{"id":628,"date":"2012-04-04T15:55:09","date_gmt":"2012-04-04T15:55:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/?p=628"},"modified":"2016-03-01T16:06:56","modified_gmt":"2016-03-01T16:06:56","slug":"diehards-and-democracy-elites-inequality-and-institutions-in-african-elections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/diehards-and-democracy-elites-inequality-and-institutions-in-african-elections\/","title":{"rendered":"Diehards and democracy: Elites, inequality and institutions in African elections"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a title=\"Diehards and Democracy: elites, inequality and institutions in African elections\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/03\/BN-0712-Diehards-and-democracy.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft size-medium wp-image-4627\" style=\"border: 1px solid black;\" src=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/elections-briefing-212x300.jpg\" alt=\"elections briefing\" width=\"212\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/elections-briefing-212x300.jpg 212w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/elections-briefing-723x1024.jpg 723w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/elections-briefing-170x240.jpg 170w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/elections-briefing.jpg 1240w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px\" \/><\/a><em><strong>April 2012<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a title=\"Diehards and Democracy: elites, inequality and institutions in African elections\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/03\/BN-0712-Diehards-and-democracy.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Download PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Multi-party elections are a salient feature of Africa\u2019s rapidly evolving political landscape. International\u00a0support for elections is prioritised above all other strategies for consolidating democracy. The legacies\u00a0of political reform are diverse, and variable. Technology, natural resource endowments, rising\u00a0inequality, volatile food and fuel costs, and entrenched elites are influencing elections in ways few\u00a0anticipated. These notes examine some essential traits of recent African elections, and consider their\u00a0implications for future contests.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"message-box-wrapper none\">\n<div class=\"message-box-title\">KEY POINTS<\/div>\n<div class=\"message-box-content\">\n<div class=\"shortcode-list bullet\"><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Elections viewed as democratic benchmark, hegemonies adapt<\/li>\n<li>Political competition invigorated, old elites recycled<\/li>\n<li>Fewer civil wars and coups, more electoral violence<\/li>\n<li>Economic growth attended by inadequate job creation and popular discontent<\/li>\n<li>Electoral management improved, electoral disputes common<\/li>\n<li>Extensions to presidential term limits rebuffed, constitutions remain vulnerable<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Democratic Africa<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Africa is undergoing rapid political transition. Governments and politicians are confronted by voluble demands for greater transparency and accountability. The proliferation of mobile telecommunications has intensified scrutiny.\u00a0Hegemonies \u2013 old and new \u2013 have adapted to fundamental\u00a0changes in external relations and political rivalry.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">African leaders confronted the uncertainties of the post-Cold\u00a0War era with pragmatism and resilience. In the late 1980s\u00a0and 1990s, economic liberalisation imposed by the World\u00a0Bank and IMF coincided with dwindling external patronage.\u00a0As governments looked to internal constituencies to\u00a0underscore their legitimacy, political reform ensued. In 2012,\u00a0only four countries in Africa lacked multi-party constitutions:\u00a0Eritrea, Swaziland, Libya and Somalia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Multi-party elections are widely regarded as the benchmark\u00a0for appraising the democratic credentials of African\u00a0governments. In 1989, three African countries were labelled\u00a0electoral democracies. By 2011, the number had risen to 18(1),\u00a0and 15 countries held presidential, legislative and\/or local\u00a0government elections during the year. Twenty-three countries\u00a0had polls scheduled for 2012 (2). Popular participation in\u00a0elections is usually enthusiastic. In South Africa, voter turnout\u00a0has exceeded 76% in all parliamentary contests since 1994 (3).<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_4628\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/Elections-in-Africa_2012.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4628\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4628 \" src=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/Elections-in-Africa_2012-300x292.jpg\" alt=\"Elections in Africa_2012\" width=\"300\" height=\"292\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/Elections-in-Africa_2012-300x292.jpg 300w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/Elections-in-Africa_2012-50x50.jpg 50w, https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/04\/Elections-in-Africa_2012.jpg 610w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-4628\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Elections in Africa 2012 (Click to enlarge)<\/p><\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">International donors intent on improving \u201cgovernance\u201d in\u00a0Africa are closely involved in the funding, planning and\u00a0monitoring of elections. Polls are costly: the 2011 elections in\u00a0the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cost over US$700m,\u00a0of which 37% was donor-funded (4). Support is underpinned by\u00a0a belief that democracy will improve the accountability of\u00a0governments \u2013 and development. But multi-party elections\u00a0have produced diverse political outcomes and myriad\u00a0unintended consequences, not all of which are progressive.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Voting and tactics<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Substantial external funding for elections has recast political\u00a0competition in Africa. Many multi-party elections involve the\u00a0recycling of protagonists. In Nigeria, former military ruler\u00a0Major General Muhammadu Buhari ran for the presidency in\u00a02003, 2007 and 2011. Four potential candidates for the 2013\u00a0presidential elections in Kenya \u2013 Raila Odinga, Uhuru\u00a0Kenyatta, William Ruto, and Kalonzo Musyoka \u2013 were\u00a0stalwarts of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) which\u00a0ruled unopposed for 39 years after independence. In most\u00a0countries, new faces remain a rarity among those competing\u00a0for the highest offices.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Political liberalisation has motivated opposition. Since 1991,\u00a031 ruling parties or heads of state have been voted from\u00a0office. In Ghana, the opposition has twice secured power\u00a0peacefully since the first multi-party elections in 1992. But\u00a0incumbent presidents win most African polls, prevailing over\u00a0stifled or fragmented opposition. Twenty candidates\u00a0attempted \u2013 unsuccessfully \u2013 to end the 26-year rule of\u00a0President Paul Biya in Cameroon\u2019s 2008 presidential election.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Ethnicity is commonly used to mobilise electoral support,\u00a0intensifying and reinforcing political divisions. Nationwide\u00a0support for the Sierra Leone People\u2019s Party (SLPP) in the 2002\u00a0elections, which marked the end of a decade-long civil war,\u00a0was short-lived. In 2007, the SLPP was predominantly\u00a0supported by the Mende south and east of the country,\u00a0while the Temne and Limba north and Krio community in\u00a0the west rallied behind the All People\u2019s Congress (APC).\u00a0Ethnic or sectarian electoral loyalties more often reflect the\u00a0dispensing and pursuit of patronage benefits than\u00a0entrenched enmity.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Vote-buying is common, and effective. Cash \u2013 or favours \u2013\u00a0for votes constitutes a more immediate and tangible reward\u00a0than promises to deliver public goods or reform policy. In\u00a0Zambia, opposition leader Michael Sata resourcefully\u00a0adopted \u201cDon\u2019t Kubeba\u201d \u2013 \u201cDon\u2019t Tell\u201d \u2013 as his campaign\u00a0slogan for the 2011 presidential election, encouraging\u00a0people to accept \u201cgifts\u201d from rival Movement for Multi-party\u00a0Democracy politicians but not let that influence how they\u00a0would vote. Sata won the presidency, and his Patriotic Front\u00a0secured a majority in parliament.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<blockquote class=\"center\"><p>\u201cThe problem of Africa in general and Uganda\u00a0in particular is not the people but the leaders\u00a0who want to overstay in power\u201d\u00a0\u2013 Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, 1986 (5)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Resounding victories at polls with voter turnouts above 90%\u00a0are usually associated with countries governed by former\u00a0liberation movements. President Paul Kagame polled 93%\u00a0of Rwanda\u2019s 2010 presidential vote. The Ethiopian People&#8217;s\u00a0Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by Prime\u00a0Minister Meles Zenawi won all but two of the 547\u00a0parliamentary seats in 2010. In Rwanda and Ethiopia,\u00a0national elections have become formalities. The need for\u00a0national reconstruction and accelerated development is\u00a0cited as justification for consensus politics and the restriction\u00a0of inter-party competition.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Violence<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Accession to power through elections is the norm in Africa.\u00a0In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of African leaders\u00a0were forced from office by <em>coup d\u2019\u00e9tat<\/em> or assassinated (6). In the\u00a02000s, there were eight military coups on the continent. The\u00a0number of civil wars halved between 1992 and the\u00a0mid-2000s. While elections have generally been more\u00a0peaceable mechanisms for contesting power, politically\u00a0motivated violence occurred in 60% of African elections in\u00a01990-2008 (7).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Electoral violence is orchestrated by political elites to\u00a0intimidate voters. \u201cYouth wings\u201d or party \u201ctask forces\u201d are\u00a0prominent exponents. In Zimbabwe, victory for the\u00a0opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the\u00a02008 parliamentary election triggered an immediate and\u00a0brutal response from President Robert Mugabe\u2019s Zimbabwe\u00a0African National Union \u2013 Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). A\u00a0campaign of beatings and targeted assassinations of MDC\u00a0officials and supporters forced party leader, Morgan\u00a0Tsvangirai, to withdraw from the presidential run-off vote.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read:\u00a0<a title=\"Old Tricks, Young Guns: Elections and Violence in Sierra Leone\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/publications\/briefing-notes\/old-tricks-young-guns-elections-and-violence-in-sierra-leone\/\" target=\"_blank\">Old Tricks, Young Guns: Elections and Violence in Sierra Leone<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Elections can exacerbate existing tensions. A recurrence of\u00a0factional clashes in northern Nigeria followed Goodluck\u00a0Jonathan\u2019s victory in the 2011 presidential election. More\u00a0than 800 people were killed in the fighting. Perceived\u00a0consolidation of power by politicians from the\u00a0predominantly Christian south, and enduring economic\u00a0disparity between northern and southern states, fuelled the\u00a0unrest. Clashes in Kenya\u2019s Rift Valley following the 2007\u00a0elections reflected grievances among Kalenjin and Maasai\u00a0over traditional lands allocated to Kikuyu in the 1970s by\u00a0President Jomo Kenyatta.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The compulsion to retain public office \u2013 and susceptibility\u00a0to resort to violence \u2013 is most pronounced in countries\u00a0where state resources are the principal, or most easily\u00a0accessible, repository of economic opportunity. Where\u00a0elections are \u201cwinner takes all\u201d contests, violence is a cheap\u00a0and effective electoral device. The prevalence of electoral\u00a0violence is a clear signal of the possibility of more\u00a0widespread and protracted strife.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Growth, youth and protest<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Democratic reforms have coincided with declarations of an\u00a0economic renaissance in Africa, prompted by growth\u00a0averaging 6% in the 2000s (8). Continental summaries and\u00a0projections mask significant variations. Ghana\u2019s GDP grew\u00a0by 13.5% in 2011. In neighbouring C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, GDP\u00a0contracted by 5.8% (9). Democratic reforms and economic\u00a0growth have raised expectations among African electorates.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The economic \u2013 and democratic \u2013 potential of an emerging\u00a0middle class in Africa is widely extolled. But per capita\u00a0income in sub-Saharan Africa was lower in 2005 than in\u00a01975. Inequality is rising and poverty levels remain\u00a0stubbornly high. In Sierra Leone, while GDP growth\u00a0averaged 5% a year in 2007-11, the purchasing power of\u00a0low-income earners halved (10). No government in\u00a0sub-Saharan Africa has yet created the conditions for\u00a0sustainable and transformative agricultural or industrial\u00a0development.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Scant progress was recorded in raising the quantity \u2013 or\u00a0quality \u2013 of formal sector employment in Africa during the\u00a02000s, despite democratic reforms. In South Africa, which\u00a0boasts the continent\u2019s largest and most diversified economy,\u00a0624,000 jobs were created during the 2000s. In 1997-98,\u00a01.8m jobs were created in a single year. In 2012, a quarter of\u00a0South Africa\u2019s labour force \u2013 and more than half of 15-24 year\u00a0olds \u2013 are unemployed (11).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The failure of elected governments to address deepening\u00a0frustrations and hardships has fuelled popular discontent,\u00a0from Swaziland to Senegal. In Malawi, 19 people died during\u00a0protests at chronic fuel shortages, rising prices and high\u00a0unemployment in July 2011. Uganda\u2019s \u201cwalk-to-work\u201d\u00a0protests, orchestrated by opposition leader Kizza Besigye in\u00a0response to a 50% surge in fuel prices between January and\u00a0April 2011, were violently suppressed by the ruling National\u00a0Resistance Movement (NRM). Nationwide strikes brought\u00a0the Nigerian economy to a standstill in January 2012 after\u00a0the government removed subsidies and the price of fuel\u00a0doubled.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Opposition leaders in Liberia, Uganda and the DRC\u00a0positioned themselves as champions of the youth during\u00a0elections in 2011. Almost three-quarters of Africa\u2019s\u00a0population are under the age of 30. With minimal education,\u00a0skills or opportunities for employment, the young are\u00a0acutely disadvantaged. As a sizeable and growing\u00a0constituency that is often less bound by ethnic allegiances,\u00a0young voters have become a prime focus of political party\u00a0campaigns and rallies. While the dearth of economic\u00a0opportunities suggests a need for caution about the\u00a0imminent realisation of an economic \u201cdemographic\u00a0dividend\u201d in Africa, the young have become a leading force\u00a0in electoral politics.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Institutions and process<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The management of African elections has improved\u00a0markedly, if unevenly. Public \u2013 and international \u2013\u00a0confidence in the independence and legitimacy of Ghana\u2019s\u00a0National Electoral Commission has been conducive to\u00a0democratic consolidation in the country. The appointment\u00a0of Professor Attahiru Jega to the Independent National\u00a0Electoral Commission in Nigeria, and his insistence on the\u00a0creation of a new voter register, enhanced perceptions of an\u00a0institution and process commonly regarded with suspicion\u00a0and mistrust. In 2007, Sierra Leone\u2019s National Electoral\u00a0Commission acted decisively by annulling votes from all 477\u00a0polling stations registering turnouts over 100%.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Where electoral management is weak, manipulation of polls\u00a0persists. A deficient voter register, unfeasibly high turnouts\u00a0and a host of other irregularities discredited the 2011\u00a0presidential election in DRC. In Uganda, the EU observer\u00a0mission judged that \u201cthe power of incumbency was\u00a0exercised to such an extent [in the 2011 elections] as to\u00a0compromise severely the level playing field between\u00a0competing candidates and political parties\u201d (12).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Clear and agreed procedures for announcing \u2013 and\u00a0contesting \u2013 election results are of paramount importance.\u00a0A violent and prolonged stand-off followed the\u00a0announcement of conflicting election results by the\u00a0Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional\u00a0Court in C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire\u2019s 2010 presidential election. In Liberia,\u00a0the chairman of the National Electoral Commission was\u00a0forced to resign after inadvertently signing a letter which\u00a0confirmed that opposition candidate Winston Tubman had\u00a0won the first round of the 2011 presidential election,\u00a0contrary to the declared result. Despite Tubman\u2019s insistence\u00a0that voting irregularities proved that the election was rigged\u00a0in favour of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and his boycott\u00a0of the run-off vote, widespread conflict was averted.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<blockquote class=\"center\"><p>\u201cThere have to be clear rules and people\u00a0must accept the rules. This is very important\u00a0in Africa because we have an attitude of\u00a0winner takes all\u201d\u00a0\u2013 Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General (13)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Efforts to resolve electoral deadlocks by negotiation have\u00a0been motivated by a desire to stop conflict \u2013 not uphold the\u00a0integrity of the electoral process. In Kenya, interaction\u00a0between members of the unity cabinet has been more\u00a0collusive than collaborative, but the creation of a new\u00a0constitution has raised hopes for a peaceful election in 2013.\u00a0In Zimbabwe, the coalition between ZANU-PF and the MDC\u00a0has been unequal and the joint Global Political Agreement\u00a0remains largely unimplemented. A fair and peaceful poll in\u00a02012 or 2013 is a remote prospect. Where intense grievances\u00a0and rivalries persist in power-sharing arrangements, the faith\u00a0of voters is undermined and subsequent elections are a\u00a0potential catalyst for renewed instability.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">By the book<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Multi-party elections have fostered more widespread\u00a0observance of formal rules and procedures. Institutions\u00a0matter in ways they previously did not. Voters demand\u00a0respect for national constitutions, and active participation\u00a0in constitutional change. In 2006, Nigeria\u2019s Senate rejected a\u00a0bill for a constitutional amendment to enable President\u00a0Olusegun Obasanjo to stand for a third term in office.\u00a0Attempts to extend presidential term limits in Zambia and\u00a0Malawi were also rebuffed. But constitutions \u2013 and state\u00a0institutions \u2013 remain vulnerable to the concentration of\u00a0power in African presidencies.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Presidents in Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Uganda,\u00a0Cameroon and Togo have extended their tenures through\u00a0constitutional amendment. In Cameroon, the abolition of\u00a0presidential term limits in 2008 enabled Paul Biya to gain a\u00a0sixth consecutive term in office. President Museveni has\u00a0eroded the oversight function of the Ugandan parliament,\u00a0removing its power to vet ministerial appointments and\u00a0investigate allegations of ministerial corruption and\u00a0incompetence.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The military retains significant influence in most African\u00a0countries. Close alliances \u2013 political and commercial \u2013 with\u00a0civilian elites are commonplace. In Nigeria, \u201csecurity\u201d\u00a0accounted for 19% of government expenditure in the 2012\u00a0budget \u2013 a sum equivalent to the allocations to education,\u00a0health, power and agriculture combined. Before the death\u00a0in office of President Malam Bacai Sanh\u00e1 in January 2012,\u00a0every one of Guinea-Bissau\u2019s elected presidents had been\u00a0removed by military coup d\u2019\u00e9tat. In Niger, the military\u00a0bolstered democracy by unseating President Mamadou\u00a0Tandja in 2009. Tandja had dissolved the National Assembly\u00a0and sought to abolish presidential term limits. Coup leader\u00a0Lieutn-General Salou Djibo oversaw a constitutional\u00a0referendum and the return of a civilian administration in\u00a0March 2011.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Also Read: <a title=\"No Mr. President: Mediation and Military intervention in the African Union\" href=\"https:\/\/africaresearchinstitute.org\/wordpress\/publications\/briefing-notes\/no-mr-president-mediation-and-military-intervention-in-the-african-union\/\" target=\"_blank\">No Mr. President: Mediation and Military Intervention in the African Union<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Some of Africa\u2019s inter-governmental organisations have\u00a0shown increasing readiness to support democratic\u00a0processes. The African Union\u2019s (AU) Peace and Security\u00a0Council has consistently opposed illegitimate transfers of\u00a0power. Six states had their membership of the AU suspended\u00a0during the 2000s. Since 2005, the Economic Community of\u00a0West African States (ECOWAS) has also suspended and\u00a0sanctioned coup leaders who refused to commit to hold\u00a0elections. The inadequacy of penalties for non-adherence\u00a0has compromised the efficacy of interventions, as have\u00a0conflicting regional responses. Initiatives from the AU,\u00a0Nigeria and ECOWAS, and South Africa to the crisis in C\u00f4te\u00a0d\u2019Ivoire following the 2010 election attested to intensifying\u00a0competition for influence in sub-Saharan Africa \u2013 but also to\u00a0a willingness to intervene that was unthinkable in the 1990s.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Vision 2020<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Senegal\u2019s 2012 presidential elections were hailed as a\u00a0triumph for democracy in Africa. In the first round, 13\u00a0candidates opposed an octogenarian incumbent president,\u00a0Abdoulaye Wade, pursuing a third term in office. Former\u00a0prime minister Macky Sall defeated Wade in the second\u00a0round by a substantial margin. Wade had consistently\u00a0undermined state institutions and the progressive new\u00a0constitution he introduced in 2001. He exhibited dynastic\u00a0pretensions and a predilection for grandiose schemes \u2013 but\u00a0accepted the election result. As neighbouring Mali\u2019s\u00a0democratically elected leader was simultaneously ousted by\u00a0a military coup, Senegal\u2019s pride in its democratic credentials\u00a0was preserved.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">African elections have assumed their own character and\u00a0momentum during the 2000s \u2013 a decade of immense\u00a0political transformation. Assertions that multi-party polls are\u00a0merely a sop to Western donors and a foreign imposition are\u00a0wide of the mark, and disingenuous. Elections have assumed\u00a0a significance which political elites cannot ignore. The\u00a0relevance of developments in North Africa and the Middle\u00a0East since 2011 may be casually dismissed in public, but is\u00a0inescapable. While elites will continue to adapt, and to\u00a0manipulate electoral processes, social and economic realities\u00a0will force reckonings with voters during \u2013 and in between \u2013\u00a0elections.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Profound social and economic developments will cause\u00a0further radical changes in political processes and\u00a0competition in Africa. Youth, joblessness, mobility,\u00a0burgeoning urban populations and inequality are already\u00a0key factors in African elections \u2013 and will become even more\u00a0significant. Economic growth during the 2000s has not been\u00a0shared by governments and elites. Even in countries which\u00a0benefited substantially from high prices for their natural\u00a0resources, investment in public goods, agricultural\u00a0transformation and infrastructure has remained derisory.\u00a0Sound policymaking \u2013 not elections \u2013 generates\u00a0development and reduces poverty. But elections are an\u00a0essential lever for improving the accountability and\u00a0transparency of governments.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Effective policy is not the exclusive preserve of democratic\u00a0government. So-called \u201ccompetitive authoritarian\u201d regimes\u00a0in Africa have proved alluring to donors and investors alike,\u00a0from East and West. Whether these regimes will succeed in\u00a0emulating counterparts in Asia is uncertain. An\u00a0over-emphasis on control and coercion and too little\u00a0inducement would fail to produce the desired outcomes.\u00a0Emerging alliances with China, Brazil, India and other rapidly\u00a0developing states enable authoritarian regimes to stonewall\u00a0demands \u2013 internal and external \u2013 for democratic reforms\u00a0and political pluralism. In the 2000s, the balance of power in\u00a0Africa altered as dramatically as the political landscape.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Expectations about elections must be realistic, in Africa as\u00a0elsewhere. Elections are not a \u201csilver bullet\u201d for effecting\u00a0immediate and positive political change. A poll deemed\u00a0\u201cfree, fair and credible\u201d by international observers does not\u00a0automatically signify a thriving democracy. But the\u00a0democratic genie will not be returned to the bottle in Africa\u00a0\u2013 and the further consolidation of electoral processes and\u00a0institutions is imperative.<\/p>\n<div class=\"message-box-wrapper none\">\n<div class=\"message-box-title\">Sources<\/div>\n<div class=\"message-box-content\">\n<p>1 <a title=\"Freedom House - Electoral Democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa\" href=\"http:\/\/africanelections.tripod.com\/electoral_democracies.html\" target=\"_blank\">Freedom House, \u201cElectoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa\u201d<\/a>.<br \/>\n2 <a title=\"EISA: African elections calendar 2012\" href=\"http:\/\/www.content.eisa.org.za\/old-page\/african-election-calendar-2012\" target=\"_blank\">Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), \u201cAfrican elections calendar 2012\u201d<\/a>.<br \/>\n3 <a title=\"International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance\" href=\"http:\/\/www.idea.int\/\" target=\"_blank\">International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)<\/a>.<br \/>\n4 International Development Committee, \u201c<a title=\"Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda\" href=\"http:\/\/www.publications.parliament.uk\/pa\/cm201012\/cmselect\/cmintdev\/1133\/1133.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda<\/a>\u201d, December 12th 2011.<br \/>\n5 Will Ross, \u201c<a title=\"Would Uganda's Museveni recognise his former self?\" href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/1\/hi\/programmes\/from_our_own_correspondent\/9477930.stm\" target=\"_blank\">Would Uganda\u2019s Museveni recognise his former self<\/a>?\u201d, BBC, May 7th 2011.<br \/>\n6 Daniel Posner and Daniel Young, \u201cThe institutionalisation of political power in Africa\u201d, Journal of Democracy, July 2007.<br \/>\n7 Scott Straus, \u201c<a title=\"Wars do end! Challenging patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa\" href=\"http:\/\/afraf.oxfordjournals.org\/content\/111\/443\/179.full.pdf?keytype=ref&amp;ijkey=4ztxA60I56z3N9E\" target=\"_blank\">Wars do end! Challenging patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa<\/a>\u201d, African Affairs, March 2012.<br \/>\n8 Ernst &amp; Young, \u201c<a title=\"It's time for Africa: Africa Attractiveness Survey, 2011\" href=\"http:\/\/www.ey.com\/Publication\/vwLUAssets\/2011_-_Africa_Attractiveness_Survey\/$FILE\/Attractiveness_africa_low_resolution_final_WEB.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">It\u2019s time for Africa: Africa Attractiveness Survey<\/a>\u201d, 2011.<br \/>\n9 IMF, \u201c<a title=\"Regional Economic Outlook, 2011\" href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/reo\/2011\/afr\/eng\/sreo0411.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">Regional Economic Outlook<\/a>\u201d, October 2011.<br \/>\n10 Michael von der Schulenberg, former UN special representative in Sierra Leone, interview by Jonathan Bhalla (Africa Research Institute), November 2011.<br \/>\n11 <a title=\"One in two youths unemployed\" href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/olivier\/Downloads\/One%20in%20two%20youths%20unemployed%20-%2031%20January%202011%20(1).pdf\" target=\"_blank\">South African Institute of Race Relations, \u201cOne in two youths unemployed<\/a>\u201d, Press Release, January 31st 2011.<br \/>\n12 European Union Election Observer Mission, \u201c<a title=\"Uganda General Election 18 February 2011 - Final Report\" href=\"http:\/\/eeas.europa.eu\/eueom\/pdf\/missions\/eueom_uganda2011_final_report_en.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">Uganda General Elections 18 February 2011 \u2013 Final Report<\/a>\u201d, March\u00a010th 2011.<br \/>\n13 \u201c<a title=\"More voting, less democracy?\" href=\"http:\/\/www.weforum.org\/sessions\/summary\/more-voting-less-democracy\" target=\"_blank\">More Voting, Less Democracy<\/a>?\u201d panel session, World Economic Forum on Africa, Cape Town, May 5th 2011.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This Briefing Note examines some essential traits of recent African elections and considers their implications for future contests. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":4627,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,8],"tags":[64,42,63,278,48,35,271,131,27],"class_list":["post-628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-briefing-notes","category-publications","tag-africa","tag-biometric-voter-registration","tag-democracy","tag-democracy-in-africa","tag-election-violence","tag-elections","tag-elections-africa","tag-political-reform","tag-politics-in-publications"],"aioseo_notices":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the 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