019s Executive\u00a0Representative in Sierra Leone has called on the National\u00a0Electoral Commission to \u201cshow greater flexibility in\u00a0discussing electoral concerns\u201d (13) with all parties, in order to\u00a0deflect any accusation of bias.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Political parties should demonstrate real support for\u00a0efforts by the newly-formed All Political Parties Youth\u00a0Association and All Political Parties Women\u2019s Association\u00a0to promote peaceful elections<\/strong>. The government should\u00a0emphasise the legal obligations of paramount chiefs before\u00a0and during the elections \u2013 and the penalties for breaches.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The APC and SLPP have relinquished control of party radio\u00a0stations. <strong>The new, independent Sierra Leone\u00a0Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) should act as a forum\u00a0for all political parties to debate electoral issues<\/strong>. Radio is\u00a0a powerful medium in a country with one of the lowest\u00a0literacy rates in the world. Debates and impartial election\u00a0coverage by the SLBC can help to inform voters, and\u00a0encourage voting determined by issues and performance.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Recent prosecutions by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)\u00a0have been welcomed, in Sierra Leone and abroad. <strong>Further\u00a0prosecutions would help to counter the widespread belief\u00a0that politicians are not accountable for the use, or misuse,\u00a0of public funds<\/strong>. The ACC needs to investigate more closely\u00a0how corruption is used to secure political loyalty.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the medium term:<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Party \u2018task forces\u2019 should be disbanded, and outlawed<\/strong>.\u00a0Special police units should assume responsibility for the\u00a0protection of political candidates and party property.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Political parties and individual candidates should be\u00a0required by law to disclose all donations, and account for\u00a0the use of funds<\/strong>. A limit on donations should be agreed by all\u00a0parties, after consultation with civil society groups and donors.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Infrastructure and other development projects funded\u00a0by international donors need to benefit all regions<\/strong>.\u00a0Increasing government revenues from natural resource\u00a0extraction must also be deployed in a demonstrably\u00a0equitable manner. Disbursement of national income and\u00a0donor funds for the benefit of government and opposition\u00a0supporters alike will help to counter political divisionism,\u00a0and the public perception that elections are a \u201cwinner takes\u00a0all\u201d contest.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Enduring peace and stability in Sierra Leone is\u00a0dependent on a substantial expansion of educational\u00a0and employment opportunities<\/strong>. In 2010, the World Bank\u00a0announced a three year US$20 million to develop the\u00a0practical skills of 18,000 unemployed young people. An\u00a0additional 30,000 will be employed in public schemes to\u00a0rehabilitate infrastructure. A new Ministry for Youth\u00a0Employment and Sport was created in 2010. Much more\u00a0is needed. Agriculture and agribusiness offer good\u00a0opportunities for large-scale employment. The development\u00a0of labour-intensive commercial agriculture in Sierra Leone\u00a0should be a priority for donors and government.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"message-box-wrapper none\">\n<div class=\"message-box-title\">SOURCES<\/div>\n<div class=\"message-box-content\">\n<ol>\n<li>Investment International, November 12th 2009<\/li>\n<li>Mohamed Fofanah, \u201cNew agriculture plan spouts\u201d, International Press Service, August 13th 2010<\/li>\n<li>Africa Economic Outlook, Sierra Leone<\/li>\n<li>Africa Confidential, \u201cMore power for Freetown\u201d, October 8th 2009<\/li>\n<li>Joel Cutting, Gladwell Otieno, \u201cAnnual Review 2006 of DFID Support to the Anti-Corruption Commission Phase 2 in Sierra Leone\u201d, January 25th 2007<\/li>\n<li>New York Times, \u201cSierra Leone voids some election returns\u201d, May 3rd 1982<\/li>\n<li>David Keen, \u201cGreedy elites, dwindling resources, alienated youths: the anatomy of protracted violence in Sierra Leone\u201d, International Politics and Society, 2003<\/li>\n<li>Maya Christensen, Mats Utas, \u201cMercenaries of democracy: the \u2018politricks\u2019 of remobilized combatants in the 2007 general election, Sierra Leone\u201d, African Affairs, September 2008<\/li>\n<li>Fifth report of the secretary-general on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, September 17th 2010<\/li>\n<li>UN Department of Public Information, \u201cYouth unemployment poses \u2018latent threat\u2019 to Sierra Leone\u2019s stability, top officials warn in Security Council briefing\u201d, March 22nd 2010<\/li>\n<li>UN Security Council, resolution 1941, September 2010<\/li>\n<li>Sixth report of the secretary-general on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, March 9th 2011<\/li>\n<li>UN News Centre,\u201cUN at critical juncture in peacebuilding efforts, UN warned\u201d, September 28th 2010<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sierra Leone is acclaimed as one of Africa\u2019s most successful post-conflict states. But the country remains fragile. Support for political parties is polarised on ethnic and regional lines, and underwritten by patronage. Youth unemployment is endemic.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":4763,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[64,41,63,48,35,27,110,161,36,40,474,162,473],"class_list":["post-636","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-briefing-notes","tag-africa","tag-all-peoples-congress","tag-democracy","tag-election-violence","tag-elections","tag-politics-in-publications","tag-post-conflict","tag-presidential-elections","tag-sierra-leone","tag-sierra-leone-peoples-party","tag-stability","tag-west-africa","tag-youth-unemployment"],"aioseo_notices":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v25.9 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Election violence in Sierra Leone - Africa Research Institute<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Sierra Leone is acclaimed as one of Africa\u2019s most successful post-conflict states. 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