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The meeting was convened at SOAS by Ayan Mahamoud MBE, head of the Somaliland Mission to the UK, and was chaired by Edward Paice, ARI’s director.

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Fadumo Dayib – former presidential candidate and anti-corruption activist – Somalia

• Decision to run: I was always aware that we needed change in Somalia, but I thought that it would come from elsewhere, or from someone else. However, after waiting for almost 26 years, I realised that maybe I could be that person. In September 2014 I decided to declare my candidacy for president. I knew that from that moment my life would never be the same again.
• My experience as a woman: We have a proverb in Somalia that a woman’s place is either at home or in the grave. I was trying to negotiate a space between the two and some people were adamant that it would expedite my journey to the grave. I received a lot of death threats; an experience not shared by the male candidates in the race. These threats were very specific and on some occasions targeted my children. This was shocking and traumatising for me as a mother, knowing that what I was doing was going to impact on my children and perhaps put them at risk. Despite the threats I do not regret coming forward.
• Corruption: Corruption was the biggest challenge. Whenever I spoke to people in politics or power the first thing they would ask was “What do you have for us?”, “How much money do you have?” or “How much can you pay?” They were not interested in my vision for Somalia. This was very frustrating. How can you come into elected office through unconstitutional means and then demand that the citizens adhere to the rule of law when you yourself have not done so?
• Clan system: I declared my candidacy with the understanding that Somalia’s elections were going to take place under a one-person-one-vote system. However, 18 months later the government reverted back to the 4.5 clan-based system. This formula segregates Somalis in a way that is akin to apartheid. It supports the notion that the four major clans are ethnically pure, while the remainder – the 0.5 – are marginalised. It is unconstitutional.
• Towards 2020: In 2020, when we will hopefully have democratic elections, I will be running again. I truly believe 12 million Somalis deserve peace, dignity, prosperity and leaders who walk the talk and set a good example. Until then I will work independently in civil society to promote transparency and human rights, to make sure that we begin the process of bringing democratic accountability to Somalia.

George Bob-Milliar – senior lecturer at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology – Ghana

• A model for the continent? 28 August 2013 was the day nine Supreme Court justices returned their verdict on an electoral petition raised by the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) about the conduct of the previous year’s election. In the preceding eight months, Ghanaians had been hooked, watching or listening to the litigation in court. At the end we were all convinced that there was something wrong with our electoral system. For example, it became obvious that there were systematic discrepancies between the results being returned at polling centres and those being returned at collation centres. This was happening on both sides of the political spectrum and it was clear these practices been going on in previous elections. The Supreme Court’s report exposed the myth that Ghana’s democracy was a model for the rest of Africa.
• Key campaign issues: The 2016 election was the first time that a sitting incumbent has lost an election in Ghana. Some commentators said that although John Mahama had served only one elected term his party had been in power for eight years, and that this historically has always resulted in a party being ousted. However, poor electricity supply and rising costs, a lack of job opportunities for young people and rising inflation meant that it was largely the economy that put paid to Mahama’s bid for a second elected term. Social welfare – the lack thereof – was also an important campaign issue. During their time in power the National Democratic Congress (NDC) invested a lot in infrastructural development, but they failed to address the welfare components of those structures; people still could not afford or access health insurance. The NPP campaigned to improve social welfare provision and on a promise to radically transform Ghana’s economy through industrialisation. But their election promise of setting up factories in all 271 districts in the country may prove difficult to deliver.
• State capture: In Ghana, whenever there is transition between the NPP and NDC, party footsoldiers view it as a coup d’état. Transition is improving at the level of national politics, but at the grassroots there is still a very strong winner-takes-all mentality. People see anything that is associated with the state as being owned by the party in power, and in the aftermath of elections in which power changes hands these footsoldiers seize control of state assets like public toilets and road toll booths. This way they ensure the revenue collected goes directly to themselves and not to central government.
• Room for improvement: Ghana has successfully consolidated its electoral democracy, but it is not perfect. Several challenges remain: the legislature is weak, the judiciary has problems and the economy is not producing the dividends that democracy was expected to bring.

Robtel Neajai Pailey – Liberian academic, activist and author

• Pseudo-incumbency: October’s election will be the first democratic transition in Liberia between two heads of state in recent memory. There will be no incumbent in this election as President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf will step aside having served her constitutionally allotted 12 years. But Vice-President Joseph Boakai is almost a “pseudo-incumbent”. Being in a position of power, he has access to state resources that can be employed to give him an edge over his rivals.
• New faces: There are a lot of the usual suspects – the seasoned politicians – who will run for the presidency, but what is fascinating is the number of new aspirants with more technocratic or entrepreneurial backgrounds. These include Alex Cummings, the former chief administrative officer at Coca-Cola; Mills Jones, the former Governor of the Central Bank; and John Morlu, the former Auditor General, who is a viewed as an anti-corruption “messiah” in many parts of the country. So far these candidates have shown signs they can gather support in urban and rural areas. The 2017 election is shaping up to be an issues race in Liberia – it is not about the cult of the personality. Voters are asking questions like “What is your track record?”, “What have you actually delivered in the last 6-12 years?”, and “Why should we trust you?”
• Coalition building: Several political party leaders have realised that they cannot win this election in the first round. Coalition-building is necessary and at the moment the most powerful looks to be the Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC), fronted by George Weah with Jewel Howard Taylor as his running mate. The CDC promises to be a “hot ticket” as it brings together voters from outside their respective ethno-regional bases and the early indications are that it can do well in areas won by Johnson Sirleaf in 2011 that are less supportive of her Unity Party successor, Joseph Boakai.
• Law enforcement: The enforcement of certain laws, or lack thereof, will be worth keeping an eye on. First, a residency clause explicitly states that if you have not resided in Liberia for ten consecutive years you are not eligible to run for president. This clause was not applied in the 2011 election, but a decision taken then by Supreme Court promised that it would be in 2017. There has not been much discussion about it so far, but if it does come up it may cause problems for the candidatures of Alex Cummings and John Morlu. Secondly, Liberia does not recognise dual citizenship. The suggestion is that several of the candidates, including Weah, who stood in 2011, would be affected if this is enforced. Finally, in 2014 a civil service code of conduct law was introduced that states anyone who is intending to run for elected office, either in the legislature or the presidency, must resign two years before the polls. There are a number of people vying for the presidency and seats in the House of Representatives who have not done so. If these three laws are raised and discussed it could lead to a constitutional quagmire.
• Women in politics: In 2006, just after Sirleaf was elected president she had five women with strong technocratic qualifications in her cabinet. There were five female superintendents, who represent the president in the 15 counties, and 13 female senators. In 2017, there are only two superintendents, three senators and three women in the cabinet. Of those cabinet officials one is the gender minister, which is a bit tokenistic, and the other heads up the National Investment Commission, a non-ministerial position.
• Sirleaf’s mixed legacy for women: Efforts to improve equality have struggled to make progress in the political sphere. A Gender Equity in Politics Bill put forward by the women’s legislative caucus in 2010 proposed a quota system, but Sirleaf was noticeably silent on it initially; even when she did express support, it was with no great enthusiasm. The bill was not passed and the fact that a female president would not openly champion a measure to give women an edge has filtered down to voters and shaped their attitudes against the need for these types of measures in the future. On a more positive note, Sirleaf, at least initially, tried to bring a lot of younger women into her political inner circle and she has done a great job improving market women’s access to entrepreneurial opportunities, in particular, and supporting efforts to improve financial autonomy. But whilst in the economic sphere there has been progress, in the political sphere Sirleaf has not done enough. The question a lot of young Liberian women are asking is “What about us?” “Is the glass ceiling so high that our president, who is a woman, has not completely shattered it?” “If so, why not?”

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The federal system of governance in Nigeria is failing to provide the basic welfare for all citizens that the 1999 Constitution prescribes. On the first anniversary of the election victory of President Muhammadu Buhari, ARI published a Briefing Note that examines the origins and purpose of the federation, state governments’ financial management and responsibilities, governors’ arbitrary power, and the need to increase internally generated state revenue.

On  28 April 2016, ARI invited three speakers to draw upon their experiences and expertise in order to discuss the state of state governments in Nigeria:

 ‘Dapo Oyewole

 Podcast

YouTube

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Dr Nic Cheeseman, associate professor of African politics, University of Oxford; author of Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform

• The Afro-pessimists: For Afro-pessimists, the regular holding of elections not only hides authoritarian regimes but provides them with a degree of international legitimacy. The most stable regimes in the world are where an authoritarian leader runs very tightly controlled elections. Afro-pessimists argue that democratic regimes are no better at representing women; that elections generate periodic violence; that the quality of civil liberties across the continent has declined as the number of multi-party systems has increased; and that there is no clear correlation between free elections and political freedoms.
• The Afro-positivists: Afro-positivists, on the other hand, argue that the holding of elections entrenches democratic traditions and values. They point to studies that show support for democracy is high amongst African citizens and that term limits are starting to bite. When respected once, term limits have never been subsequently rejected on the continent. Enforcing term limits also provides opportunities for the political opposition: when a ruling party fields a new candidate, rather than the incumbent, its chance of victory drops from 85% to 50%.
• Three Africas: There are three different camps of democratic development in Africa. The first is racing ahead. In countries like Benin, Senegal and Ghana democratic values have been consolidated over time with transfers of power, a trajectory that is likely to continue. The second is in a turbulent middle ground where low incentives to give up power have created an environment in which elections have often been conflictual and skewed in favour of the ruling party. Examples include Zimbabwe and Kenya. The third is stuck in an authoritarian backwater, ruled by military leaders in civilian clothes. In places like Rwanda and Ethiopia elections are used as a means of control and political legitimation. The trajectory of democracy on the continent is not one of convergence but of divergence.
• A role for the international community: Developing political institutions is an area where international actors can have a significant impact on democratisation. But geopolitics are also at play. Western powers provide unwavering support to regimes due to natural resources and security considerations, which in turn often undermine efforts to promote democracy. China’s arrival makes the politics more complicated, but the basic rules have not changed. Ultimately, outside processes can only do so much; domestic factors shape the success of democratisation.

Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba, former national chairman, Civic United Front (CUF); four-time presidential candidate in Tanzania

• One nation, two governments: The United Republic exhibits a significant contrast between mainland Tanzania and the Isles of Zanzibar. The mainland does not have a strong history of political opposition because of the principles espoused by the first president, Julius Nyerere. Until the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, political competition was limited to the confines of the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Even after five elections, CCM continues to exert its dominance. In Zanzibar, political opposition has a long history that pre-dates independence. The most contentious elections took place in 1995, when the Civic United Front (CUF) emerged victorious only to see the decision reversed.
• Polls in Zanzibar: With a history of closely contested polls in Zanzibar, in 2010 an agreement was reached – and enshrined in the constitution – that parties securing more than 5% of the vote would be included in a government of national unity. This stipulation was designed to reduce electoral contestation and prevent violence. But in 2015 the chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission unilaterally annulled the election results, despite lacking the legal mandate to do so. This occurred as CUF took half of the seats in the House of Representatives – and presented evidence of having won the presidential vote. Currently the Isles are without a functioning government. However, Professor Lipumba said “I remain optimistic regarding Tanzania’s democratic development; I believe we can reach a solution on Zanzibar”.
• Two terms: Term limits are a respected part of Tanzanian democracy. They are important because in a second term the president can push harder for political reforms, knowing he will not compete again. In 2015, the outgoing president, Jakaya Kikwete, tried to push for constitutional reforms. Even though political pressure eventually meant that he failed to hold a referendum on the Warioba draft constitution, he reopened a debate on the manner in which the nation is governed.
• Valuing democracy: Democracy is not a cultural imposition but a universal value. Africans prefer a democratic system of government. Democracy is so omnipresent that even coup-makers claim to carry out their actions to preserve democratic principles.

Vera Kwakofi, current affairs editor, BBC Africa

• The voice of citizens: The media can play a role in entrenching democratic principles. But in 2015 conventional media had to play “catch up” with the sentiments of people on the ground. WhatsApp is revolutionising politics in Africa. It has been transformed from a social tool to a political organising platform and a pseudo-medium for sharing news content. Because of its encryption it is harder to censor, meaning it has put the power of communication into the hands of citizens.
• Investigative journalism: The investigation into the judiciary in Ghana by Anas Aremeyaw Anas provides an inspiring example for the continent. Anas exposed wide-scale corruption in an institution that holds historic importance in Ghana, and which has always been seen as non-politicised. 20 judges have already been sacked and over 180 judges and court officials are still under investigation. The media should hold politicians to account, but journalists are not doing enough of this in Africa. More attention should be given to examining the institutions of state and interrogating how effective they are and what they are really doing.
• An African Fourth Estate: There is more at stake for local media than international media. Its primary role must be as educators – to explain the actions of actors, functions of government and processes of democracy as independently as possible. By detailing how the state works, local media can empower citizens to make informed choices. The international media should be observers of society and portray events to the rest of the world. However international media too often performs the function of local media. African media houses and journalists are better placed to understand local cultures and histories; however, the lack of a supportive environment prevents them from doing so.

 Event podcast:

Interview with Prof.Ibrahim Lipumba

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Michael Walls is a senior lecturer at the Development Planning Unit at University College London. He co-organised international election observation missions in Somaliland in 2005, 2010 and 2012 and has written extensively about Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia.

• North and south, success and disillusionment
• Democracy, a messy business
• Transition, not exceptionalism
• A history of Somali state-building
• Somaliland, a Somali nation state
• Federalism, autonomy and the prospects for representative transition
• Future Somaliland
• Notes and map

North and south, success and disillusionment

Increasing numbers of non-Somalis are taking notice of Somaliland. In part, this has come about through involvement with, or awareness of, events such as the International Book Fair in Hargeysa, capital of the internationally unrecognised republic. An essential ingredient has been the support of businesses and non-Somali donors for one of the most vibrant cultural events in East Africa. Their contributions make it possible to stage the festival annually – and for free. Huge crowds are drawn, none more so than for the recitals of the renowned Somali poet Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame “Hadraawi”. The Somali Horn of Africa is one of the few places where a poet is able to attain the cultural status elsewhere reserved for rock stars and footballers.

The festival and a new Somali Cultural Centre in Hargeysa are not simply indications of cultural tolerance and vibrancy. In the eyes of many Somalilanders and visitors their success is representative of the dynamic and stable political environment in Somaliland.

There is a strong temptation to
romanticise Somaliland’s stability

International perceptions of Somaliland are usually influenced by – or contrasted with – the ebbs and flows of political dysfunction in southern Somalia. Since the start of 2014, two major military offensives from AMISOM, the African Union force in Somalia, have pushed militant Islamist group al-Shabaab out of all major towns in the south. A US drone attack on September 1st killed the group’s leader, Ahmed Abdi “Godane”. These events have fuelled hope that the government in Muqdisho (Mogadishu) can consolidate its position and start to build the legitimacy its predecessors in the past two decades so sorely lacked. The political challenges remain daunting – and changeable. Military advances do not easily translate into social or political stability.

Amongst those who do retain an interest in the northern Somali Horn, there is a strong temptation to romanticise Somaliland’s stability – built, as it has been for more than two decades, on a deep popular commitment to the avoidance of violence. This narrative glosses over numerous difficulties and shortcomings. Somaliland’s relative success is not unalloyed. Politics is as riven by clan patronage and division as it has ever been. Major challenges lie ahead in registering voters, holding parliamentary and presidential elections, and determining an electoral system for the upper house or Guurti. Women and minority groups are excluded from most formal political participation apart from voting, and some Somalilanders are growing increasingly disillusioned with a secessionist “project” that remains incomplete and fragile.

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Democracy, a messy business

No society can sustain the high hopes of those who prefer to see only the positive. One of the key failings of many observers, both Somali and foreign, has been a cavalier willingness to adopt rhetoric that embraces only those aspects of Somali history and culture that either add conveniently to a narrative of unique success and stability, or are seemingly evidence of the binary opposite – chaos and disorder. If we are to offer effective support to Somalis committed to building a reasonably inclusive and prosperous future in the Horn, it is vital that we recognise both the challenges and the foundations on which such success is built.

No society can sustain the high hopes of
those who prefer to see only the positive

Politics is always a messy business, but it remains essential despite its persistent failure to satisfy idealistic – or simply unrealistic – yearnings. Building on success tends to be slow, painstaking, erratic and unpredictable. Of these characteristics, only the last two are applicable to the charged dynamism and breakneck speed of political change in southern Somalia. In Somaliland’s case, there is a tendency to depict the territory’s political trajectory as having started in earnest in 1991. This reading takes the fall of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s government in Muqdisho as the starting point, with that regime’s egregious abuse of human rights, and most particularly the wholesale destruction of Somaliland’s two biggest cities, as the prima facie justification for the unilateral restoration of the sovereignty that Somaliland enjoyed for five days in 1960.

While each of these facts about Somaliland is correct, and the brutality of the Siyaad Barre regime genuinely horrific, collectively they tell only half the story. Importantly, selective and simplistic historicising does not fundamentally challenge one of the key tropes used to describe Somali political development: that of a people “addicted to congenital egalitarian anarchy”.¹ In leaving that presumption somehow unchallenged, Somaliland is presented as exceptional rather than as the latest example of Somali political stability grounded in compromise, conflict and accommodation in the context of a complex set of socio-cultural institutions.

For adherents to this incomplete narrative, Somaliland is remarkable as the first Somali territory to establish a state that is widely accepted as providing, in principle and practice, approximately legitimate democratic government evidenced, in particular, by periodic and largely successful elections. Conversely, sceptics castigate the territory for failing to meet the exacting standards of the perfectly representative state. Dissatisfaction amongst some regarding its legitimacy is advanced as proof of the argument.

Somaliland’s progress has been impressive in many ways. Successive governments in Hargeysa have had to build legitimacy through a series of clan-based conferences held since late 1990. Those governments gradually consolidated their hold on power, but remained sufficiently weak that each needed to secure the support of a substantial portion of the population in order to remain in office. Elections for local councils have been held twice (in 2002 and 2012), as has a popular vote for the president (in 2003 and 2010) and for parliamentary seats (in 2005). One of the presidential elections which resulted in defeat for the incumbent by the narrowest of margins was followed by a peaceful handover of power within the constitutionally stipulated timeframe.²

There were snags with some of these elections. The local council election in 2012, for example, was accompanied by widespread multiple and underage voting.³ But each achieved the objective of providing a mechanism for political contestation in an environment that was largely peaceful. That is a major achievement by any standard. The shortcoming of the exceptionalist narrative is not that Somaliland’s progress is disputed. It lies in misapprehensions about the political process itself and the common inclination to equate the term “democratisation” with elections.

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Transition, not exceptionalism

Somali society is conspicuously democratic. Adult Somali males are used to a consensus-based system that allows them full participation in decision-making on all key issues. That system is both highly inclusive – for men – and slow and cumbersome. It is not dissimilar to the type of discursive democracy practised in the city states of ancient Athens. While this form of political participation is rightly criticised for excluding women, and for being crisis driven – it takes a crisis to get everyone together and focused on the problem at hand – it cannot reasonably be described as undemocratic. Unless, of course, our definition of democracy is so idealised as to apply only when all problems of exclusion have first been resolved.

Somaliland’s laudable success is
not one of democratisation at all

In fact, Somaliland’s laudable success is not one of democratisation at all. It is one in which most adult males are being asked to relinquish some of their traditional right to participate in decision-making to allow for a system of representation that permits greater responsiveness and speed, while also holding out the possibility of meaningful inclusion of women and of clan groups who have customarily been excluded. This process is not unnecessary or undesirable. If Somalis are to operate effectively in a globally connected world of nation states, multinational corporations and powerful international lobbies and agencies, they need a system of representative politics that confers the agility and strength to negotiate and participate effectively. If the benefits of engagement with the institutions and representatives of international trade and finance are to be shared reasonably equitably, then it is also vital that inclusive politics provides opportunities for Somali citizens to select their representatives – and remove those who are ineffective.

While elections are therefore instrumentally important, so is an understanding of the established, discursive system of democracy. This helps to explain why it has been very hard to find a way for Somali women, so vigorously active in business and all other spheres of Somali life, to participate fully in politics. It also explains why Somalilanders, no less than other Somalis, are quick to become disillusioned with their politicians. People whom they would once have called to account frequently are now installed in office for five years at a time – or longer when inevitable electoral extensions occur.

In one of the key Somaliland peace conferences – that held in Booraame (Borama) town in 1993 – the chair was noted for urging delegates that “voting is fighting; let’s opt for consensus”.⁴ For many Somalis, consensus-based politics remains the baseline that informs often unspoken understandings of the ideal nature of democracy. It is unsurprising that the representative politics of the nation state – internationally recognised or not – frequently falls far short of that standard.

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A history of Somali state-building

A highly selective application of history is also deployed by sceptics to justify the view that Somalis are ill equipped to operate within the confines set by a system of state. Somaliland has achieved a great deal in consolidating governmental institutions that enjoy broad, if qualified, support. Yet it is not the first successful Somali state, and it is incorrect to view Somali society as naturally inclined to anarchy or chaos.

Throughout the past millennium, the Somali Horn of Africa has had vibrant trading ports that periodically spawned or supported systems of government. By the mid-14th century, there were a number of successful and stable trading cities on the long Somali coast, marking the start of a period of at least 200 years of considerable prosperity. One account identifies at least 20 such towns on the Gulf of Aden coast and in the immediate northern hinterland alone.⁵

Several notable empires were founded on the wealth of coastal trading centres. In the north, the Walashma dynasty built the powerful and long-lived Adal Sultanate, with Seylac its commercial heart and a settlement close to Harar, in today’s eastern Ethiopia, its political centre. Although the sultanate was identified primarily as a Muslim rather than a Somali empire, there is little doubt that Somalis comprised a significant proportion of its population. The 16th-century Adal military leader Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi “Gurey” is still revered amongst many Somalis as the first great Somali nationalist.

It is incorrect to view Somali society as naturally inclined to anarchy or chaos

It is certain, despite a dearth of authoritative documentation of the period, that the Adal Sultanate enjoyed great wealth and considerable territorial control for at least three centuries. Initially it lived at peace with its highland Ethiopian neighbours, with whom it enjoyed extensive trading links, but the relationship grew tense as both sides developed aggressive territorial ambitions. A long period of intermittent trade links and conflict saw huge territorial fluctuations as the Adal Sultanate seized or lost ground to successive highland rulers. Only when the Ethiopian emperor Galawdewos secured the support of the Portuguese, as “fellow Christians”, against Ahmed Gury, who received some backing from the Ottoman empire in what was explicitly framed by both sides as a struggle between Islamic and Christian armies, did the balance of power alter decisively. The Adal forces were roundly defeated on the shores of Lake Tana in 1542, forcing the sultanate into a period of terminal decline.

The Adal Sultanate was one of the most famous of early Somali states, but by no means the only one. The Ajuuraan and Geledi Sultanates in southern Somalia are other prominent examples of distinctively or predominantly Somali governance enduring over long periods of time.

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Somaliland, a Somali nation state

Somaliland enjoys neither the territorial expanse nor the longevity of most of the earlier Somali states. Its uniqueness therefore lies not in its novelty as a resilient Somali state, nor in its democracy, but in its success in building a durable and broadly representative system of government within the borders of a contemporary nation state.

During the colonial era in the 20th century, Somali “states” did not allow the involvement of Somalis in governance. Colonial territories could not by any stretch be described as Somali nation states. The representative democracy ushered in by independence in 1960 and the exuberance of reunification of the British Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia Italiana was lively and vital. It was also chaotic and riven by clan division and dispute. The first attempted coup occurred 18 months later. A mere nine years on, Siyaad Barre’s coup was greeted with relief by a population already disillusioned by the winner-takes-all nature of elections and representative politics.

Siyaad Barre’s government began with a surge of reforming zeal. Clans were symbolically abolished and women were encouraged to play a full part in politics. Again, dissatisfaction followed in short order and, in an effort to retain power, the general was forced to exploit the very clan affiliations he had denounced. Desperate to keep his government in place, in 1977–8 he used a war against Ethiopia to rally his population. Defeat left him with few other options, and he steadily lost power even as he resorted to increasingly brutal repression in an effort to retain it. The insurrection that finally ended his rule started not in Somaliland, but amongst the Majerteen of what is now Puntland.

This series of events underscores the point that while Somaliland is not the first successful Somali state, and did not introduce democratisation to the region, it is the first successfully to combine electoral democracy with nation state government. That is no mean feat, albeit neither the unqualified success nor unacceptable imposition of centralised and clan-based hegemony that are the dichotomous opposites frequently suggested by observers.

The establishment of any nation state is inevitably accompanied by debate and dissatisfaction over critical issues such as citizenship. Not all who reside within a state’s borders will be happy to be regarded as citizens. In some areas of what was once British Somaliland, particularly the easternmost, a significant proportion of the population is emphatically unwilling to be classified as Somaliland citizens. This is certainly not a trivial objection, and it remains to be seen how it will be resolved. But it barely detracts from the importance of Somaliland’s success in other respects.

Often derided by critics as a one-clan state, Somaliland is in fact far from that. Although dominated by the large Isaaq clan, this is a clan grouping rather than a single, united lineage. The socio-political system requires support from a number of non-Isaaq clans: for example to bolster constituencies within the divided Isaaq group. Indeed, it was when the Isaaq clans started fighting each other in the early 1990s, once the unifying spectre of the Muqdisho autocracy had vanished, that many other clans gained confidence that Somaliland would not turn out to be an Isaaq hegemony.

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Federalism, autonomy and the prospects for representative transition

If Somaliland’s transition is not one of democratisation, then, but of progression from a patriarchal, discursive democracy to a more inclusive, representative one, that is a transition which could usefully be replicated elsewhere in the region. It is precisely what is currently being negotiated in Puntland, albeit with less success to date. Southern Somalis too are being urged in a similar direction by a heavily invested group of international donors, diplomats and major NGOs.

There is little hope that Puntland will achieve a planned return to electoral politics, following the cancellation of its first popular election – for local council representatives – in mid-2013, unless there is a greater understanding of precisely the transition that is required. There is even less prospect that the ambitious roadmap for the south, which anticipates a constitutional referendum in 2015 followed by full elections in 2016, will succeed in the absence of a more nuanced understanding.

“Federalism” means so many wildly divergent
things to Somalis and non-Somalis alike that it is in effect a meaningless term

Many Somali observers have for years been calling for a return to the sort of local peace-building that worked so well in Somaliland. That process does not necessarily need to replace completely the Muqdisho-centred efforts that have dominated for some time. But the ejection of al-Shabaab from most southern Somali towns and villages provides a real opportunity to transfer some of the ample investment in top-down federal reconstruction to a more localised reconciliation process that allows Somalis throughout Somalia to make the critical decisions about their political future. If the rhetoric from donors about providing support for “Somali-led solutions” is to carry any meaning, it is in precisely this kind of shift.

The difficulty is that this approach will be slow and the results unpredictable – as has been the case in Somaliland. However, without the kinds of local agreements generated by such a process, there is little hope that the always heated and often hysterical debates on federalism and elections will lead to the establishment of durable political systems.

“Federalism” means so many wildly divergent things to Somalis and non-Somalis alike that it is in effect a meaningless term. Puntland’s leaders argue for a version that accords so much autonomy to the constituent parts of the Somali state they hope even Somaliland might be tempted back into the fold.⁶ Their federal Somalia would look more like a multi-state free trade zone than a single nation. President Hassan Sheikh, meanwhile, has modified his centralising inclinations only slightly, still preferring a far stronger Muqdisho government than many outside the capital are willing to countenance.

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Future Somaliland

If it is to be peaceable and to consolidate progress, Somaliland’s own future will require agreement on some deeply contentious issues. Parliamentary elections are five years late, and now scheduled to be held in the middle of 2015 – at which stage a presidential election is also due. Before any elections can take place, a much delayed process of registering voters must be completed in tandem with a civil registration. The last attempt at voter registration, in 2008-9, was so deeply divisive that it brought the country to the brink of conflict.⁷

If we bear in mind the transition that Somaliland is making, it is not surprising that it has proved extremely difficult to count voters. The last Somali census was conducted in the final years of Siyaad Barre’s regime, and so threatened to upset the balance of clan power that the results were never released. The Somaliland count carried the same risk of endangering established agreements on clan representation, and it is inevitable that a new effort at registration will be fraught with similar dangers. It is possible that the experience of the 2012 local elections – which prompted widespread recognition that the lack of an electoral register was a key factor in enabling multiple voting on a massive scale – has focused minds in a way that will permit the exercise to be conducted without provoking a crisis this time round. But caution, patience and sensitivity aplenty will be required.

Somaliland’s own future will require agreement on some deeply contentious issues

The situation in the east of Somaliland also seems to be heading steadily towards some sort of denouement. In the areas around Buuhoodle town and throughout most of Sool region, the competition between Somaliland, Puntland and the nascent, Dhulbahante-based regional state, Khaatumo, is becoming increasingly intense. To date, a systematised ambiguity has operated in which each of the interested parties has simultaneously laid claim to the area and operated more or less as though that claim had substance. It is not inconceivable that this ambiguity could be maintained, but it seems less and less likely. For one thing, there are hopes that commercial quantities of oil will be found in the Nugaal Valley, which runs through Sool. Everyone wants to lay unambiguous claim to that.

It is imperative that those wishing to support continued political development in Somaliland and throughout the region take full cognisance of looming threats as well as past successes. An appreciation of the historical and cultural context in which recent political development has occurred is equally essential. This, of course, applies just as much to non-Somalis in diplomatic, donor and development communities as it does to diaspora Somalis and those in the Somali Horn.

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NOTES

1 Samatar, Said S., “Genius as Madness: King Tewodros of Ethiopia and Sayyid Muhammad of Somalia in Comparative Perspective”, Northeast African Studies 10, No. 3 (2003), p. 29.

2 Walls, M. and Kibble, S., “Somaliland: Change and Continuity”, Report by International Election Observers on the June 2010 presidential elections in Somaliland, Progressio, London, 2011.

3 Kibble, S. and Walls, M., “Swerves on the Road”, Report by International Election Observers on the 2012 local elections in Somaliland, Progressio, London, 2013.

4 Walls, M., A Somali Nation-State: History, Culture and Somaliland’s Political Transition, Ponte Invisibile/ redsea-online.com, Pisa, 2014, p. 178.

5 Lewis, I.M., A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, James Currey, Oxford, 4th edition, 2002, p.27.

6 Ali, Abdiweli M., “Solidifying the Somali State: Puntland’s Position and Key Priorities”, talk at Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs), London, 24 October 2014.

7 Farah, Mohamed, “A Constitutional Solution to the Political Crisis in Somaliland”, unpublished paper, Academy for Peace and Development, Hargeysa, 2009.

 

Recording of launch event

The post Statebuilding in the Somali Horn – Michael Walls appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Michael emphasised that his perspective of Somaliland was that of an academic and outsider, striving to be objective and to place contemporary politics in its proper historical and cultural context. The importance of understanding Somali culture and the history of the Horn of Africa was thus quickly established as a central theme of the evening’s discussion.

Disagreeing with Somali scholar Said Samatar’s pronouncement that Somalis are “addicted to congenital egalitarian anarchy”, Michael instead described Somali society as deeply democratic, albeit in a form which may not be immediately familiar to outsiders. Somali governance has historically been grounded in consensus, with adult males eligible to participate in decision-making on all key issues. Over the past two decades, Somaliland has also taken steps towards representative democracy, establishing a House of Representatives and electing local councillors. The country’s transition is less one of democratisation than from a primarily discursive form of democracy to a more representative form. This shift might be perceived as representing a diminution of democracy, as adult males are called upon to cede power to a representative between elections. Once this erosion of influence is understood, it becomes clearer why elections have proved so contentious in the Somali Horn.

Somaliland is usually the subject of two conflicting narratives. One presents the Somali Horn as a region perpetually inhospitable to the development of nation states; the other romanticises Somaliland as a home-grown success story, exhibiting a unique degree of stability, with external support notably absent. Michael contests both of these accounts. Somaliland is by no means the first functional Somali state, nor should it be thought of as an isolated arrangement borne solely out of local efforts. Over the past thousand years, there have been a series of long-lived, very successful, relatively centralised Somali states – the Adal Sultanate for example. Michael also noted that Somaliland has not been entirely ignored by the international community. Instead, in a region with a history of city-states and tribal administrations, what makes Somaliland unique is the unprecedented progress it has made in establishing a bordered nation state.

Despite Somaliland’s achievements, significant challenges still remain. Tensions in the eastern districts, forthcoming elections, the Guurti and the absence of women in representative institutions all need to be addressed.  The likelihood of oil and gas discoveries in the Nugaal Valley seems to be heightening tensions.

Iqbal Jhazbhay, South Africa’s Ambassador to Eritrea, responded to Michael’s presentation. With regards to the quest for international recognition, HE Jhazbhay highlighted its importance as a disciplining and galvanising force – but also pointed out that Somaliland has failed to capitalise on opportunities, despite an arguably strong case under public international law. For example, the African National Congress (ANC) responded positively to the case for recognition when Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was South African foreign minister, but Somalilanders failed to capitalise on her support. Dlamini-Zuma is now Chair of the African Union Commission, which provides an opportunity for renewed dialogue. The importance of the formal acceptance of Somaliland by the international community should not be overstated. The ambassador was careful to stress that nation-building efforts will only be successful if they are locally-driven. Furthermore, a tacit recognition of the state of Somaliland is increasingly evident.

Questions

Q: Fred Amonya, Lyciar: Is the lesson from Somaliland that an inclusive and consultative approach to policymaking can demonstrate better results than the prescriptions of the international community?

MW is in favour of a more evolutionary approach to development in general. One of the problems with the field is that it has been “technicalised”, which explains why development professionals develop areas of expertise which are assumed to be universally applicable. Technical expertise typically overrides indigenous cultural knowledge. This relationship should be reversed, even where there is a genuine need for technical expertise, as is the case with building infrastructure.

Q: Mark Lister, Progressio: What will help Somalilander women become more active participants in a complicated and delicate political process?

MW began by stating that women play a huge role in every sector of Somali society – except for formal politics. The invisibility of women in politics is a big problem but one with a clearly identifiable cause. Uncertainty as to whether women will represent the clan of their husband or their father has continually posed a barrier to inclusion. There is no easy solution to this problem but quotas, as advocated for by women’s groups like the Nagaad Network, might help to establish formal roles for Somali women.

Q: Yacin Yusuf, Impact Minority Association: What role will clans play in the next elections?

MW responded that clan will play an important role throughout the election period and will help structure both pre- and post-results negotiations. Looking back at the 2012 elections, he thought the decision to use an open voting list was a big mistake. Having every candidate stand for themselves created an environment whereby candidates went first to their clans and second to their party for support. Resources were mobilised and voters organised along clan lines; candidates would even change party if their clan wanted them to. Closed lists, on the other hand, would have helped strengthen parties rather than further fuel clan tensions.

Amaani Hoddoon, DfE: How important is central planning to a successful Somaliland?

MW finds it difficult to see how a strong central planning government could exist in Somaliland, given past difficulties. Nation states in the Somali Horn, whatever shape they take, are likely to be darlings of free marketeers, through being home to highly deregulated markets orientated towards internal and external trade. Governments are likely to be relatively weak in this context and clans will probably continue to play a significant role in social structure, as a means of crisis management.

Audio podcast:

Videos of speaker presentations and the Q&A session:

The post Somaliland’s Democratic Transition appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Jules also discusses how participatory budgeting can help cultivate local democracy by giving groups that are normally silenced a say on the issues they face in their daily lives. However, participatory budgeting can only fulfil its potential if there is engagement, political will and an effort to educate citizens.

Jules is co-ordinator of the Society of Booklovers, a civil society organisation that has been at the forefront of the introduction and expansion of participatory budgeting in Cameroon. The organisation was one of the inspirations for our recent paper: The Booklovers, the Mayors and Citizens, which explains how participatory budgeting has developed in a country without engrained traditions of participation or public service.

The post Interview with Jules Dumas Nguebou appeared first on Africa Research Institute.