1. According to the Lagos State Government’s Digest of Statistics, between 2010 and 2012 a total of 96,994 civil cases were filed in the various high courts of Lagos State

2. The LMDC and ADR practitioners in Nigeria recognise early neutral evaluation and other hybrid processes

3. Elias, T.O., The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester: University Press, 1956, p.247

4. Ibid., p.272

5. Green, M.M., Ibo Village Affairs, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1948, p.110, cited in Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law, p.269

6. Okereafoezeke, Nonso, Law and Justice in Post-British Nigeria: Conflicts and Interactions Between Native and Foreign Systems of Social Control in Igbo, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002, p.14

7. Elias, T.O., The Nigerian Legal System, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, p.44

8. Ewelukwa, D.I.O., “Administration of Justice”, in Okonkwo C.O. (ed.), Introduction to Nigerian Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, p.59

9. Onyema, Emilia, “The Multi-door Court House (MDC) Scheme in Nigeria: A case study of the Lagos MDC”, Apogee Journal of Business, Property & Constitutional Law, (Vol. 2; No. 7), 2013, pp.96–130

10. Arnot, Bob, “How Lagos judges are now resolving disputes more quickly”, British Council Voices Magazine, 20 February 2015

11. Logan, Carolyn, “Ambitious SDG goal confronts challenging realities: Access to justice is still elusive for many Africans”, Afrobarometer, March 2017, pp.21–22

12. While providing a non-adversarial alternative to litigation, mediation in Nigeria has yet to be afforded the same statutory backing as arbitration

13. Logan, op. cit., p.21

14. “Access to Mediation and Legal Assistance Services”, Justice for All Nigeria, CIP 2.3, Impact Report 6, 6 October 2015, p.4

15. Sander, F.E.A., “Varieties of Dispute Processing”, The Pound Conference 1976: perspectives on justice in the future Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1979, pp.65–87

16. Ibid., p.84

17. Ani, Comfort Chinyere, “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Nigeria: A Study of the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC)”, in Ernest Uwazie (ed.), Alternative Dispute Resolution and Peace-building in Africa, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, p.48

18. Odibo, Monalisa, “Access to Justice Through Court Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Programmes: A Critical Assessment of the Multi-Door Courthouse System in Nigeria”, Paper presented to the Society of Legal Scholars, Oxford, 8 September 2016, p.3

19. Ibid., p.9

20. Lukman, Ayinla, “Enhancing Sustainable Development By Entrenching Mediation Culture In Nigeria”, Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization (Vol. 21), 2014

21. Genn, Hazel, Riahi, Shiva and Pleming, Katherine, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in England and Wales: a Sceptical Analysis of Government and Judicial Promotion of Private Mediation”, Regulating dispute resolution: ADR and access to justice at the crossroads, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p.139

22. Dawson, Michael, “Non-Consensual Alternative Dispute Resolution: Pros and Cons”, Australian Dispute Resolution Journal (Vol. 4), 1993

23. Bernstein, Lisa, “Understanding the Limits of Court-connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration programs”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Vol. 141, Issue 6), 1993, p.2169

24. Hensler, Deborah R., “ADR Research at the Crossroads”, RAND Corporation, 2001

25. Ojelabi, Lola Akin, “Improving Access to Justice through Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Role of Community Legal Centres in Victoria, Australia”, La Trobe University, September 2010

26. Lagos Multi Door Court House Law (2007), S20

27. Van Zeijl, Femke, “A new type of justice for Nigeria”, Al Jazeera, 8 October 2016

28. Settlement agreements signed by parties attending mediation are regarded as a legal agreement between the parties, enforceable under Section 19 of the Lagos Multi Door Court House Law (2007). Once an ADR judge has validated the agreement, it shall be deemed to be enforceable under Section 11 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (1990). Arbitration awards are enforced under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (1988). Terms of Settlement or Memoranda of Understanding reached at other institutions can be processed by the LMDC and endorsed by an ADR judge, enforceable as a consent judgment of the Lagos State High Court

29. Rooke, John, “The Multi-Door Courthouse is Open in Alberta: Judicial Dispute Resolution is Institutionalized in the Court of Queen’s Bench”, University of Alberta, 2010

30. These are: Kano, Akwa Ibom, Kaduna, Abia, Ondo, Cross River, Katsina, Delta, Bornu, Bayelsa, Ogun, Kwara, Edo and Enugu States

BACK TO CONTENTS

Dr Emilia Onyema is senior lecturer in international commercial law at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, where she convenes postgraduate courses in dispute and conflict resolution and teaches international trade law, and law and development in Africa. Dr Onyema is a member of the editorial board of the Journal of African Law.

Dr Monalisa Ofure Odibo completed her PhD at Bangor University where her thesis was a critical assessment of the LMDC scheme. She obtained an LLM International Commercial Law at the University of Aberdeen, and LLB (Hons) at the University of Wolverhampton. Dr Odibo is a qualified mediator, barrister and solicitor and a member of the Nigerian Bar Association.

The post How alternative dispute resolution made a comeback in Nigeria’s courts – Onyema and Odibo appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

On Thursday 22 June, ARI hosted the launch of “How alternative dispute resolution made a comeback in Nigeria’s courts”. The authors, Dr Emilia Onyema of SOAS, University of London, and Dr Monalisa Ofure Odibo of Bangor University, reflected on the growth of the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC) since its founding 15 years earlier, and the resurgence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in Nigeria. Below are 10 salient points from the discussion:

Litigation was not always supreme

In pre-colonial Nigeria, local communities practised different dispute resolution processes which encompassed elements of negotiation, mediation and arbitration. By contrast, the colonial administration introduced a judicial system modelled on English laws and practices. Courts designed for European settlers gradually gained favour among Nigerians, primarily because their rulings were enforced by the state authorities. Litigation became the preferred means to resolve disputes. The 1999 constitution reinforces this prejudice, while law schools, attorneys, judges, court officials and police sustain the status quo.

Justice is slow and stressful

Nigeria’s courts face significant backlogs, cases are subject to severe delays, and the whole judicial process carries a huge emotional expense. Few disputants understand what is said in court. The system is structured to include procedural questions, with lawyers frequently appealing technicalities all the way to the Supreme Court. Nigerians are acutely aware of their constitutional right to appeal; however, the system is open to abuse. With many cases dragging on for 20 years or more, some disputes outlive the plaintiffs and defendants.

The LMDC offers a different model

In recent years, the Nigerian private sector has embraced arbitration as a means to resolve disputes without having to wait for a judicial ruling. In June 2002, Kehinde Aina introduced an adapted version of the Multi-Door Courthouse (MDC) in Lagos. This was an innovation spearheaded by Harvard law professor, Frank Sander, under which disputants are presented with a series of “doors” leading to different dispute resolution mechanisms (much as one finds doors to individual flats in an apartment block). The model stresses the equivalence of mediation and arbitration with litigation. According to Sander’s model, the MDC would share a single registry with the formal court system, facilitating case management; however, this has yet to come to pass in Lagos.

Lagos as a test-bed for ADR

Nigeria’s commercial capital has an innovative and forward-looking government. Babatunde Fashola was the first Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) to serve as Governor of Lagos State. He supported the introduction of the LMDC during his term of office, May 2007 to May 2015, and prior to that as Chief of Staff to Governor Bola Tinubu. The Lagos State judiciary embraced the MDC scheme during the tenure of Justice Ayotunde Phillips, who served as Chief Judge from July 2012 to July 2014. Before the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse Law was enacted in June 2007, the use of the LMDC was entirely voluntary, with disputants mandated to use the scheme if one or more of the parties approached a judge. The 2012 High Court Civil Procedure Rules provide for all cases filed to be screened for suitability for ADR, and if appropriate, referred to the LMDC.

Mandatory referrals are controversial

By referring cases for mediation, judges raise awareness of the MDC scheme among the public, which might not be aware of alternatives to litigation. Forcing parties to engage with the LMDC eradicates the “signalling effect of weakness” under which disputants – or their lawyers – might hesitate to propose settlement by ADR out of a fear that their opponent would then underestimate the strength of their case or their resolve. As a majority of civil disputes are concluded on the basis of an out-of-court settlement rather than a judicial determination, the very act of convening parties might expedite the resolution of their case – or at the least, help them to better understand the nature of their dispute. Finally, referrals reduce the number of cases handled by the courts, reducing the backlog in the formal system.

By contrast, informal dispute resolution is attractive precisely because of its voluntary nature. If the parties approach the process in good faith, it is more likely to lead to resolution than if they are reluctant to participate. This is particularly the case where disputants do not consider their case to be suitable for ADR. They may come to feel that they are being denied their day in court. Equally, the process is open to abuse – lawyers can use the additional step as a delaying tactic.

The Citizens’ Mediation Centre

Low value civil disputes are increasingly referred for mediation rather than proceeding to the magistrates’ courts. Since 2010, no cases have been heard by the Lagos State rent tribunal. These disputes have instead been handled by the Citizens’ Mediation Centre (CMC), which exists to provide indigent Lagosians with a free means of dispute resolution. CMCs are administered by Local Government Associations, rather than the Lagos State government. They are more accessible to ordinary citizens than the LMDC, located at the High Court. In Lagos, the CMC handles as many civil disputes each year as are filed with the courts.

How can the LMDC grow?

It would not be helpful for government to subsidise the LMDC in order to increase the number of cases it handles. The Courthouse offers a valuable service; users should pay a fee to use it. Once the state is the sole source of funding, an institution becomes dependent on the generosity of government, which is liable to change as politicians come and go. The LMDC should assert its independence. A recent pilot with three local banks, whereby the LMDC charged fees to resolve disputes raised by customers, demonstrates the potential. However, to undertake such initiatives, the LMDC must not be bogged down with small-value disputes – it needs to retain capacity to handle serious commercial matters.

What future for court-connected ADR in Nigeria?

The Supreme Court intends to open a mediation centre, but court-connected ADR is not the answer to every problem. Reducing the number of outstanding cases in the system would ease the burden on the judiciary in a much more effective manner. The government should instead promote ADR at the courts of first instance (magistrates’ courts and the High Court). Lawyers are also part of the problem – they want to keep cases in the system, rather than have them resolved.

Where do customary dispute resolution mechanisms fit in?

The more avenues available to resolve disputes, the better. That includes customary courts and area courts. The important question is how rulings from customary dispute resolution processes can be enforced by the state. It might be possible to borrow from the LMDC model and have a duty judge sign an agreement drawn up following mediation or arbitration. Enforcement remains key to increasing confidence in ADR. If traditional chiefs or community heads are able to resolve local disputes then they should be able to obtain a court order. In Ghana, customary arbitration is recognised in the ADR Act 2010. Chiefs in certain parts of the country are able to resolve disputes, reduce the agreement in writing, and have it enforced by a judge.

What more could be to convince trainee lawyers of the advantages of ADR?

Aspiring advocates attending the Nigerian Law School (NLS) can take a course in ADR, but this is delivered by a private provider and additional payment is required to participate. The NLS curriculum should be redesigned to reflect the breadth of potential practice areas. Trainee lawyers already spend four months attached to a local institution. Historically, this has been split to allow for a two-month placement with the courts; and a further two months working at a law firm. The LMDC is considered part of the court architecture so there is no reason why NLS students cannot be placed there. The Courthouse is short-staffed and could benefit from working with trainee lawyers, who also need to gain practical experience of case management. ADR should also be included in the law curricula at Nigerian universities so that aspiring advocates have a sense of its value before they attend the NLS.

Podcast

The post Justice without lawyers in Nigeria: How Lagos fashioned an alternative to litigation appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

BACK TO CONTENTS

The post How Boko Haram exploits history and memory – Fr Atta Barkindo appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

On Wednesday 5 October 2016 we were joined by Fr.Atta Barkindo, from The Kukah Center and doctoral research candidate at SOAS,  and Hilary Matfess, from the Institute for Defense Analyses. The event also launched ARI’s latest Counterpoint – “How Boko Haram exploits history and memory” by Fr. Atta Barkindo.

Fr. Atta Barkindo

• To understand the appeal of Boko Haram you need to make a distinction between the period prior to 2009 and the period after 2009. In the early 2000s people donated money to the group because they wanted to support the Islamic values it promoted. At that stage Boko Haram was not violent, and as such it was able to freely communicate with people about its religious beliefs and values. After 2009, when the approach became violent, people became less likely to join or support the group voluntarily, though many still did. The emergence of Boko Haram is not as important to understand as the why and how of the group’s transformation.
• Boko Haram’s leaders, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, have made use of the region’s history and exploited a collective memory. Translating over 50 of their YouTube videos I was struck by how frequently they referred to the Kanem-Bornu empire. What this has enabled them to do is successfully localise jihadi-salafi ideology. They describe Kanem-Bornu as a flourishing Islamic empire with good economic relations that were destroyed by the colonial powers who not only took it over but replaced it with a corrupt, western secular state system. It is against this system that Shekau constantly rails. The historical account may not be accurate, but it serves an important function for Boko Haram. They use history and memory for three things: target selection, atrocity justification and recruitment. When I interviewed former Boko Haram members in prison they could repeat verbatim sections of the YouTube videos I had transcribed.
• If you are really going to be serious about counter-radicalisation then you really need to sit down and listen to what these people have to say. This was not the approach taken at the start of the conflict. The Nigerian government saw them as poor, hungry, ignorant people – President Goodluck Jonathan called them “faceless masquerades and ghosts”. But Nigeria is now approaching its eighth year of military engagement with Boko Haram and the end of the conflict is not yet in sight. The violence perpetrated by the insurgents is abhorrent. But if we listen to them, their grievances reflect the voices and concerns of a particular set of people in a particular environment and context. For me, you can kill every single member of Boko Haram, but unless you understand how the group thinks and the environment from which it has emerged you will not eradicate them.
• The socio-economic and political environment in north-east Nigeria lends itself to the emergence of groups like Boko Haram. Citizens feel marginalised and ignored by the government, both at federal and state levels. The construct of the western state has been imposed on northern Nigerians without noticeable improvements to their daily lives. The Nigerian state is dominated by corruption, identity politics and impunity. These are drivers of conflict across the country and are why we see the continuation of conflicts in the Delta and between pastoralists and farmers.
• Boko Haram is not a Kanuri movement, and a lot of Kanuris denounce Boko Haram, but at the same time Kanuri identity and networks have been co-opted by the group. Shekau has taken advantage of local worker unions and utilised the Kanuri language to manoeuvre in the region. Historically, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, has been connected not with Lagos but with towns and people across the borders in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These connections have been utilised by Boko Haram to outsmart the Nigerian military, whose reliance on the use of federal character principles mean that many soldiers fighting Boko Haram do so without an understanding of the language, the culture and the history of the region.

 Hilary Matfess

• The role of gender is poorly understood in conflict studies generally. The tendency is to group “women and children” together, but in doing so we give the same agency to a child as we do to a woman. As “victims” is not the only way to understand the experience of women in Boko Haram.
• Operationally women have played a role as suicide bombers – more than 100 in the last 2 years – but they are also logistical lynchpins of the insurgency. They keep the camps running by cooking, cleaning and portering. Women have also been used as a bargaining chip in negotiations by Boko Haram and their value to the group is well understood. It is noteworthy that the shortest time between YouTube videos, was in the immediate aftermath of the capture of schoolgirls from Chibok and the international outcry that followed.
• Women who are forcibly conscripted into Boko Haram are referred to as those who are oppressed and downtrodden, terms of pity that imply the need for help. However some women I talked to voluntarily chose to join Boko Haram and spoke of experiencing a sense of “empowerment”. They received daily Koranic education, were banned from farming and the back-breaking labour that entails, and when married would receive the bride price normally given to their family. Boko Haram sees itself as a vanguard of Muslims and women’s role in it is crucial.
• The level of gender representation in the Nigerian political sphere, particularly in the north-east is very low. Governor Shettima of Borno State has at least spoken publically and positively about the role women can play in the reconstruction, but it can sometimes to be difficult to see in reality. A Ramadan feeding scheme I observed was supposed to issue bags of rice that would be collected by women only, but when I went to see the distribution I saw only men in the collection lines. Implementation is just as important as design and in some communities cultural practices are at odds with gender mainstreaming in policy.
• There is sizeable stigma facing women who have been part of Boko Haram. Many community leaders treat them as carriers of a disease; even families ostracise their own kin, even in cases of abduction. The process of societal reintegration is going to be very difficult at the end of the conflict and there is little-to-no planning as to how it will be done. When Nigeria reaches a post-conflict situation women will have a vital role to play in societal redevelopment as so many men have been affected by the violence.

Excerpts from the discussion

Is it important to differentiate between the different factions of Boko Haram?

(Murray Last, University College London)

AB: There is a valid question about the group’s heterogeneity but I believe there are also lines of continuity. Boko Haram is a collection of disparate cells, more criminal the further north you go and comprised of foot soldiers that have different motivations for joining. They can be members, followers, sympathisers or simply passers-by and opportunists caught up in conflict. But at the top, there are clearly ideologues that motivate and show others the way. I chose to focus on them, to look at what is it they teach and what it is they tell their followers. The eloquence of Shekau and Yusuf is rarely mentioned, but when you listen to them speak you can begin to understand their appeal. I don’t like the atrocities Shekau extolls but I find him fascinating to listen to; he can so easily switch between languages to deliver specific messages. In one of the most recent videos Shekau insults Buhari in Fulani – the president’s own language. It was a deliberate strategy to speak directly to Nigeria’s head of state. Shekau was not educated in the west, but his clarity of thinking and logic in Kanuri, Hausa and Arabic means that dismissing him as uneducated, as often happens in Nigeria when people do not speak English, is dangerous.

What does it mean for Boko Haram to be aligned to ISIS?

(Ludovica Iaccino, International Business Times)

AB: We first must ask ourselves what is a link: is it physical, ideological or inspirational? Is it not possible that I can Skype with a terrorist in Malaysia and learn something without ever meeting face-to-face? If you listen to the Boko Haram videos they draw inspiration from the writings of scholars from Saudi Arabia. This is because in Saudi Arabia they practise monarchy and therefore do not glorify democratic values – in fact they denounce them. We should not be limited to saying that there is only a link when Islamic state physically delivers weapons to Boko Haram. The ideological link is very important. I have never met Pope Francis, yet I am inspired by him every day.

To what extent has the Nigerian military’s response exacerbated the conflict in the region?

(Eva Anderson, Transparency International)

HM: The abuses committed by the Nigerian military are one of the factors that allowed Boko Haram to evolve as it did. In Maiduguri someone I spoke with compared the relationship between citizens and the military to being “like Tom and Jerry, the cartoon”. Trust is higher in the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) but its role in efforts to resolve the conflict poses longer-term problems for the state regarding what to do with these armed, often young, men. CJTF numbers 26,000 in Borno State alone and there is no real accountability mechanism in place to monitor their actions. Local mistrust of the military has created a simmering crisis – once Boko Haram has been defeated what do you do with the CJTF? Absorbing some into the formal security sector is one option, but others are needed.

AB: The problems facing Nigeria’s security service predate the Boko Haram insurgency. Long years of lack of reform of the military meant that training was not up-to-date on things like guerrilla warfare and cyber terror. This impacted on the response.  When I started my research I visited over 25 police and military barracks and the conditions I saw were deplorable. Single rooms meant for individual occupancy were housing families of eight. This is the root cause of the problem. When you ask a soldier to stand by the roadside you shouldn’t be surprised he asks for a bribe as he is always thinking about how he can raise money to move out of the barracks. In him, there is already a grievance against the state so even though he is fighting he is most probably doing so to keep his job. It is important to pay tribute to the individual soldiers who have sacrificed their lives fighting Boko Haram.

Is the Nigerian state a predatory entity? And how does this impact on the humanitarian response?

(Matthew T Page, former US State Department Nigeria expert)

HM: The scale of displacement in Lake Chad basin is huge. Estimates suggest 1 in every 7 residents is displaced. Nigeria has emergency agencies at federal, state and local government levels that, on paper, should be caring for these IDPs. However, at the camps I visited, the military and police are in charge. They are managing the gates and deciding what, and who, go in and out. On a recent visit I was unable to access a camp without express permission of the military even though I had permission from the director of the state emergency agency. This means that security services are running the humanitarian response and that raises a number of issues. Firstly, it turns displacement centres into possible targets as the insurgency is anti-state; and secondly, it increases the vulnerability of women to violence and sexual assault. As a result of these problems with official IDP camps the vast majority of displaced people in north-east Nigeria live in informal camps or with extended kin networks. This raises a question about whether channelling aid to the formal camps, when so many people live outside them, is fully addressing food insecurity.

AB: Let me give you an example of the predatory nature of the whole response. So many people in Nigeria now are coming forward as counter-terror experts; they are submitting bids for consultancy work when they don’t know the first thing about the subject. The Boko Haram insurgency has created an independent economy where people, at many different layers, are involved for personal gain. Relief materials continue to go missing. The lack of trust between citizens and the state is painfully obvious.

Why and how should we listen to Boko Haram? Who can listen?

(Elizabeth Pearson, King’s College London) 

AB: I want to go against the narrative that Boko Haram is simply faceless. Before 2009 they were preaching freely in states across the north-east and most of the YouTube videos were readily available on cassette, video and CDs in local markets. I think if you want to research Boko Haram you should go directly to the source and that is what I did.

We also have to look for invisible signs of extremism. If your drive from Jos going north there are writings on the walls and street signs in Arabic saying things like “down with democracy” & “Islam is the solution”. The Nigerian state has not responded sufficiently to the needs of these citizens.

I strongly believe that despite the atrocities of Boko Haram they really have something to say, if we can listen to them. I spoke to an imprisoned former member who was angry about the 25 car convoy of the Gombe state governor, “all the cars need to be fuelled, driven and have policeman who need to be fed”. You may think that this is a madman talking but I think he is saying something very important about the huge financial waste in maintaining Nigeria’s political democratic system. Listening to Boko Haram will help us to counter them.

See the conversation via Twitter #BokoHistory

Event recording

Films of Fr Atta Barkindo and Hilary Matfess

The post Boko Haram: the importance of listening appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

The federal system of governance in Nigeria is failing to provide the basic welfare for all citizens that the 1999 Constitution prescribes. On the first anniversary of the election victory of President Muhammadu Buhari, ARI published a Briefing Note that examines the origins and purpose of the federation, state governments’ financial management and responsibilities, governors’ arbitrary power, and the need to increase internally generated state revenue.

On  28 April 2016, ARI invited three speakers to draw upon their experiences and expertise in order to discuss the state of state governments in Nigeria:

 ‘Dapo Oyewole

 Podcast

YouTube

The post The State of State Governments in Nigeria appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Dr. Jesse Salah Ovadia, Lecturer in International Political Economy, University of Newcastle; author of The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea:

• Oil and gas possess unique potential to leverage foreign investment in domestic industry. However, the benefits of extractives development need to be directed towards national development, rather than a small elite.
• Petro-developmental states must harness state capacity and invest revenues from oil and gas productively, but should also utilise local content policies to diversify the economy. Local content can anchor non-oil growth and economic transformation. The rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP last year highlighted the importance of domestic manufacturing and the service industry to the economy as a whole.
• Nigeria’s local content law is both one of the oldest and one of the strongest in terms of what it requires. Every country that has enacted legislation since has weaker regulations.
• The current downturn in the global oil price offers advantages for the development of local content. In Nigeria the depreciation of the naira has made local services cheaper for international investors. As long as oil extraction continues, so too do the benefits of local content.

Dr. Ernest Nwapa FNSE, Pioneer Executive Secretary, Nigerian Content Development & Monitoring Board (NCDMB):

• The discovery of oil distorted Nigeria’s economy, leading citizens to abandon productive sectors in search of easy profits from extractives. No value was added in country; crude was exported and gas was flared. Taxation and royalties were assumed to be sufficient benefits. There was little attempt by domestic businesses to provide materials or services to the hydrocarbon industry. International oil companies (IOCs) everywhere assumed they had no role to play in national economic development until producers established national oil companies (NOCs) to increase indigenous participation in the sector.
• President Obasanjo directed the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to work with IOCs to enhance value addition. The NNPC reviewed programmes from Brazil and worked with a Norwegian agency to avoid disruption to operations while creating a transparent way of broadening participation in the industry. A decision was taken to legislate, but to avoid being too prescriptive. Between the genesis of local content policies in 2003 and the final legislation in 2010, the NNPC opened dialogue with IOCs, service companies and regulatory agencies.
• The NNPC began by collaborating with those possessing technology, funding and expertise; it was important to start by building trust, before moving to detailed discussions. Avoiding disruption and remaining globally competitive were two key priorities, but so were the need to ensure sustainability and demonstrate government commitment. Nigeria pushed for immediate benefits to communities affected by oil exploration. Oil exploration brings noise, pollution, and social challenges to parts of Nigeria; and when companies move on they often take electricity and employment opportunities with them.
• In five years, the NCDPM multiplied the number of Nigerians employed in the oil industry ten-fold. This was more than the country had been able to achieve in the previous 50 years. IOCs moved from operating out of hotel rooms to establishing offices and workshops in Nigeria.
• Enshrining a local content policy in legislation is important; but there is a risk of including too much in the laws, which prevents innovation. Equally, targets needed to be revisited. Strong political will and demonstrations of financial commitment are required from government to build confidence. Collaboration with IOCs should result in win-win situations. Nigeria was fortunate that any risk of losing investment was mitigated by a global movement toward adopting local content policies. The supply chain in Nigeria is now robust, with most large companies using local suppliers.

Patrick Obath, Executive Director, ASI Kenya Extractives Industry Development Programme:

• Kenya has much smaller oil and gas reserves than Nigeria, but nevertheless the discovery has resulted in high expectations. Kenya is currently establishing how best to harness income from sector, use oil to catalyse economic transformation, and ensure sustainability. The country is also in the process of devolving power from the national level to 47 county governments. Tensions between different tiers of government, and between counties, may make it difficult to leverage benefits at the local level.
• Communities where resources are located have experienced interventions by NGOs and others warning of a “resource curse”. The challenge is to manage popular expectations. Investors, government and communities are meeting to debate how the proceeds of investment should be shared. At this stage, the aim is to transform knowledge and skills in affected communities so that over the long-term local people can be properly involved in the exploitation of natural resources.
• The sharing of revenue is a political hot potato. There is a false expectation that the day drilling starts, there will be funds available to communities. County governments need to brace themselves for a delay of eight to ten years before they see any returns on the development of oil and gas reserves. Both the national government and the counties need to better understand the investment cycle and plan accordingly.

Isabelle Ramdoo, Deputy Head of Programme, Trade and Economic Transformation at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM):

• Local content policies take different forms. There can be quantitative requirements, for example quotas based on numbers, or on value; or qualitative requirements, such as reporting and justification obligations, information sharing, and advertising of opportunities. The scale and provisions can vary widely, both in terms of how ‘local’ the policies seek to be and whether they deal with labour, procurement, joint venture and technology transfer.
• Local content is not an end in itself, but part of a comprehensive development package. Governments also need to consider incentives for both foreign and domestic investors. A major challenge remains linking the extractive sector to others in the economy.
• Even if legislation is well drafted, more than just regulation is required. NOCs must possess a sound understanding of the sector, and the procurement needs at different stages. The government should work to identify opportunities and gaps, finance shortages, and adjust policies to enable local and international companies to cooperate.
• Research and development and innovation are also important. Local content can provide an opportunity to address the technology gap. However, it remains difficult to catch up with international suppliers given the degree of competition in that sector. Collaboration and partnership are the core of successful local content policy.

The Q&A can be listened to here:

Pictures:

Full Podcast:

The post The “resource curse” or economic transformation: local content policies and realising the potential of hydrocarbon reserves appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

To mark the 40^th anniversary of ECOWAS, Africa Research Institute, in partnership with The Africa Report, hosted a panel discussion to debate its continued relevance and role in improving regional economic, cultural and political integration. Our assembled experts – Arnold Ekpe, Véronique Tadjo and Patrick Smith – shared their thoughts and responded to wide-ranging questions from the audience.

Ekpe on the economy:

An ECOWAS single currency: The single currency remains a dream. It does not make economic sense when the West African economies are so heterogeneous. Regional convertibility is a more sensible approach and would encourage the free movement of capital across the region. The proposed Eco currency would have to be based on the Naira because Nigeria’s economy accounts for 77% of regional wealth; but this would be unacceptable to the francophone countries that use the CFA Franc. They are unable to provide a viable counter-proposal because the CFA is pegged to the Euro and guaranteed by France. How can you have a West African currency without having control of setting policy, printing money and a central bank?

Economic leadership: Currently we look outside, to Europe and elsewhere, for solutions to our economic problems. We must learn to look within Africa. I would support an Africa-Africa summit to discuss how we can work together to move forward economically. There is a lack of visionary pan-African leadership. Within ECOWAS I see a willingness to get things done but an inability to execute; moving from talk to action has always been its biggest challenge.

The fallacy of the African economic miracle: The 6-7% GDP annual growth figures we see in West Africa are not good enough. China grew at double digits for three decades to catch up. If Africa is to do the same we need to create bigger markets and big banks to finance infrastructure. If a country has 45 banks, they have 40 too many.

Funding development: Some African countries have struggled to attract foreign investment for ambitious infrastructure projects. Ethiopia financed its new dam by raising money from its own citizens. More attention needs to be paid to domestic revenue mobilisation if we are to create a pool of revenues for investment. Countries cannot develop from external funding alone.

Tadjo on culture:

Language: One of the biggest missed opportunities is language. ECOWAS made a key decision to keep French and English as official languages, in the belief that this would facilitate communication, but the gap between Anglophone and Francophone countries remains as stark as at independence. A lack of communication means we are not sharing ideas and knowledge across the region. This is true of African languages too.  We are not talking to each other within country borders; there is alienation between elites and the majority of the population. People are trapped within ethnic and linguistic groups. This leads to marginalisation and radicalisation.

The culture industry: We need to make culture an integral part of the economy. Government budgets for culture are an afterthought; there is a lack of political will to support art in West Africa. I see this as a loss of potential earnings.

Smith on politics and security:

Anti-third term movements: The uprising in Burkina Faso to oust President Compaoré was a very important juncture. It sent shockwaves across the continent and we are seeing the after-effects in DRC and Burundi. To ECOWAS’s credit they have tried, just two days ago, to restrict all leaders in the region to two terms but it should be no surprise that the only objectors were Togo and Gambia – the members most hostile to democratic freedoms.

The insecurity threat: If insecurity in northern Nigeria can be tackled the focus might shift to Islamist rebels in Mali. The vast amounts of military hardware in Libya left behind after the fall of Gaddafi poses a significant threat to stability in the ECOWAS region. Security crises will not go away and ECOWAS will have to find a way of financing future interventions.

Nigeria and the region: Buhari’s election in March 2015 was part of wider political movement against corruption and lawlessness that was undermining economic opportunity. His efforts to re-establish the rule of law will be vital to Nigeria’s future and promise to have regional implications with elections in Ghana, scheduled for 2016, drawing some parallels.

A political union: ECOWAS is an economic union in denial. It has done more in political and security interventions – Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia – than anything else.

Audio podcast:

Photos:

Storify:

The post ECOWAS at 40 appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Download the Policy Voice

Despite its middle-income status, Nigeria’s health system cannot provide even a rudimentary level of care for most citizens – particularly in rural areas.  As the prevalence of chronic and infectious diseases increases, indigenous medical knowledge must be utilised. In Nigeria, but also globally, there is growing recognition of the need to integrate traditional medicine into mainstream health systems to bolster their ability to cope with an ever-increasing burden.

In the early 1990s Father Anselm Adodo, a Benedictine monk, became increasingly aware of the tragic inter-generational loss of indigenous medical knowledge in his locality.  In 1996, he founded Paxherbals at the monastery in Ewu, Edo State, to preserve this valuable resource and apply scientific rigour to the manufacture of natural remedies.

Two decades later, “Pax” is the largest private sector rural manufacturing enterprise in Edo State and an industry leader in Nigeria.  It is regarded as an undoubted success story, one of which the monastic and local communities are justifiably proud. Success is based on joint endeavour. While Pax has created many jobs in its factory and laboratories, and economic opportunities through its local supply chain, its neighbours are suppliers of knowledge, skills and raw materials. They are also consumers. Pax is firmly rooted in, and has transformed, its surroundings.

This Policy Voice documents how Pax professionalised the production of traditional natural remedies and set about demonstrating that herbal medicines can be a force for innovation and progress in health care. An estimated two-thirds of Nigerians use these products, often in tandem with orthodox drugs. But Anselm is adamant that open dialogue, scrutiny and regulation are crucial if negative perceptions of non-orthodox treatments are to be dispelled and the economic potential of the sector realised. More than 30 Pax products are government-certified.

For Anselm, and Pax, “traditional” medicine must be modern, professional and based on science if it is to contribute to improving health systems and outcomes. With appropriate federal and state involvement, thriving traditional medicine and pharmaceutical industries could be fostered in Nigeria; and the transformation that Pax and the local community have brought about in Ewu could be typical, rather than exceptional. Indigenous knowledge, resources and enterprise remain under-exploited.

The post Modern African Remedies: Herbal Medicine and Community Development in Nigeria appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Interview with Anselm:

In 1996, Father Anselm Adodo established “Pax” at the Benedictine monastery in Ewu, Edo State to address what he saw as the consequences of an ever-increasing fixation with technological advances at the expense of nature. The initiative was conceived as an effort to reconnect with the natural environment through herbal medicine, in partnership with the local community.

Anselm recognised that a vast amount of valuable indigenous medicinal knowledge was being lost and sought to work with traditional healers to preserve what remained. Pax has gradually been able to convince healers to share their knowledge by establishing a relationship founded on trust and mutual respect. A common aim is to modernise and professionalise traditional medical practice, making it transparent and evidence-based.

The application of science and innovation in herbal medicine is important, but Anselm has also tried to replace outmoded views of science as something exemplified by men and women in white coats. The old farmer in a village in Kenya is a scientist: he knows about soil fertility and how much water a seed needs to grow. The purpose of science is the validation or rejection of a hypothesis. In this context, Pax has used indigenous knowledge as the hypothesis and science as the means of investigating the medicinal properties of plants, herbs and other natural resources.

Anselm does not talk about traditional medicine because traditional can imply rigidity, stasis and being stuck in the past. Perceptions are very important, not just in Nigeria but globally. He prefers the term “African medicine”, connoting something modern, innovative, uniquely African and, when done in partnership with the community, transformative.

From its origins in a small wooden hut Pax has grown to the extent that it now employs almost 150 staff. Today it has a large factory, modern research laboratories, a herbarium and three clinics. Raw materials are grown on communal farms. Perseverance, professionalism and stringent quality control have finally attracted attention from the government. By working alongside regulatory bodies and following their guidelines to ensure products meet required standards, Pax has become a respected name in a sector associated by some with charlatans and quackery. Pax is now advising regulators and health authorities on the evolution of the herbal medicine sector in Nigeria and the merits of partnership with orthodox medical care.

Pax’s success is based on an open and transparent partnership with the local community in Ewu – its suppliers and employees. Anselm is insistent that the Pax model of combining community, nature and science is a good one for the sustainable development of rural communities throughout Nigeria.

For Anselm, Pax is more than just a manufacturing or agricultural enterprise. It is a contribution to the necessary process of altering a common narrative of Africa being a continent asking for help to one in which Africa must – and can – help itself.

Questions

Q. What have you done to test the efficacy of your products? – Yemisi Bokinni, UK medical doctor

A. Clinical trials are expensive. In Nigeria, they have to be done in collaboration with government. Pax is keen to do this. Claims about the efficacy of our products are meticulously documented but not yet validated by clinical trials. However, 33 Pax products are certified by NAFDAC as safe to consume and we hope to increase this to 41 by the end of 2015. No other Nigerian firm has more than three products certified.

I encourage medical doctors and scientists to partner with Pax in carrying out research. At present most of our own research focuses on quality control, but we are open to partnerships to test efficacy.

Q. How do you separate the herbal practitioners who are doing it right from those who are simply quacks? – Professor Folayan Esan, Ekiti State University

A. More open dialogue could be the way forward. In this respect, Pax aims to be a bridge between academics, regulatory bodies and communities. I am a firm believer that once channels of communication are opened, significant progress will be made.

Q. Do you have links with China in product or policy development? Would you be interested in collaboration? – Maddalena Procopio, PhD Student at LSE

A. We have had several invitations to visit Chinese companies but my response has always been the same: come to Nigeria, then we can talk and see if we can work together. That must be the starting point – not just for Pax, but for Africa.

Video of Anselm’s talk:

Photos:

Audio podcast:

The post Africa’s Natural Remedies appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Key Information

• In 2013 ARI launched publications and hosted events scrutinising the state of urban planning law and the education of urban planners in Africa.
• This was followed in February 2014 by a book launch of “Africa’s Urban Revolution”, edited by Edgar Pieterse and Susan Parnell of the African Centre for Cities. A review of the book can be found here
• Civic conflict refers to diverse but recurrent forms of violence between individuals and groups and can include organised violent crime, gang warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest over state failure such as a poor or absent service delivery.  Civic conflict can sometimes overlap with civil conflict; however it differs from it in that civic conflict is ultimately a demonstrative or reactive process, demanding participation and response but rarely seeking to take control of formal structures of power.

  

• Graph depicting the growing prevalence of riots and protests over more conventional forms of violent conflict (Source: ACLED 2013 dataset)

Protest as Voice
Dr Tom Goodfellow

The stark statistic that three times more people die each year from interpersonal violence rather than from war is where Dr Tom Goodfellow began his discussion on civic conflict. Cities are not intrinsically violent. In seeking to understand what drives violence, with a specific focus on Uganda, Tom made three key observations:

• Violence can be caused by increasing proximity to others but that people still flee to urban centres to escape conflict and cities can in fact be centres of solutions to conflict.
• Protests or riots can become a norm of civic conflict when formal ways of participation are blocked or controlled by a central state authority, referencing the Buganda Riots (2009) and Walk to Work Protests (2011) in Uganda.
• In Uganda, President Museveni has been able to manipulate the political environment so that protestors are given space to perform and express a voice without necessarily being heard or posing a threat.

 Video of speaker presentations and the Q&A session:

To select the recording for a particular presentation, click the Playlist menu on the top left

Tom Goodfellow’s slides:

Download a PDF of Tom Goodfellow’s slides

Housing Violence
Dr Paula Meth

Violence in the home and public realm are increasingly intersecting and overlapping. Paula emphasised the need to understand the location of this conflict and to recognise that men and women are both vulnerable.  Reflecting on her research in South Africa she made three key observations to the audience:

• Domestic violence is more likely in informal housing settlements where there is a lack of privacy and space, as this exacerbates tensions.
• There is a general failure to recognise fully the male experience of violence, as both perpetrators and victims (often they can be both), particularly in cities.
• The formalisation of housing can reduce levels of violence.  In South Africa, the government funded re-housing programme has provided improved quality of living, which in turn enhances a citizen’s sense of worth.  However, it can also create new form of violence as people compete for new homes in what is a highly politicised process. Moreover, formal structures, with their enhanced privacy, can inadvertently conceal domestic violence.

Paula Meth’s slides:

Download a PDF of Paula Meth’s slides

POLITICISING VIOLENCE
ZAINAB USMAN

Zainab Usman remarked on the deterioration of trust amongst communities in Northern Nigeria that had lived in peace before the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2011. Reflecting on the composition of the Federal State of Nigeria and the escalating violence in 2014 that has caused thousands of deaths, Zainab made three critical observations:

• Whilst the central government has the capacity to address the insurgency, it lacks the political will to do so.
• In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for February 2015, it is in the political interest of the ruling party to do little about instability in what is generally regarded as an opposition stronghold; but the opposition is also wont to exploit the situation for political ends.
• The diverging political narratives around the insurgency are merely illustrations of the governance challenges bedevilling every aspect of Nigerian society.

Questions/Answers

Q. The panel was asked to reflect on the masculinities of violence at national, street and household level:

PM: Gender violence is not just economic or political but needs to be understood through a cultural norms lens too.

TG: Protests are quite masculine in the way and space in which they occur.  Urban protests are often very male-dominated in terms of who participates.

Q. What about the theme of migration in urban violence as it links closely to identity and belonging or ethnicity; does this have a substantive impact on civic conflict?

PM: There is a rural-urban dimension as men in particular can feel a loss of manhood by moving from rural areas, where they have power or authority, to urban locations, where this authority can be eroded.  Half of refugees live in urban areas so they obviously experience urban violence, but how they influence the process is not yet clear.

ZB: The border with Cameroon has been a major exchange point for Boko Haram activity but the extent to which this has fuelled the insurgency is not clear.

TG: In Kampala, migrants have not yet played a central role in violence; but in Northern Uganda there was a migration dynamic, related to the conflict, where young men challenged the role of traditional of elders; creating a crisis of masculinity. Adam Branch has written about this.

Q. What is the effect of gated communities/ integrated cities on urban violence and what is the relationship between the two regarding access to services/poverty?

PM: Gated communities are an emerging phenomenon on the continent and create settings where domestic violence can be very well-hidden.  Some research suggests that they can be sites of increased domestic violence – but still the poor want to live in these areas.  This is mainly because they reduce the risk of another type of urban violence – crime.

TG reflected on the issue of governable space and making space ungovernable, both of which are intimately linked to violence. He noted that this can include space beyond the control of the state and space that state exclusively controls.

Q. Does Boko Haram activity fuel and trigger further violence at the community level or do communities foster resilience?

Referring specifically to the bombings in Jos, ZU said she believed that the event had actually fostered a greater sense of community unity and resilience rather than creating divisions.  However she acknowledged that in other areas this might not be the case and that violence, at the community level, may be caused the insurgency.

Audio podcast:

Video of speaker presentations and the Q&A session:

To select the recording for a particular presentation, click the Playlist menu on the top left

Recommended reading:

Legal Manoeuvres and Violence: Law Making, Protest and Semi-Authoritarianism in Uganda (Wiley Online Library content, access restricted, login required)

‘The Institutionalisation of “Noise” and “Silence” in Urban Politics: Riots and Compliance in Uganda and Rwanda’

Toying with the law? Reckless manipulation of the legislature in Museveni’s Uganda

From ‘civil’ to ‘civic’ conflict? Violence & the city in fragile states

Boko Haram and the competing narratives

Related ARI content:

Conflict in Cities: In conversation with Jo Beall

Event Summary: Africa’s Urban Revolution

View all of our urban-themed work

The post Urban violence in Africa: Understanding civic conflict appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

The post Africa through my television – Michael Holden appeared first on Africa Research Institute.