The meeting was convened at SOAS by Ayan Mahamoud MBE, head of the Somaliland Mission to the UK, and was chaired by Edward Paice, ARI’s director.

The post Decolonisation in Somaliland in July 1960 in historical perspective – Prof Ahmed I Samatar appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Further reading:

“International observers of Somaliland presidential election congratulate Somaliland as Supreme Court announces final result” (Somaliland Focus, 29 November 2017)

“International observers of Somaliland’s presidential election urge all parties to use legal channels to resolve post-election differences” (Somaliland Focus, 17 November 2017)

“International observers of Somaliland’s presidential election congratulate the Somaliland people on a peaceful poll and look forward to a peaceful conclusion to the electoral process” (16 November 2017)

“SONSAF, Domestic Observers Certify Presidential Election on Monday Concluded Faultlessly” (SomTribune, 15 November)

“Somaliland Votes next week. Its biggest challenges come after the election” (Scott Pegg and Michael Walls, Washington Post Monkey Cage, 10 November 2017)

“Q & A session with HE Dr Sa’ad Shire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Somaliland” (Africa Research Institute, April 2017)

“Report by International Observers on the 2016 Voter Registration Process in Somaliland” (March 2017)

“Voter Behaviour in Somaliland” (Academy for Peace and Development/ Interpeace December 2016)

“The Economics of Elections in Somaliland: The financing of political parties and candidates” (Rift Valley Institute, 2015)

“Statebuilding in the Somali Horn” (Michael Walls/ Africa Research Institute, December 2014)

The post Somaliland’s 2017 presidential election: interview with Dr Michael Walls appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

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The post Interactive Timeline: IPTL, Richmond and “Escrow” appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Podcast

Further Reading

“Cameroon’s descent into crisis: the long history of anglophone discord” (IRIN, 4 October 2017)

“Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis isn’t about language, but economic deprivation” (Amindeh Blaise Atabong, Quartz Africa, 9 October 2017)

“Cameroon: A Worsening Anglophone Crisis Calls for Strong Measures” (Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 130, 19 October 2017)

“The Anglophone Dilemma in Cameroon” (Ateki Seta Caxton, ACCORD Conflict Trends, Issue 2, 2017)

“Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads” (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 250, 2 August 2017)

“Cameroon and the tumultuous autumn of an African patriarch” (FT View, 28 March 2017)

The post Interview with Nkongho Felix Agbor Balla by Edward Paice appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

On Wednesday 28 June we were joined by three speakers to discuss the state of the media, land matters and the economy, ahead of the August 8th election.

Kwame Owino is chief executive officer of the Institute of Economic Affairs (Kenya).

Ambreena Manji is Professor of Land Law and Development at Cardiff University and former director of the British Institute in East Africa. She is the author of ARI Counterpoint ‘Whose land is it anyway: The failure of land law in Kenya‘

Denis Galava is a former Managing Editor of the Nation Media Group.

The event marked the launch of “How Kenya is failing to create decent jobs” by Kwame Owino, Ivory Ndekei and Noah Wamalwa”.

The interview with Denis Galava featured in the event is separately available here as well.

Podcast

The post The State of Kenya appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

This September, the UN General Assembly dedicated a high-level meeting to the situation in Mali. This was the fifth general assembly since a Tuareg separatist rebellion and a military coup d’état destabilised Mali in the first quarter of 2012. The international community has focused its attention on the persistent presence of jihadists in the country, and across the Sahel. Many believed that the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) as president in August 2013 would prompt a quick recovery. Yet IBK has failed to provide the necessary leadership, occupying himself with superficial ministerial reshuffles and overt nepotism, turning a blind eye to escalating levels of corruption. His inaction may inflict greater damage to Mali than the jihadist threat.

Beyond security

At the UN meeting, officials from the European Union, African Union, regional bloc ECOWAS and the UN itself reaffirmed their commitment to resolving entwined security and political crises. IBK reiterated the threats posed by al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups both to his country and the Sahel. Although the risk is real, external interested parties should be wary of loaded rhetoric. For anyone seeking to understand what is happening in Mali, a security bias is not only erroneous but dangerous.

The jihadist threat narrative has obscured a proper assessment of the Malian government’s performance and its ability to deliver basic public services and create jobs. Poor health infrastructure, high levels of youth unemployment and endemic corruption need to be addressed. If they are not, these shortcomings could have deeper and longer-term influence for the stability of Mali. The spotlight needs to be turned the spotlight on key governance institutions such as the Bureau du Vérificateur Général” (National Corruption Commission) as part of a concerted push for reforms.

Concerns from afar

Mali has retained close ties with France since independence in 1960. The Malian diaspora is one of the largest in France. Born in France to Malian parents, I personify this link. But I, like many others in the diaspora, was concerned by the recent pronouncements of former French president Nicolas Sarkozy when he declared that he did not quite understand France’s military operation in Mali. Operation Serval began in 2013 to liberate northern Mali from the jihadists. Sarkozy questioned how 3,000 soldiers could have a significant impact across such a vast area.

Perhaps Sarkozy meant to imply that the French contingent currently stationed in the country cannot do the job alone. France has a key role to play in supporting the resolution of Mali’s political and security quagmire, but Malians need to be at the forefront of an indigenous effort to resolve the crises. However, this has so far proved less than straightforward.

Slow progress

Three years into IBK’s regime, demonstrations against bad governance have become a regular occurrence throughout the country. In May 2016, scores of protesters came together to denounce high levels of corruption and express their disappointment with the rule of a man who was elected with 77.6% of the popular vote in 2013. Several opposition figures attended the protest and lambasted the government for not addressing the growing economic misery and social suffering. Two months later, youth from Gao, Timbuktu and Bamako came together to protest that the 200,000 jobs promised by IBK during the presidential campaign had not yet been created. Issa Karounga Keita, President of the Executive Bureau of TRIJEUD, a Malian youth civil society group, raised similar concerns when I spoke with him last week: “job insecurity in Mali particularly affects the youth. Malian youth, when and if they are lucky enough to get a job, are underpaid, undertrained and underestimated”. The longer the IBK regime is unable to improve the living conditions for ordinary Malians, the more potent the threat from disenchanted youth to peace and security.

Poor governance also poses a bigger risk to foreign investment than the precarious security situation. Since the 1990s Mali has privatised many of its profitable sectors in an effort to attract external capital. Despite recurring terrorist attacks throughout the country since 2012, inflows have remained constant. However the purchase of a presidential jet for US$40 million and the uncovering of inflated defence contracts led the IMF to temporarily suspend assistance in 2014. Allegations of mismanagement of donor funds also halted the disbursement of US$4bn pledged in 2013 by 55 countries and international institutions for Mali’s reconstruction – by December 2014 it was estimated that only 50% of funds pledged had been received. These resources were intended, and desperately needed, to stimulate the economy, repair damaged infrastructure, rebuild government institutions and train the military.

Towards transparency

Within just four years, Mali has gone from being a “beacon of democracy” to the 29^th most fragile state in the world. Continued military action against jihadists is certainly important for security, but of equal importance to the stability of the nation and the future of its citizens are rapid improvements in the transparency and effectiveness of governance. This essential truth must not be overlooked.

Kamissa Camara is the Senior Program Officer for West & Central Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and a Fellow with Foreign Policy Interrupted but she writes here in her personal capacity. Kamissa blogs at www.kamissacamara.com and tweets @kamissacamara

The post Mali is becoming a failed state and it is not the jihadists’ fault appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

On Wednesday 5 October 2016 we were joined by Fr.Atta Barkindo, from The Kukah Center and doctoral research candidate at SOAS,  and Hilary Matfess, from the Institute for Defense Analyses. The event also launched ARI’s latest Counterpoint – “How Boko Haram exploits history and memory” by Fr. Atta Barkindo.

Fr. Atta Barkindo

• To understand the appeal of Boko Haram you need to make a distinction between the period prior to 2009 and the period after 2009. In the early 2000s people donated money to the group because they wanted to support the Islamic values it promoted. At that stage Boko Haram was not violent, and as such it was able to freely communicate with people about its religious beliefs and values. After 2009, when the approach became violent, people became less likely to join or support the group voluntarily, though many still did. The emergence of Boko Haram is not as important to understand as the why and how of the group’s transformation.
• Boko Haram’s leaders, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, have made use of the region’s history and exploited a collective memory. Translating over 50 of their YouTube videos I was struck by how frequently they referred to the Kanem-Bornu empire. What this has enabled them to do is successfully localise jihadi-salafi ideology. They describe Kanem-Bornu as a flourishing Islamic empire with good economic relations that were destroyed by the colonial powers who not only took it over but replaced it with a corrupt, western secular state system. It is against this system that Shekau constantly rails. The historical account may not be accurate, but it serves an important function for Boko Haram. They use history and memory for three things: target selection, atrocity justification and recruitment. When I interviewed former Boko Haram members in prison they could repeat verbatim sections of the YouTube videos I had transcribed.
• If you are really going to be serious about counter-radicalisation then you really need to sit down and listen to what these people have to say. This was not the approach taken at the start of the conflict. The Nigerian government saw them as poor, hungry, ignorant people – President Goodluck Jonathan called them “faceless masquerades and ghosts”. But Nigeria is now approaching its eighth year of military engagement with Boko Haram and the end of the conflict is not yet in sight. The violence perpetrated by the insurgents is abhorrent. But if we listen to them, their grievances reflect the voices and concerns of a particular set of people in a particular environment and context. For me, you can kill every single member of Boko Haram, but unless you understand how the group thinks and the environment from which it has emerged you will not eradicate them.
• The socio-economic and political environment in north-east Nigeria lends itself to the emergence of groups like Boko Haram. Citizens feel marginalised and ignored by the government, both at federal and state levels. The construct of the western state has been imposed on northern Nigerians without noticeable improvements to their daily lives. The Nigerian state is dominated by corruption, identity politics and impunity. These are drivers of conflict across the country and are why we see the continuation of conflicts in the Delta and between pastoralists and farmers.
• Boko Haram is not a Kanuri movement, and a lot of Kanuris denounce Boko Haram, but at the same time Kanuri identity and networks have been co-opted by the group. Shekau has taken advantage of local worker unions and utilised the Kanuri language to manoeuvre in the region. Historically, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, has been connected not with Lagos but with towns and people across the borders in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These connections have been utilised by Boko Haram to outsmart the Nigerian military, whose reliance on the use of federal character principles mean that many soldiers fighting Boko Haram do so without an understanding of the language, the culture and the history of the region.

 Hilary Matfess

• The role of gender is poorly understood in conflict studies generally. The tendency is to group “women and children” together, but in doing so we give the same agency to a child as we do to a woman. As “victims” is not the only way to understand the experience of women in Boko Haram.
• Operationally women have played a role as suicide bombers – more than 100 in the last 2 years – but they are also logistical lynchpins of the insurgency. They keep the camps running by cooking, cleaning and portering. Women have also been used as a bargaining chip in negotiations by Boko Haram and their value to the group is well understood. It is noteworthy that the shortest time between YouTube videos, was in the immediate aftermath of the capture of schoolgirls from Chibok and the international outcry that followed.
• Women who are forcibly conscripted into Boko Haram are referred to as those who are oppressed and downtrodden, terms of pity that imply the need for help. However some women I talked to voluntarily chose to join Boko Haram and spoke of experiencing a sense of “empowerment”. They received daily Koranic education, were banned from farming and the back-breaking labour that entails, and when married would receive the bride price normally given to their family. Boko Haram sees itself as a vanguard of Muslims and women’s role in it is crucial.
• The level of gender representation in the Nigerian political sphere, particularly in the north-east is very low. Governor Shettima of Borno State has at least spoken publically and positively about the role women can play in the reconstruction, but it can sometimes to be difficult to see in reality. A Ramadan feeding scheme I observed was supposed to issue bags of rice that would be collected by women only, but when I went to see the distribution I saw only men in the collection lines. Implementation is just as important as design and in some communities cultural practices are at odds with gender mainstreaming in policy.
• There is sizeable stigma facing women who have been part of Boko Haram. Many community leaders treat them as carriers of a disease; even families ostracise their own kin, even in cases of abduction. The process of societal reintegration is going to be very difficult at the end of the conflict and there is little-to-no planning as to how it will be done. When Nigeria reaches a post-conflict situation women will have a vital role to play in societal redevelopment as so many men have been affected by the violence.

Excerpts from the discussion

Is it important to differentiate between the different factions of Boko Haram?

(Murray Last, University College London)

AB: There is a valid question about the group’s heterogeneity but I believe there are also lines of continuity. Boko Haram is a collection of disparate cells, more criminal the further north you go and comprised of foot soldiers that have different motivations for joining. They can be members, followers, sympathisers or simply passers-by and opportunists caught up in conflict. But at the top, there are clearly ideologues that motivate and show others the way. I chose to focus on them, to look at what is it they teach and what it is they tell their followers. The eloquence of Shekau and Yusuf is rarely mentioned, but when you listen to them speak you can begin to understand their appeal. I don’t like the atrocities Shekau extolls but I find him fascinating to listen to; he can so easily switch between languages to deliver specific messages. In one of the most recent videos Shekau insults Buhari in Fulani – the president’s own language. It was a deliberate strategy to speak directly to Nigeria’s head of state. Shekau was not educated in the west, but his clarity of thinking and logic in Kanuri, Hausa and Arabic means that dismissing him as uneducated, as often happens in Nigeria when people do not speak English, is dangerous.

What does it mean for Boko Haram to be aligned to ISIS?

(Ludovica Iaccino, International Business Times)

AB: We first must ask ourselves what is a link: is it physical, ideological or inspirational? Is it not possible that I can Skype with a terrorist in Malaysia and learn something without ever meeting face-to-face? If you listen to the Boko Haram videos they draw inspiration from the writings of scholars from Saudi Arabia. This is because in Saudi Arabia they practise monarchy and therefore do not glorify democratic values – in fact they denounce them. We should not be limited to saying that there is only a link when Islamic state physically delivers weapons to Boko Haram. The ideological link is very important. I have never met Pope Francis, yet I am inspired by him every day.

To what extent has the Nigerian military’s response exacerbated the conflict in the region?

(Eva Anderson, Transparency International)

HM: The abuses committed by the Nigerian military are one of the factors that allowed Boko Haram to evolve as it did. In Maiduguri someone I spoke with compared the relationship between citizens and the military to being “like Tom and Jerry, the cartoon”. Trust is higher in the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) but its role in efforts to resolve the conflict poses longer-term problems for the state regarding what to do with these armed, often young, men. CJTF numbers 26,000 in Borno State alone and there is no real accountability mechanism in place to monitor their actions. Local mistrust of the military has created a simmering crisis – once Boko Haram has been defeated what do you do with the CJTF? Absorbing some into the formal security sector is one option, but others are needed.

AB: The problems facing Nigeria’s security service predate the Boko Haram insurgency. Long years of lack of reform of the military meant that training was not up-to-date on things like guerrilla warfare and cyber terror. This impacted on the response.  When I started my research I visited over 25 police and military barracks and the conditions I saw were deplorable. Single rooms meant for individual occupancy were housing families of eight. This is the root cause of the problem. When you ask a soldier to stand by the roadside you shouldn’t be surprised he asks for a bribe as he is always thinking about how he can raise money to move out of the barracks. In him, there is already a grievance against the state so even though he is fighting he is most probably doing so to keep his job. It is important to pay tribute to the individual soldiers who have sacrificed their lives fighting Boko Haram.

Is the Nigerian state a predatory entity? And how does this impact on the humanitarian response?

(Matthew T Page, former US State Department Nigeria expert)

HM: The scale of displacement in Lake Chad basin is huge. Estimates suggest 1 in every 7 residents is displaced. Nigeria has emergency agencies at federal, state and local government levels that, on paper, should be caring for these IDPs. However, at the camps I visited, the military and police are in charge. They are managing the gates and deciding what, and who, go in and out. On a recent visit I was unable to access a camp without express permission of the military even though I had permission from the director of the state emergency agency. This means that security services are running the humanitarian response and that raises a number of issues. Firstly, it turns displacement centres into possible targets as the insurgency is anti-state; and secondly, it increases the vulnerability of women to violence and sexual assault. As a result of these problems with official IDP camps the vast majority of displaced people in north-east Nigeria live in informal camps or with extended kin networks. This raises a question about whether channelling aid to the formal camps, when so many people live outside them, is fully addressing food insecurity.

AB: Let me give you an example of the predatory nature of the whole response. So many people in Nigeria now are coming forward as counter-terror experts; they are submitting bids for consultancy work when they don’t know the first thing about the subject. The Boko Haram insurgency has created an independent economy where people, at many different layers, are involved for personal gain. Relief materials continue to go missing. The lack of trust between citizens and the state is painfully obvious.

Why and how should we listen to Boko Haram? Who can listen?

(Elizabeth Pearson, King’s College London) 

AB: I want to go against the narrative that Boko Haram is simply faceless. Before 2009 they were preaching freely in states across the north-east and most of the YouTube videos were readily available on cassette, video and CDs in local markets. I think if you want to research Boko Haram you should go directly to the source and that is what I did.

We also have to look for invisible signs of extremism. If your drive from Jos going north there are writings on the walls and street signs in Arabic saying things like “down with democracy” & “Islam is the solution”. The Nigerian state has not responded sufficiently to the needs of these citizens.

I strongly believe that despite the atrocities of Boko Haram they really have something to say, if we can listen to them. I spoke to an imprisoned former member who was angry about the 25 car convoy of the Gombe state governor, “all the cars need to be fuelled, driven and have policeman who need to be fed”. You may think that this is a madman talking but I think he is saying something very important about the huge financial waste in maintaining Nigeria’s political democratic system. Listening to Boko Haram will help us to counter them.

See the conversation via Twitter #BokoHistory

Event recording

Films of Fr Atta Barkindo and Hilary Matfess

The post Boko Haram: the importance of listening appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

The last man still standing

In the week before 27 April 2016 – the day Sierra Leone celebrated 55 years of independence – musician Emmerson Bockarie launched his latest album. “Survivor” reportedly sold 12,000 copies within 24 hours of being released. Emmerson is not someone to shy away from controversy. His self-proclaimed status as “the last man still standing” is a reference to his continued artistic independence and resistance to political interference.

Back in 2007 Emmerson’s album “Borboh Belleh” (meaning “gluttonous boy”) castigated perceived failings of the Sierra Leone People’s Party government. In an election year, it gathered widespread popular support which the All People’s Congress (APC) used to its advantage. After his election as president, Ernest Bai Koroma specifically recognised Emmerson’s outstanding ability to raise public awareness through music. It is fair to say that the APC response has not been so positive this time, not that Emmerson seems perturbed. He told journalist Umaru Fofana “I have made up my mind to do what I am doing and cannot stop now”.

Striking a chord

One track in particular, “Munku boss pan matches, e jus dae krach”, highlights the rampant corruption that – Emmerson charges – has become part of the culture of the APC government. The title translates as “ill-educated people who keep lighting matches one after the other, just to see the fire again, for no other reason than because they can”. What this alludes to – and this was very clearly understood by the people I spoke with in Freetown – is the recent spate of corruption and the mismanagement of state resources by politicians and government officials only interested in advancing their own interests rather than the development of Sierra Leone.  An equivalent metaphor in English might be “like kids in a sweet shop”.

With a playtime of 15 minutes, the lyrics of the song prod and probe at length. They question the commitment shown by all government departments to the construction of roads even when it is not within their remit to do so and despite the glaring needs elsewhere: roads are an infamous source of kickbacks. They condemn the empty promises made regarding jobs for youth. They accuse MPs of failing to represent the voters and of being “under the brown envelope payroll” and question the validity of the “more time” agenda that supports an extension of the incumbent governments mandate, due to expire in 2018, to continue mitigating the disruption inflicted by Ebola. As for the president himself, Koroma is accused of accelerating his accumulation of wealth as he nears the end of his time in office and of indulging in a lavish lifestyle starkly at odds with that of most Sierra Leoneans.

Public reaction       

“He [Emmerson] sings for us,” Foday Conteh, a taxi driver from the president’s home town of Makeni, told me. From health workers, to university students and staff, to business owners the response of everyone I spoke to about the song was similar: a wry smile followed by a question as to whether I understood the meaning of the lyrics. There was broad agreement that Emmerson was speaking the truth.

Of course, some disagree. Writing in Cocorioko, editor and a diplomat appointed to the UN by President Koroma, Kabs Kanu asserted that “Emmerson’s lyrics did not reflect the true story about what President Koroma has done for our nation. There have been far more than just road construction in Sierra Leone. Every aspect of national development has been touched by the President”. At various locations in Freetown, Airtel billboards depicting the artist were vandalised.

Emmerson’s accusations would be difficult to prove in a court of law, but they have certainly been embraced by a receptive audience.  Amid the blare of horns in Freetown’s gridlocked traffic, the song resonates from the shared taxis on which so many commuters rely.

For most Sierra Leoneans water shortages, increases in the cost of living – the Leone has plummeted against the US$ since August 2014, driving up the cost of many foodstuffs – and a lack of formal sector employment are the everyday realities. Beyond new roads and a few token traffic lights, there is little sign of much-needed investment, for example in health care, education or agriculture. For now, citizens continue to endure the hardships with good humour. But if the wealth divide continues to widen, and poorer residents of Freetown are forced to suffer even more while a fortunate few thrive, there will come a point when something will have to give.

Jamie Hitchen is Policy Researcher at ARI. He wishes to extend special thanks to Joseph Macarthy for his invaluable assistance in bringing clarity to the song lyrics where he was unable to do so. 

The post “Kids in a sweet shop”: corruption in post-Ebola Sierra Leone appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

The federal system of governance in Nigeria is failing to provide the basic welfare for all citizens that the 1999 Constitution prescribes. On the first anniversary of the election victory of President Muhammadu Buhari, ARI published a Briefing Note that examines the origins and purpose of the federation, state governments’ financial management and responsibilities, governors’ arbitrary power, and the need to increase internally generated state revenue.

On  28 April 2016, ARI invited three speakers to draw upon their experiences and expertise in order to discuss the state of state governments in Nigeria:

 ‘Dapo Oyewole

 Podcast

YouTube

The post The State of State Governments in Nigeria appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

BACK TO CONTENTS

The post Who Really Governs Urban Ghana? – Mohammed Awal and Jeffrey Paller appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Dr Nic Cheeseman, associate professor of African politics, University of Oxford; author of Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform

• The Afro-pessimists: For Afro-pessimists, the regular holding of elections not only hides authoritarian regimes but provides them with a degree of international legitimacy. The most stable regimes in the world are where an authoritarian leader runs very tightly controlled elections. Afro-pessimists argue that democratic regimes are no better at representing women; that elections generate periodic violence; that the quality of civil liberties across the continent has declined as the number of multi-party systems has increased; and that there is no clear correlation between free elections and political freedoms.
• The Afro-positivists: Afro-positivists, on the other hand, argue that the holding of elections entrenches democratic traditions and values. They point to studies that show support for democracy is high amongst African citizens and that term limits are starting to bite. When respected once, term limits have never been subsequently rejected on the continent. Enforcing term limits also provides opportunities for the political opposition: when a ruling party fields a new candidate, rather than the incumbent, its chance of victory drops from 85% to 50%.
• Three Africas: There are three different camps of democratic development in Africa. The first is racing ahead. In countries like Benin, Senegal and Ghana democratic values have been consolidated over time with transfers of power, a trajectory that is likely to continue. The second is in a turbulent middle ground where low incentives to give up power have created an environment in which elections have often been conflictual and skewed in favour of the ruling party. Examples include Zimbabwe and Kenya. The third is stuck in an authoritarian backwater, ruled by military leaders in civilian clothes. In places like Rwanda and Ethiopia elections are used as a means of control and political legitimation. The trajectory of democracy on the continent is not one of convergence but of divergence.
• A role for the international community: Developing political institutions is an area where international actors can have a significant impact on democratisation. But geopolitics are also at play. Western powers provide unwavering support to regimes due to natural resources and security considerations, which in turn often undermine efforts to promote democracy. China’s arrival makes the politics more complicated, but the basic rules have not changed. Ultimately, outside processes can only do so much; domestic factors shape the success of democratisation.

Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba, former national chairman, Civic United Front (CUF); four-time presidential candidate in Tanzania

• One nation, two governments: The United Republic exhibits a significant contrast between mainland Tanzania and the Isles of Zanzibar. The mainland does not have a strong history of political opposition because of the principles espoused by the first president, Julius Nyerere. Until the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, political competition was limited to the confines of the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Even after five elections, CCM continues to exert its dominance. In Zanzibar, political opposition has a long history that pre-dates independence. The most contentious elections took place in 1995, when the Civic United Front (CUF) emerged victorious only to see the decision reversed.
• Polls in Zanzibar: With a history of closely contested polls in Zanzibar, in 2010 an agreement was reached – and enshrined in the constitution – that parties securing more than 5% of the vote would be included in a government of national unity. This stipulation was designed to reduce electoral contestation and prevent violence. But in 2015 the chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission unilaterally annulled the election results, despite lacking the legal mandate to do so. This occurred as CUF took half of the seats in the House of Representatives – and presented evidence of having won the presidential vote. Currently the Isles are without a functioning government. However, Professor Lipumba said “I remain optimistic regarding Tanzania’s democratic development; I believe we can reach a solution on Zanzibar”.
• Two terms: Term limits are a respected part of Tanzanian democracy. They are important because in a second term the president can push harder for political reforms, knowing he will not compete again. In 2015, the outgoing president, Jakaya Kikwete, tried to push for constitutional reforms. Even though political pressure eventually meant that he failed to hold a referendum on the Warioba draft constitution, he reopened a debate on the manner in which the nation is governed.
• Valuing democracy: Democracy is not a cultural imposition but a universal value. Africans prefer a democratic system of government. Democracy is so omnipresent that even coup-makers claim to carry out their actions to preserve democratic principles.

Vera Kwakofi, current affairs editor, BBC Africa

• The voice of citizens: The media can play a role in entrenching democratic principles. But in 2015 conventional media had to play “catch up” with the sentiments of people on the ground. WhatsApp is revolutionising politics in Africa. It has been transformed from a social tool to a political organising platform and a pseudo-medium for sharing news content. Because of its encryption it is harder to censor, meaning it has put the power of communication into the hands of citizens.
• Investigative journalism: The investigation into the judiciary in Ghana by Anas Aremeyaw Anas provides an inspiring example for the continent. Anas exposed wide-scale corruption in an institution that holds historic importance in Ghana, and which has always been seen as non-politicised. 20 judges have already been sacked and over 180 judges and court officials are still under investigation. The media should hold politicians to account, but journalists are not doing enough of this in Africa. More attention should be given to examining the institutions of state and interrogating how effective they are and what they are really doing.
• An African Fourth Estate: There is more at stake for local media than international media. Its primary role must be as educators – to explain the actions of actors, functions of government and processes of democracy as independently as possible. By detailing how the state works, local media can empower citizens to make informed choices. The international media should be observers of society and portray events to the rest of the world. However international media too often performs the function of local media. African media houses and journalists are better placed to understand local cultures and histories; however, the lack of a supportive environment prevents them from doing so.

 Event podcast:

Interview with Prof.Ibrahim Lipumba

Event Video

The post The State of Democracy in Africa 2015 appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

On Thursday 11 June 2015, ARI hosted the outgoing commissioners for the launch of the report, “How DFID works with multilateral agencies to achieve impact”, which was scored ‘Green-Amber’. Previous ICAI reviews have highlighted DFID’s limited oversight of EU aid, while commending its engagement with the World Bank. The three commissioners also reflected on their time in office and the significant challenges facing DFID.

Graham Ward CBE, Chief Commissioner, on DFID’s key challenges:

• Economic development: The Secretary of State has pledged to spend £1.8 billion on frontier economic development this year, but DFID must improve its work in this domain. ICAI rated as ‘Amber-Red’ both DFID’s work with the private sector and its approach to partnering with business. If DFID’s economic programmes are to have impact, interventions at different levels – such as microfinance, making markets work for the poor, and regulatory reform – must be coordinated so that they form mutually reinforcing portfolios.
• Fragile states: DFID is committed to spending 30% of its budget in countries affected by conflict, which necessitates expertise in fragile states. Yet, ICAI’s review of the scaling up of DFID support to fragile states highlighted unrealistic ambitions and excessively complex delivery methods. DFID needs to balance “quick wins” with programming designed to promote long-term pathways out of fragility.
• Emergency response: ICAI has been impressed by DFID’s humanitarian portfolio. DFID played a leading role in the response to the 2011 food crises in the Horn of Africa, achieving good impact and value for money. Yet, DFID remains weaker at responding to long-term or chronic emergencies, where humanitarian and development assistance are needed in parallel.
• Short-termism: Numerous ICAI reviews have found that DFID’s 3-5 year programme cycle can undermine the achievement of long-term, transformative impact. Internal evaluations are not timed to fit the programming cycle with the result that information on results is rarely available in time to inform the next phase of programming.

Commissioner Diana Good on DFID’s project management:

• Results agenda: An unintended consequence of DFID’s results agenda is a trade-off whereby programmes focus on quantity, rather than quality. School enrolment figures tell us little about educational attainment, or even whether there are sufficient teachers in the classroom; yet such metrics lie at the heart of the results agenda.
• Joined-up thinking: DFID’s management systems neither encourage, nor capture, portfolios of projects and more complex results. In Tanzania, private sector development programmes were presented as a list rather than integrated in a comprehensive multi-level strategy. It is hoped that DFID’s country diagnostic tool will improve this picture.
• Beneficiary focus: ICAI believes DFID’s best work stems from quality engagement with beneficiaries via existing community structures. Beneficiaries must be involved in programme design, problem-solving during implementation, and evaluation. In the case of TradeMark Southern Africa, the only report to which ICAI has awarded a ‘Red’ traffic light, DFID lost sight of the imperative to benefit the poor. As a result of poor management, this programme was closed.

Commissioner Mark Foster on how DFID works with multilaterals:

• A plethora of agencies: DFID spends 62.9% of its annual budget via 47 multilaterals. Alongside the World Bank group and the EU, DFID works with 22 UN agencies, 7 global funds, 6 regional development banks, and numerous international organisations. The proliferation of multilaterals has been unaccompanied by efforts to address their lack of coordination. Effective coalitions need to be formed around specific issues to achieve meaningful impact.
• Global presence: Multilateral agencies possess a global footprint and legitimacy which enables them to work in contexts where national governments cannot. UNICEF played a critical role in maintaining the education system in Madagascar when bilateral donors pulled out. However, staff in conflict-affected states are often constrained by operating procedures. ICAI met a WHO nutrition expert in Somalia who had not left the compound for 18 months.
• Norms and practices: Multilaterals help shape global development by diffusing norms, especially relating to women, youth and nutrition. DFID has a reputation as a “thought leader”, but recently it has focused less on agencies’ strategic priorities, and more on their processes. ICAI fears that if this trend continues, DFID risks prioritising due diligence over selecting the organisation which is best equipped to deliver with impact.
• Strategy and communication: DFID is expected to award £35 billion to multilaterals over the next five years, but there appears to be no overarching strategy to determine which agencies should receive funding, nor did ICAI identify clear country-level strategies for DFID’s work with multilaterals. DFID must do more to spell out why the UK invests so heavily with these agencies, and communicate their successes to the public.

Romilly Greenhill (ODI), responding to the report:

• Contextual changes: African governments are increasingly able to choose from a number of finance sources, but multilaterals have been slow to adapt to this trend. The Chinese are able to deliver infrastructure projects much more quickly than the development banks; while Eurobonds have proved a popular alternatives to the banks’ concessional loans – as ARI’s recent publication ‘Africa [Debt] Rising’ documented.
• Reform to remain relevant: The governance of the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks remains skewed in favour of donor governments. DFID should not have such a big seat at the table. These institutions must reform their governance if they want to remain relevant. Otherwise alternative structures will be established, similar to the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank.
• Assessment: DFID must improve its collaboration with other bilateral donors in assessing the work of multilaterals. A draft of the OECD report Multilateral Aid 2015 revealed that 205 bilateral assessments of multilateral agencies were carried out in 2014/15, including 17 of UNDP alone. DFID could do more to use the findings of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), which it co-funds, to inform decision-making.

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