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		<title>How Rwanda judged its genocide &#8211; Phil Clark</title>
		<link>https://africaresearchinstitute.org/counterpoints/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Niki Wolfe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 May 2012 11:48:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Counterpoints]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>While the full impact of the process will not be apparent for many years, gacaca community courts have delivered benefits to Rwandans in the spheres of justice, truth and reconciliation. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/counterpoints/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new">How Rwanda judged its genocide &#8211; Phil Clark</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="header"><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-Rwanda-judged-its-genocide-E6QODPW0KV.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class='alignnone size-full wp-image-3627 img-fluid' src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/header-banner-rwanda-02.jpg" alt="HOW RWANDA JUDGED ITS GENOCIDE - BY PHIL CLARK" width="940" height="225" /></a></div>
<div class="special">
<p class="intro">Since 2001, the gacaca community courts have been the centrepiece of Rwanda&#8217;s justice and reconciliation process. Nearly every adult Rwandan has participated in the trials, but lawyers are banned from any official involvement. Human rights organisations fiercely opposed the use of gacaca for trying genocide cases, on the grounds that it fell short of international legal standards of fairness. Much criticism reflects legal rigidity towards the unprecedented challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda – and a limited understanding of the aims of the community courts. Gacaca was inevitably imperfect, but also highly ambitious and innovative. While the full impact of the process will not be apparent for many years, gacaca has delivered benefits to Rwandans in the spheres of justice, truth and democratic participation. Other societies confronting the aftermath of mass conflict could learn much from Rwanda&#8217;s approach to local justice.</p>
</div>
<div class="special">
<p><strong>By Phil Clark </strong>is a lecturer in comparative and international politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and co-founder of Oxford Transitional Justice Research.</p>
<div id="contents" class="contents">
<ul class="con">
<li class="con"><a href="#S2">Justice without lawyers</a></li>
<li class="con"><a href="#S3">Scepticism and innovation</a></li>
<li class="con"><a href="#S4">Judging gacaca</a></li>
<li class="con"><a href="#S5">Lofty expectations</a></li>
<li class="con-last"><a href="#S6">Notes</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div id="S1" class="special">
<p>In a Rwandan village beside a banana palm-encircled lake, a crowd chatters beneath a blue tarpaulin shielding it from the harsh midday sun. Before the crowd on a long wooden bench sit nine elders, mostly middle-aged men and women, who have been elected by the community for their high moral standing. A young man – the president of the panel – stands to address the gathering. He explains that in their midst is a prisoner, provisionally released from jail a week ago, who has confessed to committing crimes during the 1994 Rwandan genocide which, in a little over three months, claimed the lives of between 500,000 and one million Tutsi and their perceived Hutu and Twa sympathisers. The task of those present, the president continues, is to listen to anyone from the village who saw what the prisoner did, to hear from the families of victims about the pain inflicted by losing loved ones, and for the judges to decide the case of the accused.</p>
<p>A murmur is audible as the prisoner walks to the front and stops between the crowd and the judges. He mumbles, and the president tells him to speak up. With head bowed, the man says that he has come to confess to killing his neighbour&#8217;s wife in the first week of May 1994. He found the woman hiding in bushes as gangs of killers roamed the paths of the village searching for Tutsi. She was crying, and screamed at him to let her go. He pulled the woman out of the bushes and threw her to the ground. He slashed his machete once across her neck, then again, and left her to die.</p>
<p>The prisoner, still staring at the ground, says that he has come to apologise for what he did. He had many years to think about his actions in jail, and his conscience became so heavy that he confessed his crimes to the authorities. After a pause the president asks the assembly if the testimony is true and complete. For a while there is silence. Then a man at the back stands up. Yes, he says, it is true that this prisoner killed his neighbour&#8217;s wife – but he has failed to mention that the following day he also killed the woman&#8217;s son with a machete and threw the body in a pit latrine. A woman rises to her feet and says that she too saw the prisoner kill the boy. The president asks the prisoner to respond to these new accusations.</p>
<p>The man raises his head slightly and replies that it is not true that he killed his neighbour&#8217;s son. When he received word that the boy was dead he himself was miles away on the road to Kigali, fleeing in shame after murdering his neighbour&#8217;s wife. Amid the ensuing clamour, distinct voices can be heard. &#8220;He&#8217;s lying – I saw him in the village on the day the boy was killed!&#8221; &#8220;I saw him too – he spoke to my wife in the courtyard that afternoon!&#8221; &#8220;And he killed others – more than the woman and the boy!&#8221;</p>
<p>The president calls for calm, and for each person who wishes to speak to do so one at a time. People start to cry. The judges scrawl on the notepads in their laps. In one week they will have to decide what crimes the man committed during the genocide and what punishment he should receive. When this case is decided, there will be more – more stories of pain and loss, more claims and counter-claims, more details to verify, more decisions to make.</p>
<p>This hearing took place in 2003, in the Bugesera region of southern Rwanda. It represents a common scene from thousands of Rwandan towns and villages which participated in a highly ambitious, innovative and inevitably imperfect court system known as gacaca (pronounced &#8220;ga-CHA-cha&#8221;). Derived from the Kinyarwanda word meaning &#8220;the lawn&#8221; or &#8220;the grass&#8221; – a reference to the conduct of hearings in open spaces in full view of the community – gacaca is a traditional method of conflict resolution and reconciliation that was controversially revived, transformed and codified in law to address an extraordinary predicament which threatened to overwhelm the post-genocide Rwandan state.</p>
<p class="back"><a href="#contents">BACK TO CONTENTS</a></p>
</div>
<div id="S2" class="special"><span class="topic">Justice without lawyers</span></div>
<div class="special">
<p>In 2001, approximately 120,000 genocide suspects were detained in festering jails in Rwanda at a cost of US$20 million a year. More than 10,000 people had died in detention since 1994. There were few judges and lawyers left in the country. The judicial infrastructure had been decimated. Few countries have had to tackle the aftermath of a conflict in which hundreds of thousands were killed or injured by hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens with such limited legal and financial resources. As gacaca identified new suspects still at large, the number of individuals prosecuted eventually swelled to 400,000.</p>
<p class="pullout">The process was intended to involve the people who experienced the genocide first-hand at every stage</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, the dual aims of gacaca were to prosecute every individual genocide suspect regardless of seniority or social standing, and to begin the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Rwandan society. The process was intended to involve the people who experienced the genocide first-hand at every stage. The duty of prosecution was conferred on respected individuals elected by the local population.</p>
<p>Professional judges and lawyers were excluded from any official role in the trials. In 2001, more than 250,000 lay judges were elected by their communities in about 11,000 jurisdictions. The majority were Hutu. Their training focused on general legal principles and the specific procedures of gacaca. In June 2002, gacaca was launched as &#8220;justice without lawyers&#8221;, partly by necessity and partly due to a widespread fear that lawyers would distort the process by dominating hearings and intimidating participants.</p>
<p class="back"><a href="#contents">BACK TO CONTENTS</a></p>
</div>
<div id="S3" class="special"><span class="topic">Scepticism and innovation</span></div>
<div class="special">
<p>From the outset, most international observers fiercely opposed the use of gacaca for trying genocide crimes. In February 1999, when the Rwandan government was still debating the possibility of adapting gacaca to meet its needs, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) argued vehemently that community-based courts were ill-equipped to handle complex genocide cases.<sup>1</sup> Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a host of legal commentators have waged a concerted campaign against gacaca on the grounds that it falls short of international standards of due process for the prosecution of serious crimes. In a report published in December 2002, AI stated:</p>
<p>&#8220;The legislation establishing the Gacaca Jurisdictions fails to guarantee minimum fair trial standards that are guaranteed in international treaties ratified by the Rwandese government . . . [G]acaca trials need to conform to international standards of fairness so that the government&#8217;s efforts to end impunity . . . are effective. If justice is not seen to be done, public confidence in the judiciary will not be restored and the government will have lost an opportunity to show its determination to respect human rights.&#8221;<sup>2</sup></p>
<p>Although some foreign donors contributed towards the cost of the community trials, external opposition remains widespread and strident. In 2009, HRW equated &#8220;Rwanda&#8217;s highly discredited gacaca courts&#8221; with the military commissions convened by the US government in Guantanamo Bay. Both were described by HRW as &#8220;criminal justice systems … in which hearsay is admitted before a jury of non-lawyers&#8221;.<sup>3</sup></p>
<p>These critiques of gacaca reflect legal rigidity in the face of unprecedented challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda – and a limited understanding of the aims of gacaca. The perspective stems from a narrow conception of justice based on the experiences of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II and subsequent tribunals – including the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). International legal orthodoxy emphasises the use of conventional court hearings – typically located far from the scene of the crime – for small numbers of elite suspects who have the right to defence counsel of their choosing before an impartial judiciary.</p>
<p class="pullout">Critiques of gacaca reflect legal rigidity in the face of unprecedented challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda</p>
<p>This orthodoxy is found wanting when contending with the aftermath of highly decentralised conflicts like the Rwandan genocide. Orchestration of modern conflicts is often diffuse and requires new thinking about appropriate legal responses. The profound impact on civilian populations also highlights the need to pursue broader social objectives. Truth recovery, psycho-social healing and reconciliation are beyond the remit of more conventional, geographically distant, legal institutions such as war crimes tribunals. A desire to separate and insulate the justice process from the affected population underpins the conventional legal approach to justice, ostensibly in order to maintain judicial neutrality.</p>
<p>Many critics of gacaca have failed to recognise that a different notion of justice informs Rwanda&#8217;s community courts – one necessitated by the particular nature and intensity of the genocide. A rejection of the Nuremberg model of international legal conventions is implicit in gacaca. Justice through gacaca reflects the high degree of popular participation in genocide crimes (not just the role of elites), assigns to the population a central role in prosecuting genocide cases (rather than promoting the participation of professional lawyers), and is sufficiently flexible to pursue locally defined objectives (rather than focusing exclusively on punishing perpetrators). Gacaca represents an innovative response to genocide crimes, and a challenge to conventional means of establishing post-atrocity accountability.</p>
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</div>
<div id="S4" class="special"><span class="topic">Judging gacaca</span></div>
<div class="special">
<p>Critics who fail to judge gacaca by reference to its own methods and objectives also ignore significant benefits that the hearings have delivered. These benefits will have an enduring impact on every level of Rwandan society. Gacaca has certainly been far from perfect, and the process should not be romanticised by internal or external observers. Among its main shortcomings have been numerous cases of corruption, bribery of judges and intimidation of witnesses, syndicates of liars who colluded to hide evidence, and retraumatised survivors. However, these negative aspects have not been more widespread than could reasonably be expected of a decade-long process involving as many as one million cases in 11,000 jurisdictions.</p>
<p>There has been a tendency on the part of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to identify the worst cases of corrupt or traumatising hearings and suggest that they are representative. Such selectivity may be useful from an advocacy perspective but it is analytically flawed – and undermines legitimate criticism of gacaca. While the full impact of gacaca will not be apparent for many years, it is possible to identify three main spheres in which the process has delivered benefits to ordinary Rwandans – justice, truth and democratic participation.</p>
<p><strong><em>Justice </em></strong></p>
<p>Gacaca has been remarkably successful at fulfilling the Rwandan government&#8217;s promise to deliver comprehensive prosecutions of génocidaires without exacerbating the dire overcrowding of jails that necessitated gacaca in the first place. Far from being &#8220;mob&#8221; or &#8220;vigilante&#8221; justice, as many legal critics predicted, about a quarter of gacaca cases have resulted in acquittal. Many sentences have been commuted to community service, thereby facilitating the reintegration of detainees into society.</p>
<p class="pullout">A vast genocide case load – as many as one million cases – has been handled by gacaca in a decade</p>
<p>Gacaca has also individualised the guilt of those responsible for the genocide. Greater clarity about who, as individuals, did or did not commit genocide crimes is vital for understanding the causes of the genocide, and for community cohesion in the future. Provincial governors, military officials and peasant farmers have been treated equally and their cases heard without regard to political or socio-economic status – an explicit recognition that Rwandans from all levels of society participated in the genocide.</p>
<p>A vast genocide caseload – as many as one million cases – has been handled by gacaca in a decade. In fifteen years the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in Arusha, has completed 69 trials. Gacaca has cost about US$40 million, the ICTR more than US$1 billion. The financial and social cost of sustaining a huge number of suspects in jail – with no prospect of trial of any kind – was a crucial consideration in deliberations about the creation of gacaca. By clearing the backlog of genocide cases, gacaca has released much-needed funds and people for Rwanda&#8217;s reconstruction.</p>
<p><strong><em>Truth </em></strong></p>
<p>The emphasis on popular participation during gacaca hearings was conducive to truth-telling and truth-hearing. Gacaca has enabled the recovery of truth in the form of facts about the genocide. It has also allowed individuals to tell and hear narratives that help them deal emotionally and psychologically with the past. The gathering of testimony throughout the country provides a rich and diverse repository of historical material regarding genocide crimes. The recently created Gacaca Documentation Centre in Kigali constitutes one of the largest archives concerning a mass crime anywhere in the world – an invaluable resource for Rwandans and foreigners alike.</p>
<p>Suspects and survivors often affirm that the opportunity to speak openly at gacaca about events and emotions concerning the genocide has contributed to their healing. In interviews, many suspects claim a sense of release from feelings of shame and social dislocation through confessing to – and apologising for – their crimes in front of their victims and the wider community. Many survivors say that they overcame feelings of loneliness by publicly describing the personal impact of genocide crimes and receiving communal acknowledgement of their pain.</p>
<p>The openness of the community dialogue at gacaca is one of its key features. It differentiates gacaca from the conventional forms of justice advocated by human rights organisations, in which judges and lawyers control the discourse and discussions are limited to the legal facts deemed necessary to determine guilt or innocence. Gacaca pursues these same legal questions but in a manner – and forum – which enables participants to discuss the individual and collective effects of crimes, and to seek some form of acknowledgement or catharsis.</p>
<p><strong><em>Democratic participation</em></strong></p>
<p>Gacaca has opened new spaces for political debate and spawned new forms of democratic participation. In a country where the national political arena remains tightly controlled, this poses a major challenge to a government which did not fully anticipate the ramifications of allowing the population to shape the day-to-day running of gacaca. Most debates about democracy in Rwanda focus on the national level – particularly the process of presidential and parliamentary elections, media regulation and reform of state institutions. Developments at the sub-national level may prove to be just as – if not more – important for Rwanda&#8217;s future political trajectory.</p>
<p>I spent nine years observing gacaca hearings and interviewing participants. During that time, I witnessed energetic – and highly unpredictable – forms of popular participation. Many hearings lasted eight or nine hours under the blazing equatorial sun. Communities argued over the details of genocide crimes – who had killed whom, by what means, where bodies were buried, what property had been stolen, and who deserved compensation. Complex, often heated, discussions about the nature of justice were commonplace. To what extent should peasant perpetrators be held accountable when the genocide was initiated by political and military elites? Was the imprisonment of the guilty – as opposed to compensation for victims – the preferred outcome of the process?</p>
<p class="pullout">Gacaca has opened new spaces for political debate, and spawned new forms of democratic participation</p>
<p>Many foreign commentators depict Rwandan society as closed and secretive. Gacaca has demonstrated an immense capacity for vigorous political exchange. This was especially visible during the prosecution of local mayors, prefects and other senior government officials after the 2008 reform to the Gacaca Law. For many participants, the transfer of certain &#8220;Category 1&#8221; genocide cases from the national courts to gacaca proved politically emboldening. The spectacle of former leaders being held accountable in the courtyards and marketplaces where previously they had exercised power was reflected in highly charged hearings.</p>
<p>In the midst of communal debates at gacaca, locally elected judges have gained a new moral and political standing in the community because of their ability to guide difficult discussions. Many claim that community members come to them for advice on daily matters because they have proven adept at mediating disputes and providing wise counsel. Gacaca has produced a sizeable cadre of skilled political practitioners with a deep knowledge of the divisions and concerns within their communities.</p>
<p>The impact of gacaca on local leadership has been especially important for women, who were often among the most active and voluble participants during genocide hearings. Women were excluded from any official role in the traditional version of gacaca which dealt with family disputes and day-to-day infractions. In the modern incarnation of gacaca almost 40% of judges were female.</p>
<p>Over time gacaca became a forum where communities could discuss sensitive and contentious issues beyond its official mandate to prosecute genocide cases. The discussion of crimes allegedly committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – the current ruling party in Rwanda – against Hutu was controversially forbidden by the Gacaca Law. But I attended numerous hearings in remote villages where Hutu participants debated at great length the failure to address RPF crimes. Judges tolerated, rather than actively encouraged, these discussions – and did not record any of the testimony in their court notes for fear that the transcripts would attract the attention of the authorities in Kigali.</p>
<p class="pullout">Once underway, gacaca took on a life of its own</p>
<p>Inconvenient truths only emerged towards the end of gacaca. Participants needed time to gauge what forms of discourse were safely permissible. Communities on the country&#8217;s periphery determined that state surveillance of their hearings was minimal and that open debate of controversial topics was possible.</p>
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<div id="S5" class="special"><span class="topic">Lofty expectations</span></div>
<div class="special">
<p>The Rwandan government took an enormous gamble in allowing the same population that had experienced the genocide to guide and shape gacaca. It was not a solution favoured by all factions within the RPF leadership and other influential elites. The scale, duration and complexity of gacaca militated against the degree of centralised control alleged by some international detractors.</p>
<p>Gacaca has been a far from homogeneous process. The mass involvement of the population in the trials is unique. Geographical, historical and other local factors determined the nature and outcome of hearings. Local communities moulded gacaca to their own ends – sometimes creating significant problems, and often contrary to the objectives of those who instigated the process. Once underway, gacaca took on a life of its own.</p>
<p>Gacaca&#8217;s capacity for fostering open community debate of contentious issues and new forms of local leadership highlights its democratic potential. The long-term impact in this regard will depend on developments in national politics, and the degree to which Kigali-based elites permit more broad-based political involvement and criticism. Regardless of how national policy evolves, Rwandan leaders will have to contend with the desire for substantial political participation which gacaca has aroused among hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans.</p>
<p>A major challenge for gacaca has been overly lofty expectations about what it could achieve. Many outsiders have never understood the complexity of the process or its diverse objectives – many of which evolved. International criminal tribunals focus on the punishment of leading malefactors and deterrence. It is doubtful that this objective can ever be achieved by legal mechanisms alone. More importantly, much more than deterrence is necessary to produce lasting peace.</p>
<p>The pursuit of reconciliation was enshrined from the outset in the Gacaca Law. In 2008, in response to extensive discussion in hearings over many years, the law was revised to require suspects to request forgiveness as well as confess and express remorse. Reconciliation and forgiveness are – at best – a distant prospect in most of Rwanda. But these are not one-off acts and gacaca constitutes an important starting point. Other societies confronting the aftermath of mass conflict can learn much from the substantial political and social dividends of Rwanda&#8217;s approach to local justice – as well as its flaws and pitfalls.</p>
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</div>
<div id="S6" class="special"><b>NOTES</b></p>
<p class="credit"><span style="font-size: 11px;">1</span> United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, &#8220;Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda&#8221;, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/33, 8 February 1999, p.12.</p>
<p class="credit"><span style="font-size: 11px;">2</span> Amnesty International, &#8220;Rwanda – Gacaca: A Question of Justice&#8221;, AI Index AFR 47/007/2002, December 2002, p. 2.</p>
<p class="credit"><span style="font-size: 11px;">3</span> Human Rights Watch, &#8220;US: Revival of Guantanamo Military Commissions a Blow to Justice&#8221;, New York, 15 May 2009.</p>
</div>
<div class="header"><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-Rwanda-judged-its-genocide-E6QODPW0KV.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img decoding="async" class='alignnone size-full wp-image-3627 img-fluid' src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/footer-banner-rwanda-02.jpg" alt="HOW RWANDA JUDGED ITS GENOCIDE - BY PHIL CLARK" width="940" height="225" /></a></div>
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<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/counterpoints/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new">How Rwanda judged its genocide &#8211; Phil Clark</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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		<title>Princes&#8217; Progress: Reconstruction and authority in Eritrea and Rwanda</title>
		<link>https://africaresearchinstitute.org/briefing-notes/princes-progress-reconstruction-and-authority-in-eritrea-and-rwanda</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yovanka ARI]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2011 16:39:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Briefing Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eritrea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rwanda]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://africaresearchinstitute.org/?p=661</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>While President Paul Kagame’s leadership of Rwanda has been championed as “visionary”, President Isaias Afwerki is accused of transforming Eritrea into a rogue, pariah state. Popular perceptions of these comparable countries have been simplistic – and polarised.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/briefing-notes/princes-progress-reconstruction-and-authority-in-eritrea-and-rwanda">Princes&#8217; Progress: Reconstruction and authority in Eritrea and Rwanda</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda.jpg"><img decoding="async" class='alignleft size-medium wp-image-4770 img-fluid' style="border: 1px solid black;" src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda-212x300.jpg" alt="Eritrea Rwanda" width="212" height="300" srcset="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda-212x300.jpg 212w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda-723x1024.jpg 723w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda-170x240.jpg 170w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Eritrea-Rwanda.jpg 1240w" sizes="(max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px" /></a><em>April 2011</em></p>
<p><strong><a title="Princes’ Progress: Reconstruction and authority in Eritrea and Rwanda " href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/BN-1101-Princes-Progress.pdf" target="_blank">Download PDF</a></strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Eritrea and Rwanda are among Africa’s smallest and poorest states. Substantial military resources, and expertise, have enabled both countries to exert disproportionate influence over regional security. Aggression and authoritarianism have not prompted matching responses from donor nations. While President Paul Kagame’s leadership of Rwanda has been championed as “visionary”, President Isaias Afwerki is accused of transforming Eritrea into a rogue, pariah state. These notes argue that popular perceptions of these comparable, though seldom compared, countries have been simplistic – and polarised. </strong></em></p>
[message_box title=&#8221;KEY POINTS&#8221; color=&#8221;none&#8221;]
[list type=&#8221;bullet&#8221;]
<ul>
<li>Acute legacies – Eritrea’s liberation war, Rwanda’s genocide</li>
<li>“Models for Africa” in mid-1990s, leaders praised</li>
<li>Eritrea’s proxy war with Ethiopia vilified, counters US strategy in Somalia</li>
<li>Rwandan incursions in Congo tolerated, no diminution in aid</li>
<li>Dissent and divisionism disallowed, repression decried</li>
<li>Economic “miracle” in Rwanda, Eritrea world’s fastest-growing economy in 2011</li>
</ul>
[/list]
[/message_box]
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Nascent states</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the mid-1990s, the survival of Eritrea and Rwanda as viable states was in doubt. At independence in 1993, Eritrea’s infrastructure and economy lay in ruins after thirty years of “armed struggle” with Ethiopia. In 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control of a country in which 800,000 people had been murdered in three months. Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki and RPF military commander Paul Kagame were touted as exemplars of a new generation of African leaders – disciplined, capable and incorruptible “soldier princes”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the demise of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Derg regime in Ethiopia, Eritrea’s prospects were buoyed by the likelihood of an enduring peace with its neighbour. Visitors to Asmara admired the prevailing sense of purpose and resourcefulness, the absence of corruption or crime, and the orderly demobilisation of tens of thousands of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fighters as much as the beauty of Eritrea’s capital city. Africa’s newest nation attracted commitments of more than US$1 billion of development and humanitarian assistance in the 1990s (1). The Eritrean economy grew rapidly, if unevenly. A new constitution, the prominence of women in politics and civil society, and the promise of democratic elections boded well for a country dubbed “the hope of Africa” (2).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rwanda’s recovery was more problematic, and precarious. Genocide was succeeded by a civil war mostly prosecuted on foreign soil. Rwandan forces invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – then called Zaire – in 1996, to counter the threat posed by exiled <em>genocidaires</em>. As Eritrean troops were sent to assist the new regime in Rwanda, political commentators referred to an emerging “Asmara-to-Kigali axis”(3) of power. The invasion culminated in the overthrow of Zaire’s pro-Hutu President Mobutu and installation of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in his stead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 1998, seven years of peace between the post-Derg governments in Eritrea and Ethiopia ended abruptly. Simmering tensions between the former allies were unmasked by a series of minor border incidents, and Eritrea’s decision to replace the Ethiopian birr with its own currency, the nakfa. As if emboldened by Rwanda’s seemingly successful tilt at becoming the leading playmaker in Central Africa, President Isaias rejected attempts at mediation by RPF leader Paul Kagame and the United States. Three phases of vicious fighting cost the lives of more than 70,000 Ethiopian and Eritrean combatants – and more than a billion dollars – before an uneasy peace was restored in 2000.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Also Read: <a title="How Rwanda judged its genocide" href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/publications/counterpoints/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new/" target="_blank">How Rwanda judged its genocide?</a></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war in 1998, Rwanda troops re-invaded DRC – and remained there until 2002. Despite widespread criticism of the conduct and intentions of Rwandan troops in DRC, Kigali began to attract the plaudits once bestowed on Asmara. After becoming president in 2000, Kagame earned increasingly voluble praise for maintaining stability in Rwanda, overseeing economic recovery, and implementing a <a title="How Rwanda judged its genocide?" href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/publications/counterpoints/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new/" target="_blank">truth and reconciliation process through traditional <em>Gacaca</em> courts</a>. In 2009, Rwanda was welcomed into the Commonwealth as its 54th member state.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[quote align=&#8221;center&#8221; color=&#8221;#999999&#8243;]“Building a nation from nothing? A nation that has just experienced a genocide? There is no strategy manual for this.” – President Paul Kagame (4)[/quote]
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">States of emergency</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Eritrean and Rwandan presidents have countered adversaries, internal and external, with conspicuous aggression. The imposing statue of a huge pair of shida– the distinctive sandals worn by EPLF fighters – in Asmara, and the Genocide Memorial Centre in Kigali, enshrine the legacies that define the two nations. President Isaias has been no more combative than his Rwandan counterpart. But he has proved less diplomatically adroit at containing international objections to his conduct.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Eritrea has spent a decade fully mobilised. The perceived threat of Ethiopian expansionism, spearheaded by late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has dominated President Isaias’s foreign and domestic policy. Ethiopia’s refusal to allow physical demarcation of the border with Eritrea, in keeping with agreed peace terms, exacerbated Eritrean concerns about their neighbour’s intentions. Once a committed ally of the US, and member of President George W Bush’s coalition of the willing, Eritrea has since been portrayed as a malevolent regional spoiler. For his part, President Isaias has been cast by his fiercest critics as delusional and megalomaniacal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Eritrea’s objection to Ethiopia’s non-compliance with agreed peace terms is legitimate. But its diplomatic efforts to secure compliance were heavy-handed, and short-lived. In Eritrea, the border impasse evokes bitter memories of the UN’s decision to promote the federation of Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1952, and international indifference when Ethiopia forcibly annexed the former Italian colony a decade later. In the absence of an enforced insistence by the UN or US that Ethiopia must allow physical demarcation of the border, President Isaias contends that continued opposition to Ethiopia by any means is justified – and a matter of national survival.</p>
<figure id="attachment_4773" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-4773" style="width: 345px" class="wp-caption alignright"><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_aid_by_sector.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class=' wp-image-4773  img-fluid' src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_aid_by_sector.jpg" alt="Click to enlarge (Source: UK Bilateral Aid Spending, DFID 2008-09)" width="345" height="590" srcset="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_aid_by_sector.jpg 383w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_aid_by_sector-175x300.jpg 175w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 345px) 100vw, 345px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-4773" class="wp-caption-text">Click to enlarge (Source: UK Bilateral Aid Spending, DFID 2008-09)</figcaption></figure>
<p style="text-align: justify;">President Kagame evinces equal scorn for the UN, citing its failure to intervene resolutely during the genocide. The inertia displayed by the international community is further blamed for allowing UN refugee camps in eastern DRC to be taken over by exiled soldiers and Hutu militias who had carried out the genocide. Rwanda’s armed forces have made at least four major incursions into eastern DRC since 1998, and have supported pro-Tutsi rebel groups. For Kagame, the perpetrators of genocide still imperil Rwanda’s stability, and future. Their crime, he argues, has merited exceptional responses.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">UN allegations that Rwandan commanders and troops may themselves be guilty of genocidal crimes in DRC are rejected outright by President Kagame. Accusations that Rwanda’s incursions were accompanied by the systematic looting of Congolese natural resources have also been parried with disdain. Despite some criticism from foreign governments, including those of the US and Britain, Kagame has enjoyed the support of successive US presidents and other world leaders. Astute diplomacy – backed by frequent reminders of the genocide – has secured international forbearance, though not approval, for Rwanda’s pugnacity.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">My way</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">From the outset, the presidents of Eritrea and Rwanda have emphasised their zero tolerance for corruption, and commitment to gender equality, education and good government. Vigorous development programmes in both countries have been driven by authoritarianism. Dissent and ethnic or religious divisionism are not tolerated in either country. Power is concentrated in the hands of the president and a small circle of senior advisers and military commanders. Arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and politically-motivated prosecutions are commonplace. Political competition and critical reporting have been smothered. Human rights groups have criticised Rwanda and Eritrea in equal measure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In Eritrea, the principle of political pluralism is enshrined in the constitution. But since the protest by the so-called “Group of 15” senior ministers in 2001, opposition to the president has been divided, ineffectual, and mostly directed from abroad. President Isaias cites “participation in the life of the country”(5) as the measure of Eritrean democracy. There are, he asserts, numerous fora through which Eritreans are publicly consulted and can air grievances. But the tens of thousands of refugees who have fled Eritrea since 2000 have, paradoxically, been cited as evidence that the country is a prison state. The US State Department ranks Eritrea as the country with the worst human rights record in the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Also Read: <a title="Diehards and democracy: Elites, inequality and institutions in African elections" href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/publications/briefing-notes/diehards-and-democracy-elites-inequality-and-institutions-in-african-elections/" target="_blank">Diehards and Democracy: Elites, inequality and institutions in African elections</a></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Eritrean government’s commitment to development is longstanding, and genuine. Donor assistance has mostly been withdrawn, or rejected for being profligate and of no use. In 2005, amid worsening relations between their two countries, Eritrea asked the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to cease operations in the country. But Eritrea has been praised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for “commendable progress … in primary education and health, as well as in infrastructure development”(6). The country is one of only four in Africa likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for maternal health, and one of a handful which met the “roll back malaria” targets set by the 2000 Abuja Declaration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[quote align=&#8221;center&#8221; color=&#8221;#999999&#8243;]“You go and ask the Chinese [about] their democracy.” – President Isaias Afwerki (7)[/quote]
<p style="text-align: justify;">President Kagame has been as proficient as President Isaias in silencing domestic critics and opponents. International calls for greater political pluralism are dismissed as an example of western double standards. Kagame maintains that the political process in Rwanda is fully inclusive. An annual assembly known as the National Dialogue is described by the Rwandan press as “the epitome of citizen participation” (7) in government. Turn-out in elections is always high. RPF loyalists affirm the existence of a national consensus on the undesirability of multi-party elections. The suppression, as opposed to accommodation, of ethnic identities is understandable – but fraught with hazard. Hutus comprise 85% of the population, yet the Tutsi-dominated RPF secured four-fifths of the elected seats in parliament in 2008.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rwanda has usurped, and exceeded, Eritrea’s popularity with international donors in the 1990s. The country is routinely upheld as a model for post-conflict reconstruction, and was selected by international donors as a test case for general budget support. In 2005-09, Rwanda received almost US$2 billion of overseas development assistance – five times the amount granted to Eritrea (9). Rwanda, like Eritrea, is on track to achieve six of the eight MDGs by 2015. President Kagame’s distaste for aid, insistence on self-reliance, and forthright handling of donors have matched those of President Isaias. But Rwanda will remain heavily dependent on donors for the achievement of its Vision 2020 national development plan.</p>
<figure id="attachment_4772" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-4772" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_maternal_and_infant_mortality.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class='size-medium wp-image-4772 img-fluid' src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_maternal_and_infant_mortality-300x245.jpg" alt="Source: OECD DAC database" width="300" height="245" srcset="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_maternal_and_infant_mortality-300x245.jpg 300w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/BN_Rwanda_and_eritrea_maternal_and_infant_mortality.jpg 760w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-4772" class="wp-caption-text">Source: OECD DAC database</figcaption></figure>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Command economies</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Subsistence agriculture is the predominant livelihood in Eritrea and Rwanda. In both countries, economic management is highly centralised and members of the ruling party dominate the private sector. But economic performance has followed different trajectories. In 2004-08, Rwanda recorded 8.6% average annual GDP growth while Eritrea’s per capita GDP contracted by an average of 5.2% annually (10). Rwanda has been referred to as the future Singapore of Africa. The Eritrean government’s economic strategy has been likened to that of North Korea.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia, and continuing mass mobilisation, have had severe consequences for the Eritrean economy. Before the conflict, Ethiopia was the market – now closed – for two-thirds of Eritrea’s exports. A decline in international development assistance, and negligible foreign investment, have further handicapped economic progress. Attempts to promote growth in agriculture, tourism, construction, fisheries and ports have met with limited success. Remittances from the Eritrean diaspora, voluntary and government-enforced, are equivalent to about one third of national GDP.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Natural resources have provided President Isaias with an economic lifeline. A gold, zinc and copper mine valued at US$1.5 billion – a sum greater than Eritrea’s annual GDP – commenced commercial production in January 2011. The Eritrean government holds a 40% stake. Progress by international mining companies towards extraction of many other mineral assets, including potash deposits acknowledged as world class, is well advanced. Eritrea’s coastal waters are being surveyed for oil and natural gas. Forecast GDP growth of 17% in 2011 will make Eritrea the world’s fastest growing economy (11). After a decade of economic marginalisation, President Isaias has declared his intention to “strengthen diplomatic activities focusing on trade and investment opportunities” (12).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rwanda’s recent economic performance has been praiseworthy, and encouraging. By 2017, when his current term expires, President Kagame intends to transform Rwanda into a middle-income “knowledge-based economy” by exploiting competitive advantages in information and communications technology (ICT), horticulture, tourism, tea and coffee. A marked improvement in agricultural production ensured that the country grew as much food as it consumed in 2009, for the first time since the genocide. Future growth requires diversification, and new sources of employment. Rwanda is Africa’s most densely-populated nation. At the current rate of expansion, the population will have doubled in 2006-16 – and will double again by 2035.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The achievement of President Kagame’s economic ambitions requires very high levels of foreign investment. Major infrastructure projects have attracted funding, including a modern rail link with Burundi and Tanzania, and a new international airport at Bugesera. Much more is planned – Rwanda needs US$4 billion to extend access to power to 50% of the population by 2017. Investment flows will be more acutely sensitive to confidence in Rwanda’s stability, and its president, than international development assistance.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">The tortoise and the hare</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Eritrea and Rwanda exert considerable influence in regions often described as troubled – the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes. As former soldiers, President Isaias and President Kagame seem more at ease amid continuing states of emergency – real or prospective – than with peacetime government. But common stereotypes of the two leaders are injudicious, and coloured by convenience.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">President Isaias’s fall from international favour has been rapid. In 2003, Eritrea was regarded as a key frontline state in the US-led “war on terror”. Subsequent isolation was both self-imposed – motivated by anger at international inaction and perceived injustice – and externally inflicted. Attempts to counter Ethiopian hegemony severely damaged Eritrea’s international relations. But the first signs of <em>détente</em> are discernible.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 2010, President Isaias strengthened Eritrea’s ties with Qatar, China, Egypt, Oman and Iran. Natural resources have endowed the president with a gilt-edged, arguably face-saving, calling card. Significantly, Eritrea resumed links with the AU in Addis Ababa. Relations with neighbours Sudan and Yemen – base of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), labelled “the greatest single terrorist threat to the security of the US” (13) – are good. A resumption of constructive dialogue with the US may not be imminent. Eritrea’s national motto is <em>akay’da bobi’ye</em>, “at a tortoise’s pace”. But a thaw in US-Eritrea relations would considerably enhance regional stability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Moral outrage at Rwanda’s genocide, and guilt at the failure of the international community to stop it, have underwritten the high level of support for Rwanda – and President Kagame. In marked contrast to President Isaias, Kagame has successfully mobilised a host of former premiers, globally-influential businessmen and celebrities on Rwanda’s behalf. Prominent journalists and academics have lauded Kagame in the 2000s as they did Isaias in the 1990s.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">President Kagame’s domestic popularity should not be under-estimated. But external criticism of the Rwandan leader intensified during 2010. Publication of the UN Mapping Report on possible infringements of humanitarian law by Rwandan troops in DRC since 1993 exacerbated growing unease. International reactions to the degree of autocracy on show in the run-up to the presidential elections were measured. Rwanda remains a more fragile state than Eritrea. Threats to stability, both internal and external, loom larger than any confronting Eritrea – and are potentially far graver.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The presidents of Eritrea and Rwanda have much in common. Neither has sought personal gain from office. Both are quick to castigate outside interference. Violence is readily deployed to defend national interests and independence. Marked authoritarianism accompanies constructive development. Donor nations and organisations have by turns been ridiculed, lambasted and embraced by both presidents. Traits displayed in the 1990s, when both presidents were lauded, remain to the fore. More considered, evolving renderings of the two leaders are to be welcomed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[message_box title=&#8221;SOURCES&#8221; color=&#8221;none&#8221;]
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Country Assistance Evaluation – Eritrea, World Bank 2004/ OECD statistics</li>
<li>Toronto Sun, December 28th 1998</li>
<li>Alex De Waal (ed.) “Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa” 2004</li>
<li>Daily Telegraph, July 22nd 2010</li>
<li>Interview with The Financial Times, September 18th 2009</li>
<li>IMF Public Information Notice, December 2009 consultation</li>
<li>Interview with The Financial Times, September 18th 2009</li>
<li>The New Times, December 21st 2010</li>
<li>OECD/DAC statistics</li>
<li>IMF Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook 2010</li>
<li>Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011 country report</li>
<li>www.shabait.com, October 4th 2010</li>
<li>The Financial Times, October 31st 2010</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[/message_box]
<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/briefing-notes/princes-progress-reconstruction-and-authority-in-eritrea-and-rwanda">Princes&#8217; Progress: Reconstruction and authority in Eritrea and Rwanda</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ground Control: Making the grade in agriculture</title>
		<link>https://africaresearchinstitute.org/policy-voices/ground-control-making-the-grade-in-agriculture</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yovanka ARI]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jul 2010 11:02:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy Voices]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agriculture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rwanda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[uganda]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://africaresearchinstitute.org/?p=609</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Martha Byanyima chronicles the history and development of agricultural standards in Africa and argues that they provide an opportunity to increase the continent’s presence in global trade. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/policy-voices/ground-control-making-the-grade-in-agriculture">Ground Control: Making the grade in agriculture</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PV-Ground-Control-Making-the-grade-in-agriculture.pdf" target="_blank"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class='alignleft size-medium wp-image-1268 img-fluid' style="border: 1px solid black;" title="Agriculture, COMESA, Economics, exports, horticulture, Kenya, Martha Byanyima, Rwanda, smallholder farmers, standards" src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Ground-Control-border1-212x300.jpg" alt="Agriculture, COMESA, Economics, exports, horticulture, Kenya, Martha Byanyima, Rwanda, smallholder farmers, standards" width="212" height="300" srcset="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Ground-Control-border1-212x300.jpg 212w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Ground-Control-border1-723x1024.jpg 723w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Ground-Control-border1-170x240.jpg 170w, https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Ground-Control-border1.jpg 1240w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px" /></a>Standards for agriculture – particularly horticulture – are exacting. European governments have devised regulations for imported crops. African governments which fail to impose necessary checks across the entire agricultural supply chain are denied a market for their produce. The private sector, too, is increasingly involved in setting standards for agriculture. A parallel system of private voluntary standards responds to consumer concerns for food safety, the environment and labour conditions. Farmers in Africa – large and small – have had to adapt their methods to satisfy governments, retailers and consumers in export markets.</p>
<p>In this timely study, Martha Byanyima chronicles the history and development of agricultural standards in Africa. Although international standards often are considered a barrier to trade, she argues that they are in fact an opportunity – both within and outside Africa. Martha recognises the progress made by African countries to comply with agricultural standards, but is candid about that the difficulties which lie ahead. Institutional reform, education of smallholders and coordination of supply will test the skills and determination of African countries keen to increase their stake in a burgeoning global trade.</p>
<p><strong>Author</strong> &#8211; <em>Martha Byanyima</em></p>
<p><a style="font-size: 13px; line-height: 19px;" href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PV-Ground-Control-Making-the-grade-in-agriculture.pdf" target="_blank"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class='alignleft size-full wp-image-1278 img-fluid' title="Download PDF" src="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/pdf_download_ari.png" alt="Download PDF" width="55" height="48" /></a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org/policy-voices/ground-control-making-the-grade-in-agriculture">Ground Control: Making the grade in agriculture</a> appeared first on <a href="https://africaresearchinstitute.org">Africa Research Institute</a>.</p>
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